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THE
GREAT CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIES

EDITED BY
REV. HENRY W. CLARK, D.D.

ALBRECHT RITSCHL
AND HIS SCHOOL

THE GREAT
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIES

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
ALBRECHT RITSCHL

AND HIS SCHOOL

BY

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PREFACE

It would have been idle to propose doing over again what has been done so admirably by Dr. Garvie in *The Ritschlian Theology*. The plan of this volume is widely different. In working at it I have been greatly indebted to Dr. Garvie, both for advice and for the loan of valuable essays and pamphlets dealing with the Ritschlian movement. Although detailed references to his work may oftener be of the nature of dissent than of agreement, they presuppose a general silent concurrence. Not for a moment does one forget his services in clearing away a mass of ill-informed prejudice that hid the real Ritschl, and in laying down—once for all—the broad lines of interpretation.

To Prof. Peake I have been indebted for additional pamphlets. Still greater was his kindness in permitting me to work with his own copy of the *Altkatholische Kirche*, ed. 2—formerly Dr. Samuel Davidson's. My friend, Mr. J. D. Anderson, late senior student of Lancashire College, has bestowed immense time and care on my proofs; though he is not to be held responsible for their final form.

As our foremost British authority on Ritschl

put on record, a few years ago, his inability then to discover a copy of edition one of *Justification*, vol. iii., it may be well to make acknowledgment of obligations to libraries as well as to friends.

I have to thank, then, the authorities of Dr. Williams' Library for the use of their set of *Justification*, vol. i. in the second edition, vols. ii. and iii. in the first. Edinburgh University Library possesses a complete set of *Justification*, ed. ii. This also I have been able to borrow. To the library of the New College, Edinburgh, I am indebted for articles by Diestel in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*; to the library of Mansfield College, through Dr. Bartlet, for Traub's article on Ritschl's Theory of Knowledge (*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*). At the Bodleian I have been able to consult edition one of *A. K. Kirche*, and at the John Rylands Library, Manchester, Ritschl's early work on *Marcion's Gospel and Luke*.

For the present task I procured the two volumes of *Collected Papers*; also the *Life*. Every student of the latter must join in thanking Prof. Otto Ritschl for his full and careful work. With most of Ritschl's own writings, including all the larger ones, I had long been acquainted. There is one notable exception—the original text of *Justification*, vol. i. ed. 1. Not even yet have I been fortunate enough to set eyes upon it.¹ But,

¹ I observe, too late, from the British Museum Library Catalogue, that that great institution possesses a copy.

as the changes in later editions of that volume are not great, and as the English translation made from edition one is a masterpiece, it is hoped that little has been lost by working through these.

May I conclude by mentioning that I have been obliged to write under an inexorable time limit? The fact, of course, is no real apology for defects. But it is something to explain what one cannot excuse.

ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

Manchester,

November 30, 1914.

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THE THEOLOGY OF ALBRECHT RITSCHL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

It makes a difference to one's estimate of a great author from what point of view one approaches him. The present writer, in youth, when largely influenced by Hegel through the medium of Edward Caird, was attracted to Ritschl by a sense that the latter recognized the decisive place of Christ in Christian faith—a truth which seemed to slip through the meshes of Hegelian dialectic. Such a view of Ritschl is probably that of most of his British admirers. He attracts us—when he does attract—in the interests of Apologetic. Dr. Garvie has furnished a fine interpretation of the man and the movement, chiefly from this point of view; less friendly and less helpful interpretations, by other Scottish or English authors, are similarly pre-occupied. There has been an almost excessive concentration upon Ritschl's apologetic, and upon those philosophical questions at the basis of

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apologetic in dealing with which, to speak frankly, Ritschl is peculiarly weak.

It requires some boldness, however, to regard Ritschl as an apologist at all. Verbally, he repudiates the position with all his wonted controversial energy. When he is recasting his *Early Catholic Church* for its second edition (of 1857), a letter ¹ of 1855 speaks of doing "better service than all the apologists"—showing that he is determined not to be reckoned of their number. "I have no Pietistic mannerisms," he writes in 1867, "and no apologetic endeavours."² In 1875 he furnishes a certain explanation of these sallies. "Theology hitherto, from its very beginning, has been radically apologetic, *i. e.* it describes the Christian religion in terms of infra-Christian thought."³ No wonder if he adds, "An end must be made of this."

It is always useful, in forming an estimate of Ritschl's exceptional qualities, to compare the utterances of his friends and fellow-workers. Sometimes we see in a moment that we are dealing with a mere personal eccentricity. At other times, what had startled us declares itself as integral to the Ritschlian movement of thought. Now the very same tone in regard to apologetics may be observed in Schultz,⁴ in

¹ *Life*, vol. i. p. 264.

² *Ibid.*, ii. p. 44. With this we may compare the biographer's statement, p. 167.

³ *Ibid.*, ii. p. 273.

⁴ *e. g.* *Gotttheit Christi*, p. 630.

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Herrmann,¹ in Kaftan.² On the other hand, Schultz writes a book upon Apologetics and Kaftan covers the same ground in greater detail. There must be a right apologetic as well as a wrong!³

One explanation of what we think so strange would hold of Ritschl more than of the others. He is only too much the historian. There is little room for endeavouring to bring men from outside Christianity to within it if one is prepared to acquiesce in viewing Christianity as limited to "the progressive nations of the West."⁴ For, if there is one fixed limitation, why not another of a more Gnostic type? Dr. Garvie, who knows his Ritschl so well, expresses the startling opinion that Ritschl has given no view of the grounds of Christian faith. Against this one might set, as a qualifying consideration, the fact that Ritschl perpetually quotes John vii. 17: "If any man willeth to do his will," etc. If we could force Ritschl the historical positivist to answer the great question, "What must I do to be saved?" he would apparently answer on the lines of the sage who bade men be careful how they chose their parents. Kaftan chimes in with the remark that we only can become Chris-

¹ At least in *Die Religion*, u.s.w., 1879; e. g. pp. 271, 327. For a later statement by Herrmann, compare *infra*, chap. ix.

² e. g. *Wesen*, pp. 355, 478, 485, 486 (ed. 2).

³ For a similar ambiguity in regard to the adjective "dogmatic," see Note A in Appendix.

⁴ *Justification*, iii. § 22, especially in ed. 1.

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tians if we have lived from youth under Christian norms.¹ Yet one may persist in believing that dead souls hear the voice of the Son of God, and, hearing Him, live. There *is* an apologetic task ! And the Ritschlians are not so indifferent to it as their words profess. For one's own part, one would thankfully spend one's whole life till one was spent out, for the privilege of removing a single obstacle from the path of hearts that are seeking God.

We have already had occasion to refer to the company of Ritschl's disciples and fellow-workers. Like so great a thing as Protestantism—like so small a thing as Plymouth Brethrenism—Ritschlianism, if in a less degree, had several places or sources of origin. And, apart from those of Ritschl's own household,² we observe similar movements in more orthodox Lutheranism. A generation ago this was true of Martin Kähler, whom Herrmann treated in 1886 as having learned from Ritschl, but to whom he offered handsome tribute and full apology in the preface to edition two of the same work³—Kähler, who, though little in sympathy with Ritschl's results, prevented the formulating of a hostile resolution at a meeting of orthodox theologians in 1882.⁴ It is a matter of some interest that one of the best German studies of Ritschlianism,

¹ *Wesen*, p. 440.

² See below, chap. ix.

³ Ed. 2 of *Verkehr*, 1892; see chap. ix. *infra*.

⁴ Ritschl's *Life*, vol. ii. p. 403.

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Ecke's,¹ emanates from the school of Kähler and is dedicated to him. More recent movements, like the Modern Positive Theology of R. Seeberg and Theodore Kaftan's Modern Theology of the Old Faith, are a similar orthodox counterpart to Ritschlianism.

All these more orthodox parallels will agree in considering Ritschl's starting point attractive, while criticizing his conclusions. It is Ecke's hope that in time, from Ritschl's initiative, a body of men may work their way to results much nearer the Church's hereditary creed. One may venture to say that Dr. Garvie's admirable study of *The Ritschlian Theology* occupies a similar standpoint. It is a perfectly defensible standpoint. And we must agree that Ritschl at times proposes to retrench valuable portions of our Christian heritage. But there is another side to the matter. We turn to the Ritschlians as apologists. We wish their help in restating Christianity for the modern world; and we can easily see that the enterprise has been undertaken in more serious and systematic fashion by them than by any of ourselves. In practical influence, the religious teachers and apologists of our land have done splendid service. But theory may seem to have been neglected. As usual, we have been living from hand to mouth;

¹ Not to be confused with the Ritschlian S. Eck who contributes to the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*.

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not to use the severer formula which describes us as "muddling through somehow." Accordingly, if our apologetic task is to be worthily discharged, we must face in a more earnest spirit than heretofore the duty of doctrinal restatement. For apologetic ends, among others, we must drop the false and the superfluous, while giving louder emphasis to the true.

If Ritschl the apologist—for so we dare to call him—is largely the man in revolt against Hegel, Ritschl the historian is directly and manifestly the man in revolt against Baur. On this field Ritschl won his first laurels when he wrote on the *Early Catholic Church*, in the first edition (1850) as a semi-Baurian, but in the second edition (1857) as one wholly estranged or emancipated. In working at the historical volume (1870, ed. 1 of vol. i) of his monograph on *Justification*, he again encountered Baur's methods as displayed in his *History of the Doctrine of Atonement*; and again Ritschl expresses emphatic distrust. Baur's Hegelian apparatus seemed to have determined the sweep of the development before the evidence had even been heard. It was dangerous *a priori* theorizing. Modern philosophy knew what Christianity was about, better than Christianity itself had ever known! Ritschl will rectify matters. For an imaginary New Testament made in Tübingen he is to give us the real New Testament, made in Palestine or neighbouring lands by the hand of God Himself. For the

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contortions of a disguised philosophy—talking about religion, but meaning metaphysic and theory of knowledge all the time—he is to give us the real facts and forces which have determined the real history of Christian thought.

If he had been temporarily seduced by Baur's ✓ excessive *a priorism*, he will take his revenge in an extreme empiricism. Facts are to settle everything. The Holy Roman Empire erected a Christian community—that of the State—independent of the Church centralized at Rome. It was accordingly possible for the Reformation to begin in Germany—nowhere else! The Reforming States maintained their Christian standing by adhering to the old persecuting edicts of the Empire. It is rather pleasant to Ritschl, as verifying this theory, to watch Servetus and a few other luckless heretics being done to death by Protestantism. Compulsory Trinitarian orthodoxy, at a discreet distance of time, possesses high historical value. The counterpart of this is, the impossibility of Protestantism winning any triumph in Italy. There the choice was, Romanism on the one side, and on the other a revolutionary Socinianism ignorant of the very meaning of the Church. Still more startling is it to read in the *History of Pietism*¹ that, if Loyola's reform had antedated Luther's, Protestantism must have been still-born. Ritschl is a strongly convinced

¹ i. p. 468.

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Protestant. Did ever strong conviction put the "force of truth" at a lower figure?

If possible, a still more bizarre specimen of this style of writing history is found in a remark quoted in the biography¹—that Alsace, after its reconquest from France, had to be "rationalistic," because "Rationalism was the last stage in German culture which Alsace knew" before the French overran it. Perhaps in this last sally Ritschl is not fully in earnest; yet he must have meant something by it. Such handling of history may be far removed from Baur's type of schematism. Is it not in itself pretty far removed from right reason? While the *a priori* mind sees its favourite theories monotonously verified in every direction, the *a posteriori* mind unearths picturesque neglected facts, and declares that they account for everything. They may be facts; they may account for something; but, unless you can measure the amount of their influence in accordance with some rational scale, we are still at the mercy of subjectivity, and favouritism is unchecked.

A change of air is often a wholesome thing. If Ritschl is far from being immune from prejudice, his prejudices differ from ours, and it may do us good to breathe his atmosphere. He has a taste for paradox and for inverting accepted estimates. Protestantism is not more but less individualist than Romanism. The

¹ ii. pp. 128-9.

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former is content with the common salvation; the typical Romanist devotee is in an ecstasy of private fellowship with God or Christ or Mary or some saint or with the Sacred Heart; he piles up the largest possible store of personal supererogatory merits. Lutheranism is not nearer Rome than Calvinism but further off, because it has less inclination towards an external legal discipline. *Per contra*, Calvinism gives more scope for Church life and so is less exposed than Lutheranism to certain religious infirmities. Have the unwelcome phenomena appeared in British Calvinism? They "connect themselves with other points of doctrine and with special historical occasions."¹ Here, one thinks, the bankruptcy of Ritschl's historical method is publicly announced. His fashion of studying history affords no little scope for what might be termed window-dressing. The goods to be displayed are supplied, we will suppose, by historic fact; but different clever fellows can arrange them in different ways, so as to produce very different effects. Yet some of Ritschl's "scores" are well earned. That may be the case when he teaches the high Lutherans how largely Melancthon, whose sacramental views they dread, started the exaggerated reverence for doctrine which characterizes Lutheran Protestantism.

Much of Ritschl's most important historical

¹ *Justification*, vol. i. (E. T.), p. 289; in a footnote which subsequent editions omit *simpliciter*.

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work is done as a Biblical scholar. In this region he is still in recoil from Baur and Hegel. Hegel Hellenized everything; Ritschl sees no Hellenism anywhere in primitive Christianity. Baur saw hopelessly estranged factions in the primitive Church; Ritschl sees a far-reaching doctrinal agreement, a deep underlying spiritual unity. So, too, when he writes volume two of *Justification*, Ritschl asks us to bring the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul nearer together than we had supposed possible. We are to go back once more to the New Testament and we are to realize how largely it constitutes a unity. Ritschl builds up a great theology upon the doctrine of the Kingdom of God, ethically interpreted; and he has no doubt that such ethical thoughts are the true historical meaning of Jesus' words. Many orthodox writers of distinction have used the Kingdom doctrine in Christian Ethics; Ritschl declines to thrust it on one side; it must rule Dogmatic. At the same time, he hopes to be not less fully loyal to the Pauline gospel of reconciliation. If the two cannot merge, they are embraced in a close enough synthesis. Our theology must be an ellipse with two foci¹—duty and reconciliation; morality and religion; Church and Kingdom of God.

Again, Ritschl's Biblical work presupposes

¹ *Rechtfertigung*, iii. (ed. 1), p. 6; edd. 2 and 3 and E. T. p. 11.

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pretty conservative critical findings, and rather unusual exegesis. This is one means of establishing harmony in the world of Biblical thought. And yet a comrade of Ritschl's, Hermann Schultz, reaches similar results with a less expenditure of exegetical violence. Ritschl—perhaps rightly—interprets the Johannean prologue out of the Old Testament, notably out of Exod. xxxiv. 6.¹ The personal characteristics of God most High are the personal characteristics of the incarnate Word of God, Jesus Christ. Schultz finds any attempt to explain the Logos references exclusively out of the Old Testament “geschmacklos.”² Again, Ritschl, early and late, interprets the pre-existence passages of Colossians and their parallels as affirming that the world was made not by but *for the sake of* Christ, who is its end or aim (as Head of the redeemed). Schultz, not seriously if at all differing from Ritschl in result, recognizes St. Paul's divergence.

We have already crossed the line which separates Ritschl as a Biblical scholar from Ritschl as a Dogmatic theologian. It is right that we should realize what high importance he claims and merits in the region of doctrine proper. His system was given to the world not as a new apologetic but as a new reading of Protestant and more particularly of Lutheran

¹ The O. T. furnishes not merely “grace and truth,” but “full of grace and truth.”

² *Gottheit Christi*, p. 365; compare pp. 361–368.

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theology. Such was Ritschl's estimate of his own work; and so too, one gathers, his son and biographer prefers to conceive it even now. At this point we must contrast Ritschl not with Hegel or Baur but rather with Schleiermacher. He has been considered ungracious in his attitude towards his great predecessor. Certainly he is plenteous in criticism; but he makes considerable if guarded acknowledgments of indebtedness, while assuring correspondents, half pathetically and half testily, that Schleiermacher's method in Dogmatic is repugnant to him.¹ It must be in a different sense that he elsewhere admits having learned his method in theology partly from Schleiermacher and partly from Schneckenburger.²

In Ritschl's opinion, Schleiermacher as a Dogmatist stood condemned at the bar of history. He had founded no school. His artificial or at best purely personal synthesis³ fell to pieces as soon as his thought passed into other minds. Obviously, Schleiermacher was to a very limited extent a biblical theologian. Philosophical prejudices swayed him hardly less than they did the Hegelians. Substantially, indeed, Schleiermacher and Hegel were tolerably near

¹ *Life*, vol. ii. p. 149.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 244; quoting *Theol. und Metaph.*; see *infra*, chap. vii.

³ *Rechtfertigung*, i. pp. 486, 541 (edd. 2 and 3); E. T. (of ed. 1), pp. 441, 495.

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each other in philosophical result if far enough apart in process. Again, Schleiermacher lacked Ritschl's great knowledge of the history of theology. He boldly manipulated church doctrines, making them mean what he pleased. There are aspects in which Ritschl seems hardly less subjective; but his knowledge was fuller. He is entitled, therefore, to show something of the impatience which the trained expert feels for the best of amateurs. He does *not* call us "Back to Schleiermacher." He would rather say of him what T. H. Green said of Hegel's work: "It must all be done over again."

Ritschl does, however, call us "Back to the Reformers." In *Justification*, vol. i, he seems to have little but criticism for Luther. That is part of his campaign against the High Church ultras of Lutheranism, who were determined that their great man should be spotless and every other Reformer infinitely less. When free from this preoccupation, Ritschl tells us¹ that the principles of genuine Lutheranism "are spreading over the whole field of German Protestantism." And, when we study other representatives of the movement, we learn that this estimate of Luther is a true mark of the school.² One may add that

¹ In a review article of 1855; *Life*, i. p. 378. Comp. preface to *Pietism*, vol. iii.

² Compare what is said in chap. ix. regarding Schultz and Herrmann. One may also compare McLeod Campbell's use of Luther in his *Nature of the Atonement*.

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Ritschl goes back to the Reformers' doctrine of the free grace of God clean over the head of Schleiermacher. Definitely, then, Ritschlianism is a Protestant, a very Protestant, theology. It appeals to the spirit rather than the letter, but is to give us a distillate of the genuine Luther. When Ritschl lectured on Comparative *Symbolik*, he ignored Eastern Catholicism and the smaller Protestant sects, vindicated the Union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches of Prussia, and looked forward hopefully to union with Rome when the Church of Rome had risen to the spiritual level of Protestantism. This is wholesome frankness. It may help to counterpoise not merely Ultramontaniam, but the provinciality of the average Anglican mind.

Such, then, is Ritschl's claim. Is it not of interest that the whole Protestant world should be stirred by a theology built neither on the lines of radicalism nor on those of reaction, but seeking to go back to the Bible and to Luther's best teaching, while employing for the exposition and defence of old principles all the resources of modern knowledge? An age like ours must not neglect a man or a school making such promises.

We have again been overlapping a division of this preliminary sketch that still lies in front of us. It is time now to note, with special care, that Ritschl is no mere reactionary. He does not bid us simply go back to the Bible or to Luther; we are to go on to a full and vigorous

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scientific system. It was not the business of the New Testament to produce systems. The most connected bodies of thought it contains are occasional writings, shaped by the emergencies of a far-off age. Nor was doctrine proper the business of Luther and his comrades. Ritschl's historical volume strongly insists on this point. So far as the Reformers had to construct a system, they did it hurriedly, half blindly, less than half successfully. The individual Christian in those days could get to heaven without dogmatic theology. He can do so still to-day. But the Church has always needed systems of thought, and needs them more than ever now.

What, then, is the right system? Ritschl believes that he himself has sketched it. In that belief we find one explanation of the peculiar hardness of his tone. We are all thoroughly accustomed to the accents of theological bigotry. There are many who tell us that only one creed can save. They claim to be monopolists of the truth and grace of our holy God. Ritschl's claim is different. He thinks of himself, among all Protestant Christians—and that means among all Christians of the first rank—as the man who scientifically is in the right. Hence he regards with supercilious contempt those who repel his theological claims. At the moment, as he wields his bludgeon, his back is to the wall and his enemies are clamouring for his death. But there

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is reason to suspect that he will go on fighting for victory till he has knocked down every rival. One wishes self-confident minds would lay to heart the golden words of Louis Stevenson: "We have all a sufficient assurance that, whoever may be in the wrong, we ourselves are not completely in the right."

Another impression regarding Ritschl may be named as at least half true yet very little recognized—his resemblance to the old High and Dry school of Anglicanism. Truly he is not a High-churchman as we know the breed in this country. He is thoroughly Protestant both in his doctrines and in his theory of the Church. Loyal as he is to sacraments, he regards them—with a possible passing wavering¹—purely as reiterating that message of the Gospel which faith welcomes to the saving of the soul. Yet he is a Churchman, and in his own way extremely High. The doctrine of the community, which he learned from one of Schleiermacher's early writings, counted for more and more with him the longer he worked at theology. In later life, he speaks² of the Kingdom of God and the doctrine of our sonship as the two great Christian revelations, omitted by all creeds, but central to the Lord's Prayer. *Justification* (i),³ however, mentions as

¹ In the third version of his class lectures on Dogmatics; compare *Life*, i. p. 392.

² *Life*, ii. p. 251.

³ Ed. 1 (E. T.), p. 158. Omitted apparently in later editions. Ritschl greatly disliked the conventionally ac-

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the two real principles of Protestantism individual assurance of salvation and the thought of the Church.

As a result, Methodists, Baptists and all Free-churchmen are in Ritschl's black books. The summary of his lectures on Theological Ethics—second version—records his ill will towards the Evangelical Alliance. Along with this goes something of the old-fashioned Highchurchman's aversion to enthusiasm as "a very horrid thing."¹ He dislikes revivalism. He distrusts all conscious efforts after increased "holiness." Voluntary societies for religious fellowship, which have played so great a part in most ages of the Christian Church, are to him almost wholly evil. They were bad and anti-social in mediæval Monasticism; they are bad and anti-social to-day. Above all, they are un-Protestant! This view comes up in book after book, until it solidifies into the three thick volumes of his *History of Pietism*.

One asks whether this is part of the Ritschlian ethos, or a mere eccentricity of the man? I am bound to record that there is much of it in Herrmann. We cannot therefore write it off as a mere aberration. Nor would most of us refuse it a measure of sympathy. Of machine-made

cepted "formal" and "material" principles of Protestantism. In collaboration with Kattenbusch he published (1876) a review article—included among the 1893 reprints—showing how recent and how empty the formula is.

¹ Bp. Butler's phrase to John Wesley.

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revivals, God knows, Great Britain has seen too much. And, when little groups of pious people thank God they are not like other men—who has not winced under such un-Christlike Christianity? There is much to be said on behalf of the Kingdom-of-God theology, and of the anti-Pietist view of the Christian life.

So didst thou travel on life's common way
In cheerful godliness; and yet thy heart
The lowliest duties on herself did lay.

But is there no place in God's great kingdom for imperfect practical Christianity—such a place as we have already demanded for imperfect Platonizing philosophies? I think one can be a Christian—and a Platonist. I should be surprised if one cannot be a Christian—and a Methodist. Are Ritschl and Herrmann certain that, when they are rooting up tares, they do not root up wheat as well? An excellent case might be made out for the very opposite view, that the *Landeskirche* maintains useful machinery—the skeleton or dry bones of Christianity—but that the breath of life comes from restless and dangerous souls who innovate. If old High-and-Dry had ever flourished unchecked, Christianity might have died out. As one element, even the Dry Church may do service. We have to learn that Christ haunts strange places. We may meet Him amid what Protestants must consider the dark and guilty superstitions of St.

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Peter's at Rome. We may meet Him in the thoughts of honest arid inquirers.

Is it Halle, Weimar, Cassel, Frankfort
Or Göttingen, I have to thank for 't?
It may be Göttingen, most likely !

But pray do not let us leave out the little Bethel, or "the fat weary woman," or "the tall yellow man, like the penitent thief, with his head bound up in a handkerchief," or the final charms of

Hephzibah tune,
The last five verses of the third section
Of the seventeenth hymn of Whitefield's collection,
To conclude with the Doxology.

Where two or three are gathered together in His name, there is CHRIST.

It may perhaps be fitting to say something about the personality of Albrecht Ritschl. In his presence, one feels oneself in the grasp of a powerful and unusual mind. Sometimes it presents itself to our thought as perverse. One hardly knows whether Ritschl exhibits the most valuable of intellectual qualities, originality, or the least valuable—eccentricity. Probably the truth lies midway. In any case, he startles us and forces us to think. If to us he seems strangely exotic, that may make him all the more helpful in our case. He is "a great master of gibes and flouts and jeers." Apparently he recognized a danger in this direction. Before printing a review article soon after the death of Baur, he asked Weizsäcker, the editor of the review,

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whether he had said anything unduly strong; but Weizsäcker reassured him, and passed his work as it stood. During the first publication of his *magnum opus*, the *Justification*, he “allowed himself to be persuaded” by his Göttingen colleague, L. Duncker,¹ to soften many severe utterances. And, in discharging the thankless task of collating successive editions, I have observed that not a few of the sharper utterances get eliminated. This development is normal. There are partial signs of mellowing. Yet how much remains uncanceled which one cannot read without indignation! Perhaps the worst passage of all occurs in *Justification*, vol. iii,² *à propos* to the High Church zeal displayed against him by Lutheran censors: “I have always counted what Christ says at Matt. vii. 21–23 as part of the consolations of the Gospel.” The words which consoled Ritschl culminate as follows: “Then will I profess to them, I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity.” The man actually proposes to gratify his partisan feelings before the judgment-seat of Christ.

Hereafter? And do you think to look
On the terrible pages of that Book
To find their failings, faults and errors?
Ah, you will then have other cares
In your own shortcomings and despairs,
In your own secret sins and terrors!

¹ Not to be confused with Ritschl's fellow-student, Max Duncker, the historian.

² Ed. 1, p. 250; ed. 2, p. 270; ed. 3, p. 275; E. T. p. 290.

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In edition three of *Justification*, vol. iii, he struck upon a new plan for minimizing offence. He would criticize those who seemed in error, but without naming them. Bishop Butler adopted a similar plan, and his thick-and-thin admirers find the plan "majestic." Possibly it is; but it certainly is a hard plan for later generations of students. George Eliot has told us how the unhappy "Merman,"¹ when he had got to cross purposes with the great "Grampus," came to be referred to in sermons as "some" or "others." I think it undesirable that scientific theology, even from the best of motives, should approximate to the mincing vagueness of a pulpit vocabulary.

Again one inquires how far this peculiarity appears in other members of the school. This time the result of our inquiry is reassuring. One does not observe such littleness or such arrogance in other leaders. Herrmann, indeed, is remorselessly keen in controversy, but Herrmann above all his comrades—Herrmann above most theologians who have ever lived—speaks on the dryest details of theology as one who is serving a present God. To adapt a formula of Augustine's, *Ego Ritsilio non crederem, nisi me Herrmanni commoveret auctoritas*. Never has one caught sight of any soul more passionately a-hungered for righteousness, nor yet of any soul more triumphantly joying in God through Jesus Christ by receiving the reconciliation. In the differences

¹ Is he Samuel Butler of *Erewhon*?

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of opinion between Ritschl and Herrmann, it is not certain that the younger man is always nearer the truth, still less that he is always (though no doubt he sometimes is) nearer to orthodoxy. But his personality is one of the most splendid assets of the theological movement to which he belongs.

We put it to the account, then, not of Ritschl's thinking but of his idiosyncrasy as a man if his chosen weapon is a club and if he seldom allows it to rest. Carlyle's critics thought he needed a great many volumes to speak the praises of silence. There never was a stranger (nor yet a more insistent) preacher of meekness, patience, humility, than Albrecht Ritschl. The marks of the "natural man" seem to be stamped upon almost every utterance. You would hardly suppose he was the disciple of One who passed through Gethsemane to Calvary.

When Ritschl's old master, Baur, finishes his survey of St. Paul, he rather startles the reader by borrowing a phrase from Paul himself for a summary: Paul was one who had "a great treasure in an earthen vessel." Even from a distinguished modern Radical this estimate seems hardly adequate to the apostle of the Gentiles, but we might venture to use it of the unclassifiable Ritschl. A great truth; an earthen vessel. The imperfect yet powerful, the powerful yet imperfect vehicle of a much-needed message.

CHAPTER II

BIOGRAPHICAL

THE family from which Ritschl sprang had for generations lived at Erfurt, where Luther studied in youth. Albrecht's grandfather was pastor of a church and "Professor" in the *Rathsgymnasium*; and at Erfurt was born (November 1, 1783) Albrecht's father, George Charles Benjamin Ritschl, who also became a Lutheran clergyman, rising to hold the position (from 1827) of "Bishop of the Evangelical¹ Church and General Superintendent of Pomerania." Albrecht, the eldest child of his father's second marriage, was born March 25, 1822, at Berlin, where his father's duty then lay. Two younger brothers did not survive infancy; there were, however, children by the first marriage. The father delivered "a beautiful address" at Albrecht's baptism, when he "astonished every one" by giving the child this name, along with one of his own—Benjamin; but the second name Albrecht Ritschl never troubled to employ. Like many men of distinction, Albrecht seems to have owed much to his mother, on whose affection he had

¹ *i. e.* Lutheran, or in this case United.

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so unique a claim. The father is described as an enemy of Rationalism and a champion of the policy which united the two Protestant confessions in a single Church-fellowship. Briefly, he stands for a sober and moderate Protestant orthodoxy. His grandson, in the biography of Albrecht, contrasts Bishop Ritschl favourably with Schleiermacher's father. Whereas the latter grew bitter towards his son during the days when he seemed drifting from Christianity, Albrecht Ritschl's father guided his child gently, and was rewarded by hearing him ultimately enunciate positions which could be greeted not merely with relief, but with gladness. Prof. Otto Ritschl goes so far as to claim that the Bishop did more than any other single influence to mould Albrecht Ritschl's final beliefs. The thesis may be exaggerated, but it is a pleasant manifestation of a grandson's pious regard.

I

From 1828 the family home was at Stettin. In 1831 Albrecht became a schoolboy. He soon learned to know every uniform; and an interest in military things accompanied him through life. Like many German families, the Ritschls were musical. As a young man of twenty-one, Albrecht is found mastering the organ; a few years later still, "though I am sufficiently child of my age to enjoy pepper and salt in my music," he criticizes what his son describes as the con-

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cealed sensuality, mixed with mysticism and pessimistic *Weltschmerz*, of Wagner's productions. No two types of personality, adds the biographer, could be more diametrically opposed than Ritschl's and Wagner's. To return to Ritschl's boyhood; he once saw Schleiermacher (anno 1831). The Ritschl family drove the great man out into the country for an airing, and the child Albrecht sat on the box seat. In this he afterwards claimed to trace a parable of his superiority to Schleiermacher as a theologian of wider outlook and fuller mastery. He learned to be fond of gymnastics, of swimming, of dancing; but skating proved difficult and was abandoned. His anxious mother did not greatly encourage exercise, and her criticism of his friendships tended to make him shy. He was confirmed at the age of sixteen, without forming very strong religious impressions.

When he finished his schooldays—as senior boy, and also pupil of greatest distinction—theology was chosen for his life task, partly (he tells us) from a boy's love for resembling his father, but still more from a “speculative impulse.” The university selected was Bonn, in the then detached area of Rhenish Prussia. At Bonn Albrecht's cousin, Friedrich Ritschl, the classical philologist, was a professor. He and his wife proved warm friends to their young cousin during his years at Bonn as student and as teacher. Another attraction for Ritschl's

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father was the presence in the theological Faculty of Karl Immanuel Nitzsch, one of the central leaders of the "mediation theology" which claimed inspiration rather than instruction from Schleiermacher, and which sought to steer midway between Rationalism and stiff orthodoxy. The most distinguished of Nitzsch's colleagues was perhaps Bleek, the Biblical scholar. But no one at Bonn exercised any great influence upon Albrecht's development.

The young man's studies are interrupted for a time by inflammation of the eyes. When he recovers, he reads Strauss's *Life of Jesus* without being greatly moved; he assures his father that Nitzsch has satisfied him of the fact that Strauss's central assumption—presumably the presence of myths in the New Testament—cannot be made good. The narrow and reactionary orthodoxy of the Hengstenberg school proved even less attractive. An exception occurred only once, under the influence of a fellow-student. Diedrich's arguments might be weak; his testimony to personal religious help was less easily waved aside. However, the pendulum soon swings back. He reads Schleiermacher's *Letters to Lücke*, and hopes soon to acquaint himself with the *Glaubenslehre*; but apparently this was postponed.

To speak of lighter matters: with some compatriots—no doubt in a narrower sense—he decked a Christmas tree in December 1840; "something

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of a rarity at Bonn.” We are told of the impression made on him by Cologne cathedral “even in its then unfinished state.” We also hear of a holiday journey into Switzerland and as far south as Milan—the only foreign travel of Ritschl’s life; unless we should reckon under this head his visit in Lord Acton’s company to Döllinger, among the Bavarian Alps, forty-one years afterwards. “Strictly speaking,” says his son, “his pleasure in travel did not last beyond his earliest student days.” When the party of 1840, seven strong, reached Baden-Baden, Albrecht was the only one who refrained from staking something at the gaming tables. Soon the party dissolved into smaller groups. It was a relief to the mother when the whole journey was over. A few months later, when Albrecht was *en route* for Halle, she had the privilege of seeing her son after an absence of eighteen months. During the same journey Albrecht, as a guest, heard Neander lecturing on the Epistle to the Romans at Berlin, but without pleasure.

The young Ritschl’s discontent with Bonn teaching had induced his father to consent to a change, such as the German university system facilitates. The choice lay between Berlin and Halle. It was no attraction to Albrecht that Berlin contained a large circle of relatives. At Halle Julius Müller, Tholuck, Erdmann seemed to him names of promise, and Halle finally was chosen. But here again neither the vigorous

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mediation theology of Müller nor the more pietistically tinged spirit of Tholuck satisfied their new listener. As for Erdmann, his conservative and theologically orthodox reading of Hegel was being challenged by the revolutionary school of the Left—Strauss, Feuerbach and (at Halle itself) Ruge. Nevertheless, in one shape or other, Hegelianism at that time enjoyed commanding influence. Young Ritschl was caught in its strong current; and, though the biographer claims that he “never completely adopted the standpoint of the Absolute Philosophy,” he grants that the study was a good because severe discipline for thought. Julius Müller’s dislike for Hegelianism lest it should involve Pantheism was intolerable to young Ritschl. Tholuck and he were at least friends, but even there friction arose.

He enjoyed Gesenius on Isaiah, finding it “impossible not to laugh at his profane wit.” Of Erdmann he speaks sometimes with gratitude, sometimes with censure. But the decisive impression was made upon him by the reading of Baur’s book on the *History of the Doctrine of Atonement*. He became more than ever Hegelian, and began to incline to historical studies. Nothing will satisfy him but a visit to Tübingen. He considers Baur “the foremost theologian of Germany,” while assuring his father that Baur, Zeller, Vatke and most of the Tübingen school are much more positive than Strauss, Feuerbach

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or Bruno Bauer. He preaches more than once in classroom at Halle. Among his student friends are Max Duncker the historian, Nasemann the philologist (a lifelong correspondent), Rogge, his old room-mate, for whom he once actually preached, and Carl Schwarz, also a theologian, whose book on *Recent Theology* Ritschl reviewed with painful consequences in 1856. The close of the Halle period is marked by his proceeding to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, when he defended six Latin Theses.¹

The next step forward was a first theological examination. The subjects prescribed included a sermon on Rom. ii. 4—a text to which Ritschl constantly turned in later life for its testimony that repentance is a consequence of grace, not its prerequisite. Rather against the grain, he spent some months in Berlin working for this examination, “without leisure to hear many lectures.” However, he made the acquaintance of Vatke, a Hegelian divine, and one of the forerunners of the Wellhausen criticism of the Old Testament.² The examination itself took

¹ How many of our university men understand the proper meaning of a “thesis” in connexion with graduation? or realize that Luther’s ninety-five theses which “shook the world” were meant as an appeal to the learned? Since writing these sentences I have met with a reference to true “theses” at Cambridge in the biography called “J.”

² His work, according to Robertson Smith (*O. T. J. C.*, ed. 1, p. 418), was “encumbered with a mass of Hegelian terminology of a repulsive kind.”

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place at Stettin, April 23, 1844, with satisfactory results; a "test sermon" on 1 Cor. i. 20-25 being pronounced "very good." Presently he had to put in six weeks of military service.

Before the visit to Tübingen was sanctioned, the father insisted on a short visit to Heidelberg. There Richard Rothe, who was at the zenith of his career, proved extraordinarily kind. Ritschl also met Ullmann, editor of the *Studien und Kritiken*, and saw something of Umbreit. But it was not long before he pushed on to what his father laughingly called "the promised land." Within a few days, through the kindness of a friend, he was personally acquainted with Zeller, Schwegler, Kuno Fischer, and not long afterwards with Baur himself. He observed the Tübingen custom—it has astonished since then successive generations of Scottish visitors—by which the young theologians pass the evening together in beerhouses.

At this early date the Tübingen theory was still in process of development. Ritschl ardently flung himself into the fray. For an academic purpose, he chose a theme belonging to the field of New Testament study, defending Schwegler's radical theory of the dependence of the canonical Luke upon Marcion's Gospel. Ritschl accordingly dated the canonical Luke between 140 and 180. The essay gave great satisfaction to Baur, who secured its purchase and publication by a Tübingen bookseller, and

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followed it up by an article from his own pen, in the Tübingen *Jahrbücher*, enforcing the same conclusions.

Thus Ritschl, when not yet twenty-four, had become an author, fighting under the banner and supported by the applause of the great radical critic. He did not, however, contemplate settling in the remote Swabian town. Halle might have pleased him, but his friends Duncker and Schwarz had met with unfriendly treatment there. Marked man though he was, friendship might smooth his way to a teacher's life at Bonn. Here accordingly he passed his examination as Licentiate in Theology (May 18, 1846), defending nine more Latin theses. The first of these asserts the priority of Marcion's Gospel to the canonical Luke; the last affirms that we ought to speak of "Theological" rather than of *Christian* "Morals"; a usage which, with a slight modification,¹ Ritschl followed to the end of life. Next came his "habilitation" as *Privat-docent*, a business which dragged on with the unfortunate result that Albrecht could not attend the celebration of his parents' silver wedding. Visits to the parents (then temporarily at Berlin), to the home at Stettin, to Halle, and to Marburg were followed by first experiences as a lecturer.

¹ "Theological *Ethics*."

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II

If one tries to take a general view of the eighteen years spent by Ritschl as lecturer or professor at Bonn, one is struck by the check in his career. The clever and precocious boy seemed to develop with comparative slowness after his first sensational hit in manhood. One cause of this might be his connexion with the suspected Tübingen school; but that cause cannot have operated alone. From very early lecturing days, indeed, he was forsaking Tübingen positions; and published work made this plain, notably in the two editions (1850, 1857) of the *Early Catholic Church*. By 1857 there was no ground for regarding Ritschl otherwise than as the representative of a moderate orthodoxy. It is the most orthodox point in his whole curve. Still, suspicion may have outlasted its grounds. One learns with surprise of a report formulated by Dorner in 1850 on behalf of the Protestant faculty of theology at Bonn, and presented to the Prussian Government. It criticized and patronized the younger man, pushing him gently back into what the authorities considered his proper place.

There were several disappointments for Ritschl in other matters besides his promotion. He had hoped for the appointment of Rothe to a vacant chair in 1847; but Dorner was preferred. Later, in 1849, Rothe came, and the numbers of the

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theological students at Bonn increased; but Rothe accepted a call back to Heidelberg (1851), and the numbers at Bonn fell off again. For a time, it would seem, Ritschl's old friend and fellow-student Krafft surpassed him in popularity as a teacher. In 1850, when a vacancy had to be filled, Krafft, not Ritschl, was chosen, and the Government informed the Bonn faculty it regretted it could not find a vacancy for Ritschl (as had been suggested) in another university. In 1852, after a further disappointment, he became *Extraordinarius*, not becoming *Ordinarius* till 1859—when he cut out Krafft.

The biographer gives a record of every course of lectures delivered by Ritschl, whether in winter or summer *Semester*, and of the numbers attending. During three and a half years (seven *Semesters*), hardly more than one-third of the attendances go into double figures; whereas in the four closing years of the Bonn period only one lecture out of twenty-five falls below ten, and it counts nine, while the average over all is above twenty-six. But there had been worse experiences. In the winter of 1849–50 Ritschl had no demand whatever for his lectures. An altered programme was equally unsuccessful; and the *Privat-docent* had to sit down in his lodgings with his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, sending a message of thanks to his mother for transmitting to him hereditary courage. It is hardly necessary to say how complete a contrast is furnished by the later Göttingen years.

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Never, not even in a Seminar,¹ do we find an attendance of fewer than ten, while classes approach and sometimes surpass a hundred; and the last years of all are the best. In those days it was Ritschl who was the "foremost theologian of Germany." He had a great door and effectual opened to him, if truly there were many adversaries.

Ritschl had qualified at Bonn as a lecturer in New Testament. Before he got to work, he felt inclinations towards Church History; but university regulations did not allow of a new branch of teaching till after two years' service, and he did not long use this liberty when it became available. In 1853, when Dorner left for Göttingen, Ritschl had opportunity to do something in Dogmatic, and his inclinations had been turning in that direction. Hence he was glad to serve the Faculty; but in a little while it came to appear that they were almost making him a "maid of all work." In the thoroughgoing German fashion, he lectures both on Dogmatics and on Theological Ethics. One feels a difficulty about the frontier between these two studies. We learn that Ritschl himself introduced into ethics teachings in regard to a Christian's patience, prayerfulness, faith in providence, which he afterwards came to feel claimed a place in Dogmatic *as well*. Göttingen arrangements led him to separate Dogmatic into two courses, and

¹ Taken in alternate years with H. Schultz.

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“Ethic,” “Dogmatic I,” “Dogmatic II” regularly recur, while the few other courses chiefly deal with New Testament Epistles. A New Testament teacher; tempted to diverge into Church History; devoting himself afterwards mainly to system; and within Dogmatic, so far as published work goes, mainly to the great doctrine of “Justification and Reconciliation”—such in outline is Ritschl’s place as professor. The biographer reports carefully on the more important Systematic courses. He tells us that, in their very first form, they contain all the characteristic Ritschlian positions, but that not nearly all foreign matter is extruded—as ultimately it will be. Ritschl as a lecturer freely enlarged his text by oral additions or corrections. Sometimes he had to secure the results for his own use in the future by copying out a student’s *Heft*. Along with this classroom work he was producing many articles in learned periodicals, leading up to the two editions of the *Early Catholic Church*, or to the even greater task of his life, the trilogy on *Justification*.

Among new friends we may mention Hilgenfeld, one of the most loyal of Baur’s followers, from whom Ritschl naturally diverged in opinion as years elapsed till the friendship faded away; H. Holtzmann and Weizsäcker, lifelong friends, although the latter, so far as the biographer reports, was never personally met; Diestel, a valued colleague and correspondent, on whom

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Ritschl relied for the Old Testament basis so important in his system. Pupils included Nippold, afterwards a very unfriendly critic; Link, loyal through life, who demonstrated that Ritschlian views could be made effective by a working pastor; Thikötter, who also trod the paths of his master's developing thought, and defended Ritschl's views in a pamphlet which, when translated into French, professed to set forth the "Théologie de l'Avenir." It is impossible not to observe the lack of eminent and brilliant pupils, such as we read of in the Göttingen period. While Ritschl's Dogmatic was only half defined, his influence had only half its power. And indeed it was by the printed page more even than from the academic platform that he made converts.

A more important and more promising friendship dated from 1856—with R. A. Lipsius, then at Leipzig, afterwards well known at Jena. When Lipsius communicated to Ritschl his postulates for Dogmatic, Ritschl "had to say to himself that he had essentially been working on the same plan." They entered on a lively correspondence. And the following year, when Lipsius visited Ritschl, they walked among the Siebengebirge "with much perspiration but still more pleasure." Unhappily this friendship was to be shipwrecked on theological differences. "Old Baur" himself (*der alte Baur*) permitted a good deal of amicable intercourse even in the face of

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hostile criticism. Ritschl was naturally proud of this. But his unfortunate anonymous review of Schwarz's book proved unpardonable, and killed the friendship outright.

We have heard of walks taken in Lipsius' company. When Thikötter was a pupil, he and Ritschl often went singing together along a certain "pretty path" not far from Bonn. And once, when Link pays a visit to Göttingen as late as 1874, there is the record of a walk taken for pleasure. But one gathers that Ritschl early yielded to that habit of neglecting exercise which reached an evil perfection when he spent holiday months at Göttingen working in his garden. The bill came in promptly. Before the end of the Bonn period, "obstinate sleeplessness" had begun.

The greatest losses of these years were the death of his father in 1858 and of his mother in 1861. Albrecht was present at the Bishop's death-bed, but not when his mother passed away. The parents had sympathized warmly in their son's professional disappointments. The careful father had had a copy of the *Early Catholic Church* (ed. 1, 1850) presented to King Friedrich Wilhelm. It made the author smile to see how splendidly the binder gilded it, after he had learned that it was meant for a great personage. When a gracious acknowledgment came, complimenting both father and son, the Bishop formally thanked his son for putting him in the way of such praise.

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Between the two sad dates fell the happy event of marriage.¹ The bride was Ida Rehbeck (or "Roebuck"), daughter of a late pastor, and sister-in-law to Pastor Edward Steitz of Frankfort-on-the-Main, who had become and who remained Ritschl's warm friend and theological confidant; vol. i. of the *Justification* is dedicated to him. A long day in the woods with Steitz and Ida made Ritschl sure of his own heart. The son prints many of his parents' love-letters. They range over all the serious themes of Ritschl's thought and teaching. When opinions differ, the lady tries gallantly to stand up for her beliefs, but she is borne down partly by argument and partly by authority. "Ritschl hated wedding journeys," so, one day after the marriage proper—the religious in contrast with the civil ceremony—they took the steamboat for Bonn. Unfortunately the day was wet, and "the crowded cabin tested their powers of endurance." It was no true omen. The marriage was thoroughly happy. All that we are shown of Ritschl as husband and father redounds to his honour. He was left a widower within ten years, but remained devoted to the beloved memory. His half-sister and, after her death, another lady-housekeeper cared for his home.

¹ There is a veiled reference to some other unsuccessful courtship (1856).

III

With his promotion to Göttingen in 1864¹ begins the last period of Ritschl's life. The university dates from the reign of our second George, who founded it as Elector of Hanover. Indeed it is named after him (German fashion) "Georgia Augusta." In 1864, political conditions in Hanover were strained.² Church politics also had a colour of their own. Coming from a "united" church into the undiluted Lutheranism of Hanover, Ritschl is required to give specific assurances of loyalty to the Lutheran faith, and does so cordially. It is a great event for him when Prussia annexes Hanover. The same minister of worship is in office—von Mühler—who in former years had seemed cold, perhaps hostile, towards Ritschl; but renewed relations proved pleasanter. Ritschl, of course, was Prussian to the core. He declares that the stiff confessional Lutheranism of many in the Hanoverian state and university is a cover for "Guelphic" hostility to the new government. A few vacancies, a few fresh appointments, and the situation

¹ Ritschl is believed to have preached for the last time in 1863. It was in a country church; the text, Rom. ii. 4.

² We have said nothing hitherto of Ritschl's relation to politics; of his mild liberalism; of his presence as a spectator at sittings of the short-lived Frankfort parliament of 1848, the year of revolutions.

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in *Georgia Augusta* changes in favour of the Prussians. It was put about in certain quarters that Ritschl had great influence with a subsequent minister of worship, Falk, Bismarck's instrument in the *Kulturkampf*; but the biographer assures us this was a delusion. He also repels the charge that Ritschl pulled strings in favour of his personal adherents, summarizing the few and slight efforts he was at any time induced to make on behalf of pupils. Quotations prove, indeed, that Ritschl was resolutely anti-partisan. He even chose an orthodox divine to prepare his eldest son for confirmation.

A still greater event than the campaign of Sadowa was the triumph over France. One regrets to find Ritschl sharing the tone of high moral superiority which was so common in Germany, and so embittering.

A series of invitations, to leave Göttingen for other universities, helps to prove Ritschl's popularity. There is, indeed, some disappointment among his friends that he is not called to a vacancy at Heidelberg. He is, however, warmly pressed to transfer himself, after the peace, to the remodelled university of Strassburg. But he declines to move; and on four separate occasions, when invited to Berlin, he rejects the offer. For he regarded himself as a "small city man." He took a similar view of Lotze, a colleague at Göttingen whom he greatly valued,

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and who exercised much influence on his thinking. When Lotze was tempted away to Berlin, Ritschl judged that he had made a serious mistake. It may have been so; certainly Lotze did not long survive his change of sphere. Later (1877) we are told how Ritschl was placed first and Pfeleiderer third on a list of names eligible for a vacancy at Tübingen. It was a time of keen controversy. The authorities thought safest to make an appointment which could not be called partisan.

The great events of this period are of course books. First came the *magnum opus*: vol. i. in 1870; vols. ii. and iii. in 1874; later editions of one or other in 1882, 1883, 1888, 1889. Shorter works dealt with *Christian Perfection* (1874; 2nd slightly revised ed. 1889); with Schleiermacher's *Reden* and their effects on German Protestantism—here the son takes a different view from his distinguished father. *Instruction in the Christian Religion* is a valuable summary for students, if an unsatisfactory school book (1875; 2nd and 3rd edd. revised 1881 and 1886; posthumous edd. of 1890 and 1895 are reprints of ed. 3). A short discussion of *Conscience* (1876) removes it from the place of honour it had held in some of Ritschl's courses of dogmatic lectures as the religious faculty proper, and treats it—under the influence of his friend Gass—as derivative, not primary. *Theologie und Metaphysik* (1881; 2nd somewhat revised ed. 1887) shows the increased

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attention to philosophical prolegomena which we also encounter in later editions of *Justification*, vol. iii.

About this time Ritschl felt it needful to concentrate upon some other great theme. He therefore devoted several years to the history of a phenomenon which he greatly disliked—*Pietism* (vol. i., 1880; vol. ii., 1884; vol. iii., 1886). He admits to a correspondent that vol. i. turned out more than he had expected an *Anklageschrift*, or speech for the prosecution. The other volumes are largely pitched in the same key. Yet the work is laborious, thorough, well documented; and the author never hesitates to praise—though he is skilled in making praise in one quarter reflect blame upon another. As with Tennyson and the *Idylls*, so with Ritschl and *Pietism*, one doubts whether engrossment in such a theme was the wisest disposal of time. The last production which we need name—the posthumous pamphlet on *Fides Implicita*—exhibits a return to Doctrine or History of Doctrine.

These busy and prosperous years at Göttingen greatly enlarged the number of Ritschl's friends. First may be mentioned Hermann Schultz, who left Göttingen just before Ritschl's arrival, but returned after some years of service at Basel and then at Strassburg to be a colleague and close intimate. Prof. Otto Ritschl, in his perfectly respectful reference to Schultz, rather underrates the amount of theological sympathy

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which bound him and Ritschl together. It is quite true that the preface to Schultz's *Gotttheit Christi* speaks of a religious sympathy which united the author not only to Ritschl but to men like Schleiermacher—whom Ritschl strongly criticizes—or like Lipsius, with whom he had broken. The difference in viewing such men is one of temperament rather than of opinion. Religious sympathy is one thing, detailed theological agreement is another. In the detail of theology, Schultz was exceptionally near to Ritschl. There is a remarkable list of distinguished pupils—among others, Bender (who developed Ritschlianism on radical lines, and gave up theology), Guthe, Robertson Smith, John S. Black, Duhm, Smend, Baethgen, Wellhausen, Bornemann, Loofs, Wrede, Baldensperger, Oskar Holtzmann, Simons, Gunkel, J. Weiss, Mirbt, Troeltsch, Bousset. Scholz, a Moravian, who became a disciple and made himself known by letters, is an interesting figure. For his benefit Ritschl softens as far as possible his wonted censures on Moravianism. Ultimately Scholz found it necessary to join the national Church. Kattenbusch and Wendt were Göttingen colleagues who adhered to the Ritschlian movement. Men not pupils nor colleagues on the staff who became enthusiastic supporters were Schürer, Harnack, and above all Herrmann.

If Ritschl's books moved his followers to enthusiasm, they evoked hostile criticism from the

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right¹ and from the left; in the latter case, Pfeiderer and Lipsius were leaders. A second burst of hostility seems to have been partly at least due to the publication of a full statement of the new Christology in Schultz's *Gottheit Christi* (1881). The final break with Lipsius belongs to this period. Ritschl suspects Lipsius of jealousy; Diestel with difficulty makes peace. But Herrmann's polemic against Lipsius² sharpens the antagonism, and personal friendship goes to pieces. Theologically Lipsius, though a philosophical neoKantian, had reached results practically coincident with Pfeiderer's or Biedermann's.³ Ritschl could not be expected to concur. But the two might have parted in peace.

This separation marks in a sense the rise of a Ritschlian school. Lipsius seemed⁴ to treat Herrmann as a mere underling, speaking or falling silent at his master's bidding. Ritschl was indignant at the suggestion, and Herrmann denied that he was the spokesman of any school.⁵ One knows how British and American philosophers,

¹ Compare what is said of Ritschl's rejoinder (*Theol. u. Metaph.*), *infra*, chap. vii.

² In a review article and in *Die Religion* u.s.w. (1879); but the preface to the latter contains an apology for previous severity in language.

³ The writer heard him say so in conversation (1881).

⁴ In *Prot. Kirchenzeitung*, 1877, quoted in Ritschl's *Life*, ii. p. 309.

⁵ *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit*, pref. p. viii. Comp. *infra*, chap. vii.

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profoundly influenced by Hegel, decline to be described as "Hegelians." A further unpleasantness appeared when Nippold¹ insinuated that Ritschl pulled strings on behalf of those of his school. We can understand that there was a disposition to deny that such a school had any existence; yet one believes that Prof. Otto Ritschl is only doing his duty as a historian when he records its "rise."

Though reluctant to be entangled in university business, Ritschl was highly capable of doing such service, and twice was called to the pro-Rectorate. On the first occasion the duty fell to him of pronouncing the Göttingen oration on the 400th anniversary of Luther's birth. His second pro-Rectorate was marked by a ball attended by a hundred and twenty guests; to this his family had instigated him. During the same term of office, as public orator on the university's 150th anniversary, he retorted on Catholicism the charge of responsibility for all revolutions. It created much amusement when a Roman Catholic critic treated Ritschl—one of the foremost living New Testament scholars—as a non-expert in exegesis, on no better grounds than that the calendar of the university did not include his name among the New Testament teachers.

Ritschl's health was disturbed from time to time. There was an attack of typhus in 1865,

¹ Comp. *supra*, p. 36.

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followed in 1866 by inflammation of the lungs; and the old enemy of sleeplessness gave much trouble. In 1883 Ritschl and Schultz were favoured with anonymous letters from some pious persons at Hermannsburg, where Ludwig Harms earlier in the century carried on his vigorous labours on behalf of evangelical religion and orthodox Lutheranism. The letters intimated that several Christians had been praying God to convert the two Göttingen theologians, but if that "could not be" to stop their teaching. After this, when he felt worse than usual, Ritschl would remark, "The people at Hermannsburg are praying." The final break-up came rather rapidly in Ritschl's sixty-seventh year. His biographer gives us few details.

Calumny did not leave Ritschl alone even after death. The old lurid painting, in fancy's hues, of an infidel's death-bed was refurbished and made to apply to him; but his son assures us that neither sickness nor the approach of death interrupted Albrecht Ritschl's peace of soul. He had been no great admirer of Paul Gerhardt's celebrated passion hymn. Perhaps few of us realize that the hymn is based on Bernard of Clairvaux's meditations on the several limbs of the suffering Redeemer—a species of mediæval piety which is also extended to the Virgin Mother. Ritschl quoted against such hymns our Charles Kingsley, whom he did "greatly admire." Nevertheless, when he had

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reason to apprehend the approach of death, he instructed his son to repeat to him, very near the end, the last two verses of Gerhardt's poem.¹ Evidently he accepted as suitable for the dying a mode of religion which seemed to him undesirable in time of health. But, when death drew near, he was beyond the reach of any human voice, passing away peacefully March 20, 1889.

The accepted portrait caused Ritschl great annoyance during the necessary sittings. The face recalls, *mutatis mutandis*, Carlyle's verdict on Macaulay's countenance: "Well, anyone can see that you are an honest, good sort of fellow, made out of oatmeal!" Those who knew a Scotsman of great gifts in another department will still more certainly be reminded of a yacht builder, Will Fife, the second in the Fairlie dynasty of that name, who designed many masterpieces, from the "terrible *Fiona*" of the 'sixties to the miraculous *Annasona* of the 'eighties, and whose *Bloodhound* of the 'seventies still, as an aged cruiser, carries to victory the well-known colours of Lord Ailsa.

¹ Beyschlag has put on record—I borrow from Schaff-Herzog—how, at Ullmann's request, these same two verses were actually recited to him during his last hours. One wonders whether the brusquely original Ritschl condescended to imitate Ullmann, or whether it was a pure coincidence.

CHAPTER III

NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM AND EARLY CHURCH HISTORY

Das Evangelium Marcions und das kanonische Evangelium des Lucas, 1846.

Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche, 1850.

Ueber den gegenwärtigen Stand der Kritik der synoptischen Evangelien. In *Tübinger Theologischen Jahrbücher*, 1851. Reprinted in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 1893.

Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche. 2nd ed. (almost wholly recast), 1857.

Materials in the *Life*.

Comp. Appendix B.

A REMARK of J. H. Newman's in early Oxford days was treasured by W. G. Ward—then his adorer, afterwards in the Roman Church his fierce critic—to the effect that, as Protestantism could never have developed into Popery, the primitive Church, whatever it was, cannot have been Protestant. Ritschl comes half-way to meet this clever thrust. He admits in both editions of the *Early Catholic Church* that Protestantism is bound, in the interests of historical science, not merely to prove that Catholicism jars with the New Testament, but also to explain how the one grew out of the other. Polemics may

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have been necessary; something else is needed too, especially in modern times.

The primitive Protestant formula Ritschl stigmatizes as unhistorical. From the Magdeburg Centuriators to Neander and the learned German Irvingite, Thiersch, it was taught—in substance if not in plain words—that a Fall separated the golden age of the apostles from the evil age of Catholicism. It was a new thing when the Tübingen school began to seek for an historical explanation. They sought rather than found it. Even externally they hampered themselves unnecessarily. Schwegler, says Ritschl, paused too soon in his connected study. Baur's complete sketch belongs to a later period.

The Tübingen school are inspired by Hegel's programme of progress through antagonism, and the young Ritschl was himself nearly as much attracted by Hegel as by Baur. Still, it would be well if we in this country realized that the historical theories of Tübingen allege historical arguments. Their philosophical presuppositions are not in such close connexion with the historical findings as either to vindicate or to discredit the latter. In contrast with the mere negations of Strauss, Baur desired to have a (critically and historically) positive view of each New Testament document. The apostolic age was supposed to be ruled by controversy; and each Gospel was taken as a "tendency" document, Petrine,

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Pauline or Mediating. Our Matthew was a doctored version of the Gospel according to the Hebrews. Luke was a similar version of Marcion's true text.¹ Mark—as Griesbach had held on independent grounds—was a version of the common material of these two; less partisan, according to Baur. John's Gospel was idea in the garb of facts. Of the Pauline epistles the four great fighting letters were genuine—none of the rest. The Johannine Apocalypse was genuine, and contained vehement polemic against Paul. Acts was a carefully balanced glorifying of the two party leaders. Outside the New Testament the Ignatian Epistles and the pseudo-Clementine literature gave rise to burning questions. Baur held by the old Presbyterian view of the entire falsity of the Ignatians. He identified the anti-Pauline virus of the Clementines with the primitive Jewish-Christian mind. Schweigler had announced that Catholicism was a development of this primitive Ebionism; Baur preferred rather to call it a compromise between Ebionism and Paulinism. Both assumed a long process of diplomatic approximations leading up to the Catholic solution.

Ritschl first struck into the debate as a youthful recruit on Baur's side, elaborating Schweigler's position with regard to the Third Gospel. He wrote astonishingly fast, and his book gave great

¹ Comp. *supra*, p. 30.

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satisfaction to Baur. But it was a false start. Twice over it was refuted from within the Tübingen school, and Ritschl recanted on the first opportunity (in his article of 1851).

Other divergences had begun to appear even before the publication of the first edition of the *Early Catholic Church* (1850). Ritschl had acknowledged a longer list of genuine Pauline writings than Baur would admit, and had come to accept a minimum of genuine Ignatian epistles. In the latter direction he never advanced further; but even a minimum of genuine letters from Ignatius was fatal to Baur's construction. There was not *time* for long negotiations.

When he first gives a synthetic view of the situation (1850), Ritschl is not more than half a Baurian. It might have helped us had he made a formal statement of his critical basis. Neither this edition nor the important second edition (1857) does so. If Baur calls Matthew the oldest canonical Gospel, Ritschl in 1850 thinks he can draw from Matthew so luminous a view of the teaching of Jesus that all must confess it to be historical. The Sermon on the Mount extends the Mosaic law to thought (against Pharisaic externalism). Jesus, while requiring faith towards himself, allowed the two principles of Faith and Works to stand side by side, without realizing that they must come to be antagonized. Another formula is that Christ embodied in full perfection the new Christian righteousness, but was not

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moved to insist on a personal claim that must have staggered Jewish minds. In 1850 Ritschl is not yet a Marcosian; he will announce his conversion in 1851. The Johannine Apocalypse is assigned (1850) to "milder" Jewish Christianity, like that of the pseudo-Clementines in a later generation. Extreme Jewish Christianity is found in the Galatian proselytizers. The Epistle of James is taken as a polemic against Paul's doctrine of justification. For the rest, it is an "inexplicable" writing. No use can be made of it. Acts xv. is interpreted—as by Baur, and as always by Ritschl—of the same events as Gal. ii.; with which he finds it irreconcilable. He therefore (in 1850) holds the passage in Acts to be unhistorical. The "Decree" may have been issued later;¹ its arrival at Antioch may have occasioned the sudden and painful change in Peter's attitude (Gal. ii. 11). Ritschl did not admit permanent estrangement between Paul and the Twelve, though he granted that the Decree and its supposed effects at Antioch might have stimulated the Galatian heresiarchs.

This edition already contains one of Ritschl's great discoveries, that Jewish Christianity played no part in the final Catholic synthesis. The tragic fact is almost universally admitted to-day. Correspondingly, the Gentile Christian Church regarded the gospel as taken from the Jews and given to Gentiles. We have a hint of this in

¹ Comp. Acts xxi. 25?

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edition one,¹ and fuller references in edition two.²

How, then, does edition one hold that Catholicism came into being? It accepts the formula of Georgii³ that Catholicism developed out of Paulinism. And what led Paulinism to lose heart and pith? As yet, apparently, edition one knows no answer to this question. The Epistle to the Hebrews, the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, and most of the Apostolic Fathers, are said to exhibit a *weakening* Paulinism. The extrusion of sterner Jewish Christianity is connected with the refounding of Jerusalem as a purely Gentile city (Aelia Capitolina) after the suppression of Bar-cochba's rebellion. Milder Jewish Christianity is thought to have been driven out in the Quartodeciman controversy.

Justin is the most important figure in the sub-Apostolic age. Here, where Ritschl begins to sketch the genesis of the Catholic idea, he becomes brilliantly telling. He proves Justin's depend-

¹ pp. 336-7 give the quotation from the *Apostolical Constitutions* which stands on p. 327 of ed. 2.

² At p. 172. The present writer would further cite Matt. viii. 12; xxi. 43; also the scheme of the Acts (*e.g.* xxviii. 28): so strangely contrasted with the teaching of Ephesians and, in a different way, with the planlessness of the Third Gospel. Was Luke freer in interpreting the events of his own life; more bound to his materials in handling the Gospel period?

³ 1842: criticism of Schweigler's *Montanism*. Lechler repeated the formula in 1851 (*Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Age*), yet neither writer has made Ritschl's significant discovery.

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ence on St. Paul, but shows how he formulates (1) the conception of Christianity as a new law, (2) the conception of a Rule of Faith. Later Fathers, of course, follow Justin.

Not less striking is the analysis of early Catholic organization. Officials exist in all churches from the first,¹ but for a time they have no significance beyond the local community; no one yet thinks of calling *apostles* officials! And for a time the officials simply *represent* the members of the Church. Great decisions, whether elections to office or disciplinary sentences, require the concurrence of the members. Finally, there is as yet no readmission to membership after mortal sin; of which a typical example is apostasy. The first main cause of change was Gnosticism. Over against the Gnostic claim to a secret tradition from the Apostles, the great Church (1) defined the conception of heresy (and soon included in it Jewish Christianity), (2) claimed a tradition of doctrinal or religious truth in the hands of bishops. The first wavering form of this episcopal theory, which makes each local bishop an officer of the whole Christian Church, and so gives dogmatic value to that one type of ministry, is found in the Curetonian Ignatians; even the shorter of the Greek texts was supposed by Ritschl to embody episcopacy of a later and more sharply defined sort.

The second great cause of change was the

¹ Ed. 1, pp. 367-8; ed. 2, pp. 347-8.

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Montanist controversy. It called forth, says Ritschl, innovations on both sides. The new prophecy assigned disciplinary authority not to the people but to the prophets. The great Church retorted by claiming similar authority for the hierarchy. Ritschl approves of the change. It was necessary that the Church should drop apocalyptic fancies, and settle down to its task of influencing the world. Those who preferred to seek active holiness in Christ's church are frowned upon by the Ritschl of 1850 or 1857, as in later life he frowned on modern Pietists. Besides explaining the historical development, he expends a good deal of energy in arguing that Montanism is wrong. Conversely, John Wesley thought Montanus one of the most misrepresented figures in Church history. Cyprian exhibits a further stage. Yet he does not entirely extrude either the people or the personal spiritual gift. He believes in an official but also in a holy priesthood. The germs of later Donatism and of the later Catholic system lie side by side in him. The *Apostolical Constitutions* reveal a climax. When the Christian minister is called a priest, to the practical exclusion of the priesthood of believers, Catholicism has made an immense advance.

Just one year later than 1850 Ritschl made his first and last great contribution to Gospel criticism. It took the form of a survey of recent literature on the subject, and was published in

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the Tübingen theological journal. Baur, in view of some supposed change in Franz Delitzsch's attitude, had put himself at Ritschl's disposal as a champion of the order Matthew, Luke, Mark, inviting him to criticize freely. Ritschl prints both authors at the head of his article as maintaining the order in question. Towards Baur he is thoroughly respectful.

Part I is devoted to criticizing Hilgenfeld, who had argued that the (apocryphal) Gospel of Peter must have been later than the canonical Matthew, and must have served as a midway stage towards Mark. This new argument for the posteriority of Mark had to be met before Ritschl could proceed to his central task. We have no need to dwell on Part I. In later life Hilgenfeld, while still holding with Augustine and many Fathers that Mark is Matthew's *pedisequus*, did not renew the theory about the Gospel of Peter.

Part II is of more permanent importance. It argues—for the first time with conclusive success, says Prof. Otto Ritschl—for the priority among the synoptic Gospels of Mark. Weisse and Wilke are named to us in modern books as the earliest champions of this view. Ritschl briefly dismisses Wilke as stating the argument in a form which few would seriously consider.¹ His reference to Weisse in the article is casual but

¹ Bruno Bauer had discredited Marcosianism by treating the author as the earliest evangelist, but a fabulist. Comp. Volkmar later.

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respectful, though a letter of 1845 had referred to his "useless fantasies" about the Gospel history. Among recent writers Ewald was most of a Marcosian, but he too had characteristically discredited his results by piling up imaginary documents (*nine* in all in the Synoptics). Ritschl gives a purely abstract critical discussion. Historical consequences at stake are never once referred to. Is it likely, he asks, that the variations between Matthew and Mark are due to Mark's altering Matthew? Or are they better explained by Matthew's altering Mark? The comparison is held to be decisive.

(1) Mark shows how carefully Jesus kept the secret of His Messiahship. When He worked cures privately, He insisted on silence. The demons whom He drove out knew Him (according to the evangelists), but He forbade them to speak. The name Son of Man—only twice employed in the early part of Mark—was a riddle rather than a revelation to those who heard it. Not till Peter's great discovery and his confession of it before the disciples at Cæsarea Philippi does Jesus begin to unveil Himself even to disciples with any freedom. On the other hand, Matthew has much of this material, but in sad confusion. The demons are not silenced. Men are sometimes bidden be silent about cures which were wrought before a crowd, when secrecy was impossible. Jesus' divine Sonship is freely recognized in many quarters from early days. Briefly, Mark has a

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coherent, well-thought-out view; Matthew has confused fragments of it.

(2) Mark represents the disciples as slow learners; Matthew has more of the later tendency to glorify them.

(3) With a single exception in his introductory sentences, Mark's Old Testament quotations are conformed to the LXX. The phenomena in Matthew are much more complex. The speeches of Jesus quote according to the LXX; but the evangelist frequently points out fulfilments of prophecy, and in such cases often goes back beyond the Greek to the Hebrew form of the text. We might almost say that Mark's behaviour is uniform and self-consistent, Matthew's multiform and inconsistent. Which is likelier, that Matthew blended uniform material borrowed from Mark with other material or with contributions of his own? Or that Mark carried through a critical Pride's Purge upon Matthew?

It is claimed then for Ritschl that he spoke the decisive word which gave a starting-point to modern Synoptic criticism, by affirming the priority of Mark. It remained for others, friends of Ritschl's, to carry out the thesis in detail. But the beginning had been made, in the generously hospitable columns of a Tübingen organ. What Hilgenfeld and Volkmar had done, within the school, to check Ritschl's aberrations, Ritschl now does in the school's organ to rectify Hilgenfeld and Baur himself.

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On another point, it is true, Ritschl has no light to give. He is impressed with the unreliableness of Patristic traditions about the Gospels, and will have nothing to say to the theory of a Hebrew or Aramaic Book of Discourses—our second great foundation pillar in Synoptic criticism. The Two Document hypothesis was already current in more than one form; but Ritschl stands aloof.

Nor does he furnish us with any detail regarding Luke's Gospel. He assumes that, if he has proved the priority of Mark to Matthew, he hardly need repeat proofs for the priority of Mark to Luke. The greater part of the phenomena which warrant our postulating the Logia—or Q, as it is now generally called—are differently viewed by Ritschl. He is certain Luke used Matthew—if only because of the form of the quotation Luke vii. 27=Matt. xi. 10. This is still Ritschl's view in 1857, where a footnote¹ shows us how he conceived Luke's *modus operandi*. Plainly, then, however guarded in 1851,² this is a different view from that of Simons, Wendt and (since 1878 ³) of H. J. Holtzmann, according to which the Third Gospel has borrowed merely a few details from the First. Ritschl assumes that the Third Gospel may have drawn perhaps the central body of its discourses from the First Gospel. The question

¹ *Early Cath. Church*, ed. 2, pp. 46–7.

² p. 48 of reprint.

³ *Comp. Ency. Biblica*, art. "Gospels."

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with him is: "What other sources did Luke employ?" Not till 1874 does he come publicly into line with the Two Document hypothesis.¹

It was no part of Ritschl's task in the 1851 article to deal with the Fourth Gospel. When he comes upon the subject in Part I in connexion with Justin's use of the Gospels, he tells us—what he will repeat in the second edition of the *Early Catholic Church*²—that he can find no place for that Gospel in the second century, and is bound to assign it to the first.

Between 1851 and 1857, when the second edition of the *Early Catholic Church* appeared, Ritschl did several minor pieces of work bearing on that special field of study. He wrote in a literary or historical journal on the significance of the pseudo-Clementines (1852), dealing specially with a Roman Catholic criticism of the *Early Catholic Church* (ed. 1). In 1853 he wrote on the Book of Elxai, arguing that this obscure figure was a disciplinary reformer, like Montanus or Hermas, but working among Essene Christians. An address of 1853 and an article of 1854 dealt with the authorship of the *Philosophumena*, breaking a lance with Baur. In regard to this detail, too, Ritschl was on the winning side. In 1854 he reviewed Hilgenfeld on the Gospels. In 1854 also, helped by a conversation with Baur, he returned to the Essene problem, working out

¹ *Justification*, vol. ii. (ed. 1), p. 27 note.

² Footnote, pp. 48-9.

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his own theory, and publishing it in the *Tübingen Jahrbücher* (1855). In this discussion Ritschl was not dealing with the Early Catholic Church, nor yet with early Christian heresies, but with a substructure. Edition two of his book was to argue that Essene influences played a great part in the obscure world of so-called Ebionism.

In another way Ritschl's attitude towards the Essenes is prophetic of theories which he will advance as a theologian. He tries to explain this sect purely out of Jewish conditions; subsequently he will insist that the New Testament must be explained directly out of the Old Testament. Indeed, it is the Old Testament in contrast with later Judaism which he seeks to make the key to everything, even in the Essene movement. The Essenes were a priestly sect, linen-clad, consciously in rivalry with the temple priesthood. If they came to dislike animal sacrifice—that is a secondary consequence of their having been excluded from the temple by the indignant official priests. But they are not estranged from the religion of their people. The treasury of the temple profits by their gifts. This supposed effort to realize the ideal of *Exod. xix. 6*—"Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation"—is a very characteristic Ritschlian hypothesis. It is a good rule for inquiry, to begin by asking how far native conditions may account for strange outgrowths, and, if native causes prove inadequate, then and

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only then to postulate borrowing or infection from abroad. But, on this, its first appearance with him, Ritschl pushes the principle very far.¹

Edition two of the *Early Catholic Church* is much more conservative than edition one in the criticism and interpretation of the New Testament. First, Ritschl now regards Mark as the oldest and most historical Gospel. Moreover, he places all the Synoptics very early. He is quite sure that the canonical Matthew is earlier than the fall of Jerusalem.² Mark's record is said to exhibit progressive abrogation of one imperfect feature after another in the Old Testament law. And in Mark Ritschl discovers the principle regulating Jesus' action. "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath."³ There were laws of two kinds! For some, man was made. These were permanent. Others were made for man, *e. g.* perhaps the divorce law enacted through human "hard-heartedness."⁴ Such laws were provisional, and Jesus abrogates them.

With this distinction in hand, Ritschl returns to Matthew's Sermon on the Mount. He now argues that Christ is not dealing simply with the Mosaic law, but with the combined fabric of "the law and the prophets," a phrase found four

¹ A disastrous anonymous article of 1856 on the Tübingen school led to a never-healed personal quarrel with Baur.

² p. 154.

³ Mark ii. 27.

⁴ See Mark x. 5.

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times¹ in Matthew and once in Luke. This phrase Ritschl explains—perhaps rather too much in the spirit of the age before Wellhausen—as meaning “the law in its prophetic development.” The watchword of the law proper was holiness. That ideal included ceremonial purity side by side with moral. But the watchword of the prophets was righteousness. Obedience, they cried, is better than sacrifice. The Old Testament religion as modified by them was already profoundly ethical. Jesus claims to perfect this process of ethicizing: “I am come to *perfect* (Matt. v. 17) the prophetic reading of the law.” And so, says Ritschl, Jesus, while no mere legislator, yet like a legislator calmly and deliberately studies the imperfections of the Old Testament code, and strikes them out for the future.

As to the remaining New Testament books, Ritschl assumes the genuineness of all Pauline epistles except 1 Timothy, and quotes as proceeding from the circle of the Jerusalem apostles James, 1 Peter, Revelation. He has convinced himself now that James is the genuine work of the Lord’s brother, and that it is earlier than St. Paul’s teaching, therefore no polemic against him. He believes in the genuineness of 1 Peter. Nor does he admit that the theology of the latter is Pauline; he appeals to B. Weiss’s discovery of a Petrine *Lehrbegriff*. The Apocalypse is no anti-

¹ If we include Matt. xi. 13.

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Pauline manifesto. If I observe rightly, Ritschl does not definitely name its author, speaking of it simply as "bearing the name" of one of the heads of the church at Jerusalem. Still, on the whole, it is certainly handled as if it were John Zebedee's.¹ Having vindicated such evidence in the New Testament, Ritschl can argue strongly for the existence of spiritual Christianity in the circle of Jesus' personal disciples.²

The interpretation of Acts xv. still identifies it with the interview recorded at the beginning of Gal. ii., but professes to find no divergence. Paul was asked by the Antioch Church to go to Jerusalem—no doubt he also had a vision, sanctioning the step. He had private intercourse with the leaders of the Church; but the very words of Gal. ii. 2 suggest that a larger and more public gathering, like that of Acts xv., also took place.³ The decree was no doubt historical, and no doubt had that time of origin.⁴ But unfortunately the decree did not settle everything. Paul interpreted it geographically, James ethnographically. In other words, it failed to provide for the case of scattered Jewish Christians living among Gentile Christians. That case arose at

¹ On this point Ritschl's views wavered extraordinarily. Comp. *infra*, pp. 71-2.

² Schwegeler had almost in terms made this impossible.

³ This has been reasserted since on grounds of grammar; by others on the same grounds strongly denied. Doctors differ!

⁴ In spite of "imparted nothing to me," Gal. ii. 6.

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Antioch. At first Paul carried the day. Then emissaries from James appeared and recaptured the position, impulsive Peter swaying like a vane with each gust. So that ultimately it remains matter of precarious conjecture how Paul and the Twelve were related in after days. Ritschl still inclines to think the best.—Every point here is controversial, and it is impossible for us to discuss the merits of any. Speaking roughly, we may say that this part of edition two, while the most generally acceptable in our country, is perhaps the least really successful, certainly the least securely established.

Next we have to notice in edition two the brilliant sketch of the different Ebionite parties. Here Ritschl takes his start from Justin Martyr. Edition one has already introduced us to Justin's great position as the initiator of Catholicism. Now we are asked to consider his testimony regarding different classes of Jewish Christians. Later Patristic testimony is largely drawn from him; or at any rate, Ritschl thinks it represents but little other first-hand evidence. The first class is that of the Ebionites proper—the early, the Pharisaic Ebionites. They deny the Virgin Birth, or even regard Jesus as $\psi\iota\lambda\omicron\varsigma \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$; they hate the Apostle Paul; they insist on the necessity of circumcision for salvation. Secondly come others who are also, in a confusing way, called Ebionites, but who are better described by a name we also find given them—Nazarenes,

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the original name¹ assigned by Jews to the Christians. Nazarenes keep the law faithfully, but praise St. Paul and acknowledge the full Christian standing of uncircumcized Gentile believers. The Epistle to the Hebrews (regarded as addressed to Jerusalem) and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*² are now held to represent this peculiar type instead of being a "weakened Paulinism." We can see, then, how Jewish Christianity, even in its milder form, was heading towards estrangement from the western world and entanglement in the national doom of Israel. Ritschl points out³ that Baur took his ideas of Ebionism from the pseudo-Clementines, and could not be induced to pay attention to the all-important testimony of Justin.

As to the pseudo-Clementines, Ritschl now treats them as belonging to a third type of Jewish Christianity and a second version of Ebionism—the Ebionism described by Epiphanius, *i. e.* (as almost all will now grant) *Essene* Ebionism. It is Ritschl's not improbable hypothesis that the Essenes, hating animal sacrifice, came over in great numbers to Christianity when Jesus' prediction of the fall of the temple had been fulfilled. While they accepted Christianity, they remained in many respects strongly Jewish. They began,

¹ Comp. Acts xxiv. 5.

² Recent criticism holds these, apart from some glosses, to be pre-Christian.

³ In an article of 1861; see *Life*, i. p. 398.

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like Pharisee Ebionites and unlike Nazarenes, to propagate their views among the Gentile Churches of the West, and especially at Rome; and they revived that hatred for Paul which the primitive Pharisaic Ebionites had displayed. The Book of Elxai gives us one glimpse of them; the complicated pseudo-Clementine literature affords us fuller knowledge. Here we have reached Ritschl's last and deadliest retort on Baur. What Baur had regarded as a simple survival of the phenomena of the primitive Jerusalem church is shown to be a strange hybrid—a system equally heretical from the points of view of Judaism and of Christianity. It is probable that Ritschl has drawn too sharply the line between Ebionites of the old school and Nazarenes. But his treatment of the Essene Ebionites is masterly.

There is no such fresh material when edition two proceeds to discuss Gentile Christianity, yet the improvements in handling are no less conspicuous. First of all, Ritschl now speaks of Catholicism as developed not out of Paulinism but out of average primitive Gentile Christianity—a thing compacted from fragments of all Apostolic teachings, and fully comprehending none. Here at last Ritschl breaks with the *statement* of the problem imposed on him by Baur and his friends. Once again, to employ a phrase of his own, he “distinguishes more carefully in order accurately to combine.” At the same time, we must not mis-

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understand the nature of the improvement. The biographer holds that Ritschl was breaking through the narrow intellectualism of the Tübingen school when he came to recognize as the basis of Catholicism not Paulinism—a scheme of doctrine—but Gentile Christianity; a thing of the life in all its breadth and manifoldness. But may we not hope that the Paulinism of the apostle was more than a scheme of doctrine? And must we not affirm that the average Gentile Christianity, out of which Catholicism sprang, fell as far short of the religious depth of St. Paul as of the accuracy or brilliancy of his thoughts?

More important than this statement is the explanation which immediately follows it. Primitive Gentile Christianity, even when in touch with St. Paul, fell short of Paulinism; and fell short of the teaching of other apostles; and of the true sense of Christ's words—because, for lack of schooling in the Old Testament, Gentile converts were unable to comprehend the Christian revelation.¹ Here then, at last, we have a genuine answer to Newman and Ward. Christianity did not indeed start from Protestantism! It started from imperfect half-apprehension of

¹ pp. 282, 303–4, 331. The second edition does not repeat the former appeal to Quartodecimanism as explaining the extrusion of mild Judeo-Christianity from the Catholic Church. Ritschl in 1857 held that the Quartodeciman controversy had nothing to do with a Jew-and-Gentile division of Christians.

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those great thoughts of the New Testament out of which eventually Protestantism sprang. Meaning the very best, the early Church lost grasp of much that was most precious in divine revelation, and walked forward with bandaged eyes into the darkness of a new legalism. Our eyes are unbandaged; let us keep them so!

It will further be clear that Ritschl's work, however brilliant and permanently valuable, does not exhaust the historical explanation of Catholicism. It constitutes only one instalment of what we require. Weizsäcker, Engelhardt, and notably Harnack¹ have built upon Ritschl's foundations. The early Gentile Christians did not understand their New Testament; that is a negative statement. Their minds were warped by Hellenic ideas; that is the positive explanation added by Harnack. To-day, new issues are opening up. Had later Judaism really no distinctive influence on the original Christianity? Are there not other foreign influences to be traced in Catholicism besides the Hellenic?

The incapacity of Gentile minds for learning from Jesus or from His personal disciples or from Paul is one of the bases of Ritschl's later and more strictly theological work. The historian hands on results to the dogmatic theologian. An interesting question arises here. Is it purely as an historian that Ritschl affirms

¹ All three are named in this sense by the biographer, i. p. 293.

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this Gentile incapacity? Or is there a religious judgment behind the affirmation?

We may push our question further back. When a Christian student investigates Christian origins, is he purely presuppositionless? Ritschl rather evades this issue. He held, we are told, that absence of presuppositions was a duty in *critical* work strictly so-called, but only there. Both editions of the *Early Catholic Church* quote Wilh. von Humboldt to the effect that presuppositions are necessary and right in all *historical* surveys. One inclines to think that this last debate might be compromised. Every single result reached helps the determination of outstanding points—there are presuppositions! But also, honesty must be prepared to surrender or modify results if newly studied details cast a fresh light upon the whole—No presupposition absolute! Deeper questions seem to need a different answer. The religious mind has grounds of its own—what Ritschl later calls “value-judgments”—for expecting and seeking historical results which will help religion. Of course, this truth is peculiarly liable to abuse. And, in the *Early Catholic Church*, Ritschl seems to confine himself to purely historical arguments. If he believes in the Christian intelligence of Christ’s personal disciples, he does not defend his belief by the affirmation that he and they are alike Christians, but by means of historical considerations. The recognition of a common principle

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in the different early-Christian parties, and the prospect of a natural not a forced union in Catholicism—these rather than outraged faith discredit Schweigler's insulting view of the Twelve. But, unless a different argument is latent in Ritschl's mind, there is serious discontinuity between his early and his subsequent work.

All through his life Ritschl, even when most occupied with Systematic subjects, continued to lecture on New Testament epistles and to give courses on New Testament Theology. But he did not long continue either to lecture or to write on Church History, unless the *History of Pietism* is to be called a return to an early love. And New Testament Introduction, the subject of his very earliest course of lectures, became almost strange to him. A few chronological jottings may conclude our record of this side of Ritschl's activity.

1846-7 (lectures). The Apocalypse and the Fourth Gospel *not* by the same author. Probably the Apocalypse is by John Zebedee; but the other possibility is not excluded. "Baurish" on Acts.

1850. *Early Catholic Church*, ed. 1. Apocalypse "mild Jewish Christianity." James aimed against Paulinism. Acts *partly* historical, partly not.

1851 (article on Gospels). Fourth Gospel dates from first century, but has little influence

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till late in the second century, and not very complete influence then.

1852. Letter to K. I. Nitzsch before promotion. Gospel and Apocalypse are both Johannine !
1857. *Early Catholic Church*, ed. 2. High-water mark of conservatism in Ritschl's New Testament criticism.
- 1859–60 (lectures). Possibility that all Johannine writings have one author. Grave difficulty in giving the Apocalypse to John Zebedee.
1870. "The barely canonical Apocalypse of John," *Justification*, vol. i. ed. 1, E. T. p. 531. (The whole passage is recast in ed. 2, 1882; and the phrase disappears.)
1871. Letter in the *Life* declares that that "unapostolic" book, the Apocalypse, speaks of punitive justice ! (ii. pp. 115–116).
1874. *Justification*, ii. The Apocalypse only *seems* to speak of punitive justice—*infra*, chap. v.; Acts a writing of "secondary character" (p. 65); "produced pretty late" (pp. 293–4); Barnabas author of Hebrews, Luke a "Petrinist," 1 Peter written from Babylon (p. 212); 1 Timothy not by Paul (p. 221); authorship of Ephesians *doubtful* (pp. 212, 242, 289); (all repeated in ed. 2; doubt of Ephesians apparently strengthened; see ed. 2, p. 292).
- 1878 (letter). Luther and Calvin happily let alone the "two apocryphal books," *Song* and *Revelation*.

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1885 (letter to Holtzmann on his *New Testament Introduction*). "Has not lectured on the subject for sixteen years." 1 Timothy, Titus similar in age and character to the *Didache*; some glosses later still. 2 Timothy may be genuine, but he is "not yet clear on the point."

1886. Vischer has found the "egg of Columbus" (Harnack's phrase? Compare A. B. Davidson in *Theological Review and Free Church Colleges Quarterly*, Nov. 1886).¹

¹ A "Chronology of the Tübingen School and of Ritschl's Relation to it" stands in Appendix, note B.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF DOCTRINE, ESPECIALLY

JUSTIFICATION, VOL. I.

Life, vol. i. pp. 176, etc.

Ueber die Methode der älteren Dogmengeschichte. Jahrb. für deutsche Theol., 1871 (Review of H. Nitzsch). Reprinted *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 1893.

Geschichtliche Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott. Jahrb. für deutsche Theol., 1865, 1868. Reprinted *Ges. Aufsätze, Neue Folge*, 1896.

Die Christliche Lehre v. d. Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung, vol. i. *Die Geschichte der Lehre*. 1870; 2nd ed., revised, 1882; 3rd ed. (reprint), 1889.

A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. By Albrecht Ritschl. Translated from the German with the author's sanction by John S. Black, M.A., 1872.

AT as early a stage in his Bonn professorship as technicalities permitted, Ritschl lectured on History of Doctrine; it was a new subject in the Bonn programme. Between 1849 and 1860 he gave these lectures six times in all. The Church's Dogma is the general theme. Three periods are distinguished, each ruled by a dogma of its own, after a preliminary period has seen the *formation* of the (Early Catholic) Church. The first period, strictly so-called, is dominated by the doctrine of Christ's Person, as union of

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God and Man. In the second period, introduced by Augustine, the doctrine of the Church is the conscious centre of everything. In the Protestant period the dominant theme is faith and religion. It is characteristic of Ritschl to seek to light up details by great principles; but the principles chosen would not fully commend themselves to his later thought.

We meet with a more developed stage of Ritschl's thought when in 1871 he reviews H. Nitzsch's *Grundriss*, vol. i.—all that ever was published. By this time Ritschl has already concentrated himself on his special theme—the doctrine of Atonement—and has published his historical volume. Before we allow ourselves to participate in this concentration of attention, it may be helpful to summarize his review article. Even a summary will show us what Ritschl might have accomplished had he worked out his general views as fully as disciples of his have done. He is brilliantly original and suggestive, if something of a formalist.

He reminds us that the History of Dogma began in a consciousness of the variations of theological belief. The Schoolmen registered these variations in order to harmonize them; the rationalists of the eighteenth century, on the contrary, in the hope of discrediting dogma. Science must discard both sets of prejudices, studying impartially the movement of thought. Hitherto the treatment had been “anatomical rather than physio-

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logical." It had lost itself in detail, misled by the authority of the Protestant *loci* as arranged, under the influence of mediæval tradition, by Melanchthon. Nitzsch had done something, but by no means everything, towards supplying a remedy. In his outline of the patristic period, he had rightly paid very special attention to the doctrines of Christ and of the Church; but the other dogmas followed on in the old external sequence. It was wrong, says Ritschl, to separate theology proper and cosmology in studying the early Greek-Church mind. Further, different primitive Christologies ought to be registered, as well as that Logos doctrine which in the end proved victorious. A complete table of nine sections is sketched (p. 154 of reprint).

Nitzsch's wise emphasis on the doctrine of the Church is said to lose by being placed too early in history; and the material is thought to be badly arranged. In theory, Vincentius of Lerinum first formulates the rule of tradition; in practice Augustine, or *his eastern counterpart the pseudo-Dionysius*, for the first time places the sacramental conception in the centre of things. Henceforth the Church is all-important, until "the Germanic nations' love of truth" leads to consciousness of the contradictions in Church teaching, and ultimately to a Reformation in which the East cannot share.

The Middle Ages really begin with Augustine and pseudo-Dionysius. Protestantism had mis-

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understood Augustine, seeing in him purely the forerunner of Luther. Ritschl is the last man to undervalue that side of Augustine. His historical volume argues that the Reformation is due to full insistence on Augustine's principle of salvation by grace. But Augustine had other elements in his thought, which made it impossible for him to anticipate Protestantism. He knew of no assurance of salvation for the individual soul. Election was a hidden mystery. Sacraments must make salvation probable, but could do no more. Again, his banishment of Chiliasm and his identification of the Kingdom of God with the Catholic Church made him the law-giver of the mediæval West as pseudo-Dionysius was of the East. We must further recognize that the sacramental significance of baptism was defined earlier in time than that of the eucharist, which latter long continued to be "a sacrifice rather than a sacrament." Baptism is the very foundation of the Church, and the doctrine of baptism the foundation for the dogma regarding the Church, though the latter assumes different colours as it confronts *heathenism* or *Gnosticism* or *Jewish-Christianity*. Moreover, the apostles must be viewed as representatives of the first generation of believers rather than as prolonging Christ's authority—a favourite thought with Ritschl to the end. Another full table of contents is sketched, p. 163.

It only remained for Ritschl to deal with

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Nitzsch's treatment of the Pelagian controversy. Misled by the customary grouping, Nitzsch assigns this to the vanishing patristic age. It really introduces the mediæval period. Catholicism rested on a sort of counterpoise between law, with its rewards, and sacramental (*i. e.* at this stage almost exclusively *baptismal*) grace. The fault of Pelagius lay in destroying the Church's working compromise. Augustine re-established it by grounding infant baptism on a doctrine of original sin. The later Middle Ages, in the West, developed Catholic Augustinianism : (A) sacramentally, especially in the doctrine of transubstantiation and the extremely important new sacrament of penance; (B) in regard to Church authority—the growing papacy; (C) Church and State; if, as Augustine taught, the State is the realm of sin, the Church must claim predominance. Pseudo-Dionysius, obeying his church's instinct to concentrate on the cultus, has something very different in the regions of (B) and (C).

Isidore of Seville in the West, John of Damascus in the East, shape theology as a pure collection of traditional materials. The living and progressive scholasticism of the later West has no Eastern parallel. Even this higher scholasticism has its roots in Augustine. It stands for the harmony of faith and reason, or perhaps rather for a compromise between them; in relation to the Trinity, Augustine himself sometimes calls for

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blind faith, sometimes offers rational analogies. Mysticism is an impulse from the East—from pseudo-Dionysius—which the West admits in subordination to its own scholasticism. Nor is it, when admitted, allowed to ripen towards Pantheism; mystical rapture is connected, habitually if not exclusively, with the Eucharist. When we are studying the scholastico-mystical period, the doctrines of theology may properly be handled in their traditional order; not in earlier ages; not in Protestantism.

The theme of the great monograph throws Ritschl more decisively into Western lines of thought. The "baroque assertions of the redemption of men from the devil by Christ's death" are "only a secondary inference from the doctrine of Christ's Godhead," and rank for very little with him. More importance is allowed to "the human life of the Logos-God" in "Irenæus . . . Origen . . . Athanasius . . . Hilary . . . Augustine." From 1870 onwards, Ritschl always lays great stress on the Athanasian formula—Christ became human that we might be deified. His second edition pays a tribute to an early work of W. Herrmann's on the Christology of Gregory of Nyssa; with this in his hand and with an introduction from Tholuck, Herrmann had first sought the older man's acquaintance. Accordingly, edition two considerably expands the treatment of what Baur called the "mystical" Greek-

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Church doctrine of Atonement. Still, Ritschl holds as firmly as ever that the West has interpreted the essence of Christianity more faithfully than the East.

The problem begins to be defined—all too unhappily—when Tertullian and Cyprian require “satisfaction” from sinners put under Church discipline, and hold out to the Church’s children a prospect of acquiring “merits.” Not¹ for centuries are these great traditional forms of thought applied to the saving work of Christ—not, in fact, until the appearance of Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo*. By that treatise Anselm forces a new doctrine upon the Church’s list. He is much less successful in getting his view of the new doctrine accepted by others.

Ritschl repudiates the method of Baur—followed in essentials, he says, in Dorner’s *History of Protestant Theology*—by which “two very thin threads of thought unloose themselves from their original connexion, and find it again in such a way as to acquire a peculiar strength.”² His own method is very different; yet the underlying schematism even in Ritschl is simple. Anselm and Abelard furnish the two great historic types of theory. The former interprets Christ’s work almost exclusively in its bearing upon God; the latter mainly concentrates on the manward effects. In the terms of Protestant dogmatic,

¹ With possible slight exceptions.

² E. T. p. 16; ed. 2, or 3, p. 27.

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Anselm expounds Christ's priestly office, Abelard His prophetic. It may be fair to say that the Reformers go with Anselm against Abelard; but we must realize how different their theory is. Or it might represent Ritschl more accurately if we said that the Reformers included both elements—propitiation of God, reconciliation of men. Such at least is Ritschl's own task. He is to strike out propitiation, and law in the sense of a code; but he is to fulfil in detail the Pisgah vision of the Reformers, giving us a doctrine moral but objective. By way of criticism, one might note two doubts. Does Ritschl make sufficiently conspicuous the ever-recurring suggestion that Christ bore punishment? May there not be a doctrine of Christ's refashioning human nature in the Passion—a doctrine which does not fit into any of Ritschl's ready-made receptacles?

Anselm is characteristically mediæval¹ when he represents the suffering and death of Christ as required by God's injured personal honour, wronged by sin. On the other hand, God's honour requires that He should save at least some of mankind. Ritschl holds that Anselm is lacking in logic when he slips into speaking of God's "justice" as requiring propitiation. The demands of honour are indefinite. Other things might satisfy it² than those exacted by justice.

¹ Ed. 2, accepting correction from Cremer, emphasizes this more strongly.

² Repentance and confession?

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In a further way Ritschl finds inconsistency between different parts of Anselm's little treatise. When we speak of God's honour or glory, God appears in His supremacy towering over man's littleness. But, when we speak of an infringement of God's rights, it sounds like a suit for damages between equals. Thus not even justice means with Anselm what it will later mean to the Reformers. As Ritschl puts it, Anselm works with the conception of *private law*. Person has injured person. Some reparation must be made. As man (Anselm convinces himself of this with remarkable celerity), Christ is qualified for paying compensation on account of the injury done by man's sin; as God in disguise, His sufferings and the yielding up of His life are things unsurpassably, infinitely, honorific.¹ A still further irregularity is detected by Ritschl's keen eye when the closing chapters begin to speak of Christ's *merit*. A new point of view! Hitherto we have heard of satisfaction. Now it appears that Christ's satisfying God's righteous claims was concurrently a supremely meritorious act! But He was God, and stood personally in need of no recompense. To whom could He so suitably assign the fruits of His great enterprise as to those of His human brethren who learn

¹ Anselm never says, at least in *Cur Deus Homo*, that Christ was punished. He says that Christ's sufferings were more honourable to God than any punishment could have been.

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from His teaching and imitate His virtue? Anselm therefore applies both satisfaction and merit to Christ's saving work. Christ satisfies God's claims; Christ merits on our behalf. As yet, however, the connexion between Saviour and saved is far from being close-knit in theology. On Christ's side, there is a transferable merit. On ours, there is—imitation of Christ.

Abelard's central thought is not honour as with Anselm, or penal justice as with Protestantism, but the biblical conception of love. At least four times over, in different contexts,¹ Abelard quotes his favourite scripture, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friend." Such love evokes counter-love. Thus the "moral theory" is launched and started upon its career. There is a casual or hesitating reference to Christ's bearing punishment. There is incidental reference to Christ's merits. Nothing whatever is said about satisfaction rendered by Christ to God's "justice" or "honour." Abelard's silence rules out or rejects Anselm's suggestions. Abelard has, however—biblical once more—a reference to Christ's *intercession*; a block of Anselmism—of higher type, says Ritschl, than Anselm's own—in the rival theory. Again, Abelard, as hostile as Anselm to the thought of ransom paid to the

¹ Quoted in Appendix to Moberly's *Atonement and Personality*.

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devil,¹ declares that the Elect were never in Satan's power. This, of course, is extremely grateful to Ritschl, and in two ways. The doctrine of Election always suggests to him the Community. Man is to be saved as one of a fellowship—not otherwise. Secondly, Ritschl does not wish to discover anything remedial in the work of Christ. But, at the time, Abelard's views roused Bernard to a furious reassertion of the decaying superstition which held that the devil had been bought off. The redeemed of the Lord surely *were* redeemed "from the hand of the enemy"! It is not easy to decide how far Abelard's scattered suggestions cohere. His central thought is gloriously Christian. Yet, has he—or has Ritschl—shown any reasonable ethical necessity for Christ's death?

In this weakness, Abelard was typical of average mediæval thought. Peter Lombard puts Anselm's new doctrine upon the list; but he repeats the old hints at solution along with Abelard's; Anselm's he omits. The supremely great mediæval master is rather more friendly. In Thomas Aquinas Christ's satisfaction and His merit are both recognized. They practically absorb two biblical conceptions which Thomas also names. Satisfaction is taken as the meaning of *redemption*, and merit of *sacrifice*. Satisfaction

¹ Moberly prints by inadvertence part of a quotation from Origen, affirming that doctrine, as if it were Abelard's own.

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seems to imply the *necessity* of Christ's work, which Anselm had proclaimed; but Thomas cautiously falls back on the view traditional since Augustine, that the method of our salvation, while ^{*}congruous and fitting, was not the only possible method. If the thought of satisfaction is thus weakened, it suffers still more from the competition of the thought of merit. Thomas tries to argue that Christ's merits are absolute things, appealing to God *de condigno*. Merit *de congruo* for Thomas is a minor logical possibility, having little or nothing to do with the scheme of human salvation. Still, he admits the possible existence of such inferior degrees of merit. Similarly, if sin is in a sense an infinite evil, as committed against the infinite God, it may also be described as finite, since it is committed by our finite selves.

Duns, the great rival of Thomas, hews a plain broad track through these hesitations. In three highly obscure republished articles, Ritschl expounds mediæval theology in the light of the underlying thought of God. First, there is the pseudo-Dionysian conception of God as the opposite of the universe. This is purely negative. In itself, it is an empty Pantheism. Secondly, superimposed on this and modifying it, the Aristotelian conception views God as following (positive) ends in the world. But these ends are only relatively necessary to God. Even when mediæval thought says something

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positive and something ethical about its God, there is still an element of arbitrariness in the conception. Half latent in Thomas, this element becomes appallingly clear in Duns¹ and in the later Nominalists.

Sin is finite, and not infinite. Christ's merit, too, is finite—availing for the finite number of the Elect; it is not infinite. There is no satisfaction in Christ's work—only merit. In merit there is no strict claim upon God, not even in the merits of the Saviour. Merit ranks as such because God wills it should. Had God so willed, Adam might have redeemed himself and his posterity. Had God chosen to bestow initial grace, each sinner might have been his own deliverer. We have a divine Redeemer, it would seem, because God needlessly chose that we should. Socinianism is ready to develop out of this phase of mediæval orthodoxy at a single touch. And Duns' frankness reveals the true drift of the mediæval mind. As Ritschl insists, a doctrine of the arbitrary election of individuals to salvation or damnation suggests that caprice is supreme in God. It is even probable—Ritschl has no doubt on the point—that Duns means to explain moral right and moral wrong as due to God's capricious choice. Anyhow, that would be the final logic of mediævalism.

Protestantism, therefore, is as much con-

¹ Ritschl half sympathizes with Duns (in the rejection of satisfaction?) and thinks him the ablest mediæval mind.

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cerned with vindicating morality against sophistications as with extricating the Augustinian principle of absolute dependence on grace from ideas of merit which were threatening to strangle it. In contrast with arbitrariness—except for remainders of Predestinarianism—or in contrast with the system of private rights in which Anselm believed, or with the general mediæval conception of personal honour, Protestantism teaches that God is the administrator of a great system of public justice. The half-confessed belief in Christ's being *punished* now becomes central. The interpretation of Atonement is Anselmic or more than Anselmic; God's justice absolutely requires it—*i.e.* requires it if man is to be saved. Along with this clear-cut theology, morality is austere reasserted. There is at first, says Ritschl, no worked-out doctrine in Protestantism either of atonement or of justification. There is a great religious consciousness of being reconciled with God through Christ. Grace reigns. Satisfaction and merit *on our part* towards the God of heaven cannot exist. Yet, strangely enough, Protestantism does not question the doctrinal tradition—scholastic rather than biblical—which finds these very things present and all-important in the work of Christ.

Apparently, therefore, there is more continuity in the conception of atonement, as an objective transaction carried through by Christ, than in the conception of justification as the dominant

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phase of Christianity *qua* subjective experience. Protestantism stands by Christ's satisfaction. Grace creates the new system; but in that new covenant the cross produces a novel harmony between the impulses of divine love and the requirements of divine justice. To Luther¹ Christ is as it were "the only sinner"; as early as Calvin there are hints of the monstrous yet not illogical thesis, that Christ endured, though briefly, the pains of hell.² But, in the subjective region, the paradox of faith rings out clearly. It is again known to the Christian mind that God "justifies the ungodly."³ As Ritschl expresses it in Kantian language, the decree of justification is "synthetic." He argues and quotes to show that, in the primitive age of Protestantism, justification was made to rank as prior to renewal. If at times during that age justification and regeneration appear to be synonyms, Ritschl urges that we must interpret the second by the first, rather than hold that justification includes renewal. He thinks Protestantism is deteriorating when the divine sentence comes⁴ to be viewed as "analytic"; the *believer* is justified! This part of Ritschl's

¹ Quoted by McLeod Campbell.

² McLeod Campbell quotes this, in plain words, from no less a man than John Owen. Ritschl quotes Quenstedt. Is it from Ps. cxvi. 3?

³ Yet all this is found in Bernard; see Ritschl, i. (ed. 2), p. 114.

⁴ As early as the Scottish Halyburton.

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work appealed strongly to Herrmann. He points out that Ritschl, whom his enemies called a mere moralist, vindicates the priority of the "religious" element in Christianity over all its blessed moral influences.¹

Yet there is a grave difficulty here. Protestantism seems to split the religious life into two unconnected parallels. All that Puritanism can do is to warn us passionately that we must distinguish justification from sanctification. But what of their connexion? Is nothing to be said, first or last, except that the two lie side by side? Does Ritschl's "ellipse" really help us much?²

Protestantism soon began to translate religious insight into formulated doctrine. Ritschl is convinced that this had to be done. The Church could not live permanently in the thin ether of a first unanalysed joy. No one proved quite equal to the new task. Ritschl urges upon High Lutheran bigotry that Melancthon, whom High Lutheranism so disparages, was the leading dogmatist. It was he who first assigned extreme importance to theological orthodoxy; who first hinted at that vulgar Protestantism which holds that Christ turned a God of anger into a God of love; who feared that too much of free grace might produce immoral effects, and therefore reintroduced legalism; who worked not with a system but with a string of Loci, drawing details

¹ *Die Religion*, u.s.w. (1879), p. 14.

² *Comp. supra*, p. 10; *infra*, p. 135.

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ever more and more largely from mediæval sources.

Still, it was not the work of any one man to create the Protestant scholasticism. That system arose by normal process—by the emergence of heterodoxies, and the consequent stiffening of orthodox definitions. The first Reformers—in this resembling Abelard—had all inclined to speak of Christ's life, or active obedience, as well as of His death. But the new doctrine received precise formulation through the work of two errant spirits—A. Osiander the Lutheran, J. Piscator the "Reformed."

Osiander spaced out doctrinally the conception of Atonement. There was a difference in time as well as in meaning between Christ's work for God and His work for men. Christ's death had already reconciled God to us. Christ was now willing to bring the individual back to God, by justification. But this justification Osiander takes in the mediæval and exegetically false sense of an actual moral change. Christ makes us good! If this is the main thing, the Catholic tradition is right! The paradox of religious faith may be lost again. Osiander's further assertions outrun not only Western but Eastern Catholicism, though they recall the peculiarities of the latter. Christ "justifies" us (in a Catholic sense) by making us share His eternal righteousness as Logos. Finally—with a return towards Protestantism—our participation in this eternal

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divine righteousness is always incomplete upon earth. There is need of *imputation* to supply its defects. And what is imputed is Christ's active obedience. His death has won our pardon. The merit of His earthly life wins gracious acceptance for us all through our pilgrimage.

Logically coherent or not, Osiander's system had done a good deal to develop the forms of Protestant orthodoxy. His return to a Catholic interest and definition was of course rejected with horror; still more, his innovation in regarding the eternal divine righteousness as immediately availing to save. But other elements "made good"—the separation between the Godward and the manward work of Christ; the necessity for assigning a distinct function to the Active Obedience.

Piscator, following in this F. Socinus—whose sharp intelligence allowed few of the difficulties of orthodoxy to escape him—denied any separate significance to the Active Obedience. Both Protestant confessions reasserted and re-emphasized the threatened position. Thus the central biblical assertion that Christ saves by His death—interpreted by Protestantism definitely in the sense that Christ saves by bearing our punishment—was encased within an elaborate scheme of doctrines. The law required obedience; Christ's active obedience met this demand. It required punishment when disobedience had taken place; Christ's death met this requirement. We had

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need of forgiveness; this was secured from the law by the double righteousness. We had need of positive acceptance with God, which may be thought to carry us beyond law, into a region more truly gracious. Christ's two obediences "in their conjunction"¹ satisfy justice; if we "subordinate" passive to active, they constitute His saving "merit."¹ *The assertion that Christ was punished instead of us is not a complete doctrine of atonement.* When Protestantism, in the two confessions, had fully worked out its central doctrine, the result was so artificial that it immediately began to crumble.

A new note was sounded by Grotius, who, seeking to defend against Socinus the Church's faith in Christ's "satisfaction," allowed himself to alternate with the conception of substitutionary punishment, remedying the past, the very different conception of penal example, safeguarding the future. Ritschl does not seem to realize with sufficient clearness how, both in Grotius and in its later history, the Penal Example theory of Atonement is a transitional phase of thought. While it seeks to relieve the difficulties of orthodoxy, it is less than half-conscious of being animated by a different view of punishment. Punishment is retribution, valuable for its own sake if for nothing else. *Fiat justitia, ruat cælum!* Protestant orthodoxy so felt and spoke, though it persuaded itself that punishment could

¹ Ritschl's summary.

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be transferred—had been transferred in our case to Christ. Grotius asserts an administrative rather than a legal necessity for atonement. The maxim he is feeling after is *Salus populi suprema lex*. As Caiaphas said before him, One man ought to die for the people. Or: Sin is *liable* to the death penalty. But when it shall be exacted, and when it may be remitted—these are questions for the wisdom of the ruler. He may relax law, if he provides something morally effective as a substitute for punishment. In the Christian scheme, the death of Christ is that Something.¹

Grotius half-consciously treated punishment as a deterrent. The eighteenth century goes beyond this. It almost everywhere treats punishment simply as remedial. In German Protestantism, a body of Lutheran divines seeks to bring theology up to the level of the age's enlightenment. With various hair-splitting distinctions, carefully registered by Ritschl, various representatives of the *Aufklärung* take this that and the other evil out of the schedule of things which wise men have cause to fear—of things which a kind God might wish to remove from His children's life (say, by the tragic expedient of concentrating them in the Passion of the First Born). Not so! There should be no forgiveness; that would mean loss of wholesome chastenings. There is no very dark guilt any-

¹ I omit Ritschl's slight reference to the evasive formulæ of the Arminian *divines*.

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where. And there is no risk of final tragic miscarriage in the neat and well-regulated universe of a kindly and reasonable God.

Still, even in this phase of opinion, Ritschl discovers a Christian element. The thought of God as Father is for the first time getting to work in the theology of the West. The age supposes Divine Fatherhood to be a truth of Natural Theology. The supposition is false. Divine Fatherhood is the sacred essence of Christ's revelation; not matter-of-course, but wonderful. The meaning of being justified by faith is supremely this trust in Fatherly providence. In support of his interpretation, Ritschl quotes early Protestant statements of doctrine and later hymns. The reality of advance in the eighteenth century is borne out by a further comparison. In old days, when men challenged the tyranny of penal law in theology, they contended that God was *exlex*. So Duns taught, and after him the later Nominalists, and the Socinians, and in measure the Arminians. God might if He liked be unconditionally lenient. No one could set bounds to His will. It is surely more Christian to say, with the eighteenth century, that God's loving goodness *makes* Him seek our welfare. The age believed that too lightly, on insufficient evidence. Yet the belief was true.

A great check to the levity of the age was furnished by the philosophy of Kant. He

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preached destruction to bland deistic optimism, and summoned the age to a more painful and taxing life. According to him, morality is grounded in the nature of man as a reasonable being. We may know it—in a sense, we must know it—as our own inner law. Even if God were not a certainty, duty would be certain. Such independent or autonomous ethic gives a significance to righteousness which it would lack if it were defined for the first time as the will of a Supreme Being. Along with the recovered certainty of duty comes back perception of sin as a fact and of the significance of retributive punishment. One agrees with Ritschl's critics that this appeal to Kant—in advance, too, of Herrmann's influence upon Ritschl—is significant, but is hard to reconcile with some of his empiricist sallies. One also holds that Ritschl has laid down no truer or more wholesome principles than in this appeal.

Unfortunately for orthodoxy, Kant does not accept—save as a symbol of moral truths—the idea of vicarious punishment. His deeper earnestness made him not more but less accessible to such a dogma. The “all-destroying” mind, which had so mercilessly criticized Enlightenment, twisted about its religious conceptions till the findings of the eighteenth century were largely rehabilitated. Ritschl charges Kant with being untrue to himself here. It was illegitimate to make a “dogmatic” use of positions which had

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been "critically established."¹ This use of Kantian terminology is hard to understand. With Kant, Criticism is a method, superior to the agelong seesaw between Dogmatism and Scepticism.² That primary usage is recognized by Ritschl himself; Kant seeks to establish "critically, i. e. *with scientific strictness*,"³ the conceptions of moral freedom and guilt. If results are reached "with scientific strictness," *can* any use of them be "unduly dogmatic"? What Ritschl seems to mean is, that criticism discloses conscience and the moral nature as *among the pre-conditions* of the good life, but affords no guarantee that, isolated from God, Christ or the Church, individual man is capable of moral victory.

The other great name at the watershed between the centuries is Schleiermacher. According to Ritschl's grouping, Schleiermacher "revives Abelardism." He had already said much the same of two less celebrated men—Töllner, in the midst of the Enlightenment, and Tieftrunk, probably the most important of that group of Kantian divines who tried to get into closer touch with essential Christianity. Töllner and Tieftrunk share one great thought; they may have reached it independently. With the older writer, it sparkles like a jewel in the dust amid his ordinary

¹ E. T. pp. 399, 401; ed. 2, or 3, pp. 441, 443.

² Comp. Pascal's *Pensées*.

³ p. 387 or 429. *Justification*, iii. p. 530, E. T., confuses one still more. Comp. *infra*, pp. 185-6.

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ideas. What of guilt? If Christ indeed frees us from punishment, will not the problem of personal guilt still prove intolerable? Töllner can only suggest that, independently of delivering from punishment, God by a deed of sovereign power sets our guilt aside. That was at any rate better than the teaching of Töllner's "half-orthodox" opponents, who told him he ought to be thankful if punishment were transferred from him to Christ, and that he need not trouble about so shadowy a remainder as guilt. Tieftrunk with no great success tries to reconstruct atonement in terms of law, apart from the anomaly of transferred punishment. He and others of his group spoke much of the peculiar significance of guilt; but the group produced small effect, and in time disappeared. Does not Ritschl say truly that they have left us the legacy at least of an urgent question?

Töllner and Tieftrunk were in a pretty literal sense Abelardians. They conceived of Christ's work almost exclusively as manifestation of the Divine, though perhaps they did not recapture the deep biblical emphasis upon the manifestation of divine love which is so impressive in Abelard. Schleiermacher is less narrowly Abelardian. He does not find in Christ manifestation merely, but decisive historical *communication* to disciples of a new attitude towards God. Such emphasis does he lay on the novelty of the Christian mind that he excludes the Old Testa-

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ment from the circle of what is Christian. Ritschl criticizes Schleiermacher on both points, demanding full loyalty to the Old Testament, and giving hints of something more constructive than either Abelard or Schleiermacher displays.

One of his own chief positions Ritschl confessedly inherits from Schleiermacher. The doctrine of the community, which Ritschl finds in the fathers of the Reformation, is definitely and independently formulated by the father of modern theology. Ritschl does not mainly appeal to the *Glaubenslehre*. He thinks this position receives less than justice there. To make the individual Protestant Christian, unlike his Catholic brother, reach the Church *through Christ* is to strengthen a dangerous prejudice. It is an early ethical treatise of Schleiermacher's on the *Chief Good* which, according to Ritschl, works out in masterly fashion, and independently of the Reformers, the truth that the supreme moral blessing can only be enjoyed in fellowship. This treatise must also have helped to ripen Ritschl's view of the Kingdom of God as itself our supreme good.

A second conception for which Ritschl thanks Schleiermacher is that of Christ's *vocation*. Several writers champion this thought; it may have been in the air; but Schleiermacher's advocacy was peculiarly important. The term is biblical; but the Bible, of course, frames no systems. Vocation is to supersede both Satisfaction and Merit as referred to Christ.

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The doctrine of satisfaction was legal; penal; non-ethical. The doctrine of merit was indeed ethical, but ethical of the second rank. In serious moral judgment there can be no surplus of goodness; nor can the only-begotten Son Himself advance claims upon God. But there may be a unique and supreme personal vocation, to fulfil God's chief end in the world by establishing the community of the Kingdom of God. Such a vocation affords opportunity for that flawless faithfulness which both Schleiermacher and Ritschl confess in the Sinless One. To similar vocations we ourselves are called. In our lesser positions, with our lower capacity for true success, we also are to do God's will. The unique vocation aptly fits the unique Person through whom God's loving will conquers upon earth.

A third doctrine which Ritschl accepts is Schleiermacher's view of corporate guilt and the Kingdom of Sin. Ritschl challenges, however, the dogmatic remainder in Schleiermacher which explains the joint sorrow of mankind as the aggregate penalty for mankind's sin. Nor is it fair play when Schleiermacher attaches the traditional name, original sin, to his new doctrine.

Schleiermacher distinguishes redemption and reconciliation, holding the first to be Christ's primary gift and the second dependent on it. Redemption he defines as the imparting of Christ's sinless righteousness, or of a share in His victorious consciousness of God. Reconciliation

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comes when, sharing in this consciousness, we cease to view evils as penal or indeed as truly evil at all. Ritschl has no room for any doctrine of Christ as immediately imparting new life. Redemption in this sense he will not admit; and in any of its senses he thinks that we may easily exaggerate the importance of the metaphor. With him, reconciliation stands first. In justification, along with forgiveness and trust, we accept God's aim and make it our own. Then, indeed, evils cease to look penal, and become disciplinary. It would not be safe to treat these discussions as mere questions of language. Through the differences in speech, differences in thought show themselves plainly.

It is an improvement in edition two that the chapter on the speculative philosophers is transferred from the last place to the second last. These philosophers make the attempt to interpret Atonement not in moral terms—as reconciliation of the will—but in terms of pure thought. Atonement for them means the essential unity of the divine and the human. Ritschl thinks this a mere aberration. Some adherents of the school extract orthodox Trinitarianism from their principles. Others, probably with better logic, are more radical. Ritschl shows how largely Schelling anticipates the negative positions of Strauss. With a malicious pleasure he traces the same tendencies of thought in the High Lutheran Kliefoth.

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Having disposed of this erratic school, the later editions end with certain positive advances traceable in the period after Schleiermacher. Ritschl complains, it is true, of the immense confusion of our age. More ominous still, the Pietist revival, far from orthodox though it was in several points, gradually led to a complete "repristination of Lutheran orthodoxy." Such came to be the professed attitude of High Lutheranism, however largely infected with modern theories of kenosis. Extreme Calvinistic orthodoxy, one may add, had never wavered in its acceptance of the post-Reformation subtleties which "Evangelical Arminianism"—*i. e.* Methodism—brushed aside. The two confessions agree in telling the modern world that not one jot or tittle is to pass from the Protestant Scholasticism. Elsewhere, however, in one point after another, Ritschl sees the beginnings of a sound moral doctrine of Atonement. Or at the least the modern Christian mind is seen groping after some such thing. Can Ritschl give the age what it plainly needs? He believes he can.

CHAPTER V

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY, ESPECIALLY *JUSTIFICATION*, VOL. II.

THIS part of Ritschl's work occupies an almost paradoxical position. It is regarded by the author and by his son as the central stronghold. Hence it stands after the history of doctrine and before the positive theory, as the supreme court of appeal; we find the same three parts similarly arranged in Schultz's *Gotttheit Christi*. Yet vol. ii. of Ritschl's *magnum opus* remains untranslated; it is less circulated even in Germany than vol. iii.; and Prof. Otto Ritschl has to make the admission that much of the detailed exegesis failed to carry conviction. Before we deal with vol. ii.—rather more fully than we should have cared to do, had it been accessible in translation—something must be said about Ritschl's earlier performances in the same field, and upon his presuppositions.

✓ Ritschl stands upon the whole for the assertion of harmony between different types of Bible teaching. The master discovery of his career as a Bible student, announced in edition two of *A. K. Kirche*, dominates his work ever after—

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the need of interpreting the New Testament in the light of the Old. Within the Old Testament Ritschl is aware of a contrast between the Law and the Prophets. On this point also he uses fixed language from 1857 downwards; the prophets represent "a higher development" of the religion of law. Even when Ritschl accepts his pupil Wellhausen's establishment of the Graf hypothesis, and recognizes¹ the dependence of the priestly law upon the work of Ezekiel, he leaves some of his former expressions uncanceled.² Other Old Testament literature, notably the Psalms, Ritschl is content to place along with the prophets, beyond the frontier line separating prophets from law. Again, in the New Testament there are for Ritschl three important literary groups: the Synoptic teaching of the Master; the teaching of the apostles generally; the teaching of St. Paul. Discourses in the Fourth Gospel are occasionally valuable in confirming the Synoptics, but they have been too largely modified to serve as an independent historical source. On the other hand, Ritschl thinks they contain too much of historical recollection to be utilized for a Johannine *Lehrbegriff*. The Tübingen school, which was dominant in Ritschl's youth, had little to say about the first of his three groups, and found the second

¹ *Justification*, ed. 2, p. 54.

² Nor ought we to forget how large a part of the material of the Old Testament law *must* be extremely archaic.

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and third to be in downright antagonism to each other. Ritschl early stood aloof, and afterwards revolted. In this case the characteristic attitude goes back as far as *A. K. Kirche* (ed. 1), for in it Ritschl already emphasized the agreements between St. Paul and other apostles. In edition two and in the *Justification* this emphasis grows stronger.

The English reader must not, however, suppose that Ritschl sees no diversities within Scripture. At times he will even blame a New Testament writer for not being equally sharp-sighted in reading his Old Testament.¹ Beck of Tübingen was intolerable to Ritschl, at least in youth, from his fault of "mixing all the Bible in one bowl."² Ritschl is also perfectly aware of the divergence of St. Paul from other writers of the New Testament. Still, he stresses the agreements. In handling St. Paul he is helped by the view he takes of him as a "dithyrambic"³ orator rather than a systematic thinker. Not without help from this undervaluing of the logical kernel of the apostle's thought, Ritschl is able to argue, *first*, that Paul holds the same view of Christ's sacrifice, as ensuring access to God, which other apostles teach; *secondly*, that Paul is warranted

¹ The Epistle to the Hebrews is blamed for mixing up prophetic and legal doctrines of forgiveness—things which ought to be strictly separated.

² *Life*, vol. i. p. 87.

³ *Justification*, vol. ii. § 37, p. 335 ed. 1, 338 ed. 2, 339 ed. 3.

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in remodelling the sense of the word "justification" in order to check Pharisee error, while the Reformers are similarly warranted in using St. Paul's language as a weapon against Romanist error; *thirdly*, that Paul's view of the Mosaic law is unhistorical and "apocryphal." We may well question whether Pauline thought, however "dithyrambic" in its utterance, has not more of compact texture than such an analysis will admit.

The question of rejecting parts of St. Paul's teaching is even graver. Ritschl is to be a biblical divine, but he does not concede that everything in the Bible binds us. What is the principle of selection? His friend Thikötter suggests that nothing in the New Testament is normative unless it lies along the lines of Old Testament piety and doctrine. He instances this very doctrine of the law in St. Paul as clinching his point. Paul was Pharisaic rather than loyal to the Old Testament in that view; therefore we strike it out. The principle succeeds well enough in that particular instance. But will it always work? Thikötter's essay was read and approved by Ritschl, but we cannot be sure that he endorsed every detail, nor yet that he felt bound to give authoritative ruling upon difficult points.¹ Paul had been a Pharisee, and—on Ritschl's own showing—repeatedly manifests traces of Pharisaism, even in more important

¹ Did not Browning form a habit of referring questions to the Browning societies?

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doctrines. Jesus was no Pharisee. He was no schoolman of any sort. And yet in regard to the Master, as well as in regard to His strange and great disciple, the question arises—Was He unaffected by His historical environment? Can we rigorously, in explaining Christ's words, go back over the whole of contemporary Judaism to the documents of the Old Testament?

The Old Testament has little to say to us about a future life; and Ritschl is among those who cut down the evidences of the first rise of that great hope, by refusing to discover personal immortality anywhere in the beliefs of the Psalter. Between the Old Testament and the New, the great hope had conquered the minds of most Jews, taking the form of the Pharisee doctrine of resurrection. More than this: we find Jesus teaching that "the Kingdom of God is at hand." Before Him, and after Him, Kingdom of God implies an eschatological transformation. It may be right to discover deeper meanings in Christ's doctrine of the Kingdom than belong to the phrase elsewhere; it can hardly be right to force the words of Jesus into sharp and unrelieved contrast with everything of their own age. Similarly, Pauline soteriology has to be a doctrine of salvation for the immortal individual. The salvation of the tribe might be good and sufficient Old Testament doctrine; "the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness

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unto children's children;" but the salvation of the Church, which counts for so much in Ritschl's eyes, could never suffice one who had passed through agonies of Pharisee individualism on his way to the peace of Christ. To put things strongly: might not Thikötter's test compel us to set aside personal immortality itself as an unwarranted gloss upon Old Testament ideas? Or, to be a little more reasonable: is not Ritschl's account both of the Master's teaching and of St. Paul's gravely discredited by a refusal to give due weight to beliefs, which hardly show themselves within the canonical Old Testament, but which are fundamental both to orthodox Judaism and to every form of genuine Christianity? It remains that, so far as one can see, Ritschl in theory is an orthodox Protestant with indefinite reserves, and in practice is absolutely eclectic.

It may be of interest to note Ritschl's early handling of Paulinism (in ed. 1 of *A. K. Kirche*). A writer who, in his maturity, concentrates upon Atonement, and who vindicates the Protestant devotion to Pauline forms of thought, stands or falls by his success in studying this theme.

Ritschl in youth had been helped towards his first theories of Atonement by the writings of Klaiber, upon whom we may read the maturer Ritschl's considered and unfavourable judgment in *Justification*, vol. i. A footnote¹ in *Justifica-*

¹ § 27; p. 222 of ed. 1; pp. 224-5 of ed. 2; p. 226 of ed. 3.

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tion, vol. ii., further informs us that Ritschl had been "misled" by Klaiber until after the time when he wrote *A. K. Kirche* (ed. 1). The same footnote affirms that Klaiber influenced Baur. A good deal more characteristic of the Tübingen school (one would suppose) is Schwegler's formula, according to which Paulinism is "the immanent dialectic of Judaism itself—the dialectic development of the religion of law into the religion of freedom."¹ Almost the same formula reappears in Pfleiderer²—"Paul's doctrine of redemption is a means of escape from the religion of law by the use of the very forms of the religion of law"—and is denounced in *Justification*, vol. ii.³ The volume of 1850, however, shows us Tübingen influence leading Ritschl to a highly "orthodox" interpretation of Paul. There is a harmony of grace and justice in the death of Christ, a death which He personally had not deserved. The law asked for "obedience or punishment." Christ as *ἱλαστήριον*, or "sin-offering," is a Substitute.⁴ Still, neither the Tübingen school nor Ritschl was bound to accept St. Paul's authority, and *A. K. Kirche* (ed. 1) summarizes the Klaiber interpretation of Romans vi.–viii. as a supplementary doctrine of atonement by which

¹ Quoted at p. 19 of *A. K. Kirche*, ed. 2, from *Nachapostolisches Zeitalter*, i. pp. 155–6.

² Ritschl cites it from an article of 1872 in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*.

³ § 35; ed. 1, p. 312; ed. 2, p. 315; ed. 3, p. 317.

⁴ pp. 85, 86 (*A. K. Kirche*, ed. 1).

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Paul relieved "difficulties" of which he could not but be conscious in the theology of penal substitution. This supplement, which Ritschl in 1850 calls with Baur a "mystical" doctrine of personal and moral salvation through Christ, had its difficulties too; the final result being that—still according to the Ritschl of 1850—Paul yielded to the eschatological current, tacitly discredited both his penal and his mystical doctrines of atonement, and threw the Christian salvation into the future. This is a noteworthy modification of the orthodox interpretation; and yet one would not have believed that Ritschl—in print, too!—had ever gone so far towards accepting the orthodox tradition. And he gives a place of dominating importance to Romans ii. 13, harmonizing it¹ with iii. 20 in view of the fact that no one does actually keep the law—an interpretation which in later life Ritschl vehemently rejected.

Prof. Otto Ritschl has pointed out that the introduction to vol. ii. of *Justification* contains prolegomena to Dogmatic rather than to Biblical Theology. This ought to warn us against expecting too much in the way of system from vol. ii. Originally, Ritschl had hoped that a second volume might complete his task. Only the fear of unwieldiness led to a further division of his

¹ *A. K. Kirche*, ed. 1, p. 78. The view taken of Paulinism in *A. K. Kirche*, ed. 2, seems to be purely transitional.

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materials. Hence vol. ii. gives just so much of biblical discussion as may lead up to the constructive treatment.

The introduction contains four sections. § 1, dealing with "Dogmatic or Positive Theology," repudiates Schleiermacher's view, that this central part of theology is to be a statement of the Church's authoritative dogmas. Ritschl finds no historical warrant for Schleiermacher's idea. Theology aims at truth, not at reproducing accepted views. Are we thrown back, then, upon the subjectivity of each theologian? No! The theologian draws the contents of his system (§ 2) from the Bible. Experience, whether in Hoffmann's or in Lipsius' version of it, is an unsatisfactory basis for any system. But there is no need to talk of an infallible Bible. Indeed (§ 3), while the authority of scripture is *polemically* absolute, the religious life itself is fed much more by the teaching of the living Church than by scripture. Yet we must look to the *first generation* of the Church—apostles and apostolic men; *men also who enjoyed a right understanding of the Old Testament* presuppositions of the Gospel. These men of the first generation, in supplement to Christ and in due subordination to Him, have given us our norm in the New Testament. True (§ 4) "Biblical Theology" will never absolutely coincide, even if it were systematized, with Dogmatic. Some views of some apostles are "apocryphal." We cannot settle in advance

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just where the boundaries of authority are to be drawn. We can only decide that point when we have constructed our system.

Chapter i. deals with the meaning of Jesus' thought of Forgiveness. First and most generally (§ 5) Jesus proclaims the Kingdom of God as a present reality, come to the earth with Himself. We are warned that it is not biblically correct to speak of the Kingdom of God before Jesus—not even in the Old Testament. On the other hand, it is admitted that sometimes the Kingdom of God is projected into the future, even in the Master's words; but this is purely on ethical grounds. Ritschl does not grant—his son assures us¹ he would never to the end have conceded—that “Kingdom of God” demands, as used by Jesus, an eschatological interpretation. On this background of a supreme moral and spiritual gift, Jesus (§ 6) defines the more special promise of “forgiveness and salvation.” But, in contrast with the very greatest names of the Old Testament, He means by salvation deliverance from sin—a remedy for separation from God—not necessarily, or even not at all, political freedom. Part of His work of “perfecting” ethical and spiritual teaching (Matt. v. 17, according to Ritschl²) is this sharp contrast to the Old Testament. The conditions of forgiveness are repentance and attachment to Christ's person.

¹ *Life*, ii. p. 189, footnote. ² Comp. *supra*, p. 63.

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We take one more step forward (in § 7) when we note that Jesus connects forgiveness and salvation not merely with Himself but with His death. The Gospels furnish no materials for deciding how early Jesus began to give this teaching. The two great synoptic passages (Mark x. 45, xiv. 22-25, and their parallels) had been set aside by Baur, and if admitted they had been explained away by Holsten. Ritschl submits very penetrating criticisms, especially of the latter. Both scholars, he thinks, were misled by undervaluing Mark. Since Mark's record is early and trustworthy, how are we to interpret these passages? We are now taken back (§ 8) for the first time directly to the Old Testament, and especially to its "poets and prophets." Still, the primary point of departure is the ritual law, with its sacrifices offered for the community, not for individuals, and with its confinement of sacrifice to sins of "ignorance." It is true that we read of certain special sacrifices, or even of other means of propitiation,¹ when the covenant has been definitely broken. But the prophets shrink from dwelling upon such sacrifices lest they should encourage superstition. They prefer to teach a hope in God's mercy to the very uttermost, independently of sacrifice. Both versions of the law, "in the form in which we have them," have made room for the great thought of mercy to the uttermost—repentance, of course, being

¹ *e. g.* the story of Phinehas, Num. xxv. 11.

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presupposed. When Jesus disentangles the hope of salvation from external politics, He cuts the ground away from those who would interpret His "ransom" death as a vicarious punishment.

Have we not such language in Isa. liii. ? Must not that passage have affected the mind of Jesus ? Do we not need to attach some more positive value to the sufferings and death of Christ than Ritschl has yet indicated, or will ever be in a position to point out ? In § 9, with laborious skill, he removes Isa. liii. out of his way. It is argued that the hymn referred originally to some royal sufferer, and (with Ewald) that it was incorporated by the exilic prophet. If such considerations reduce the authority of the passage, the scanty use made of it in the New Testament warns us afresh against overvaluing it. True, Acts viii. 35 suggests to us that there *was* a Jerusalem tradition which interpreted the passage of Christ's death. Yet Matt. viii. 17 proves that the tradition had not attained dogmatic definiteness. It was still felt legitimate to apply the words quite otherwise. The references to Isa. liii. in the passion narratives of Mark and Luke are set aside upon grounds of textual and historical criticism respectively. John i. 29 (36) is also, not unreasonably, referred to the Christian Evangelist rather than to the historical Baptist. Ritschl contends that Jesus is more original—nay, more of a "revealer"—if He arrived unaided at the thought of

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a redeeming death. But, if any one likes, he may be permitted to hold that Jesus was helped by Isa. liii.—an unusual stretch of concession from Ritschl. Only it is held that the opinion cannot be proved.

In §§ 10 and 11 we are given a positive interpretation of Mark x. 45. Three points have been signalized¹: (1) Ransom is paid to God—comp. Ps. xlix.—not to the devil. (2) Jesus does what no man could do, whether for himself or for others. (3) He, not personally liable to death, voluntarily surrenders His life to God (Job xxxiii. 24).² The passage, therefore, deals with deliverance from death, not from sin; and Ritschl rationalizes or modernizes³ so far as to make deliverance from death equivalent to deliverance from the fear of death. The other great passage—the words at the Last Supper—Ritschl holds over for treatment in chapter iii., which discusses the whole New Testament doctrine of Christ's death as a sacrifice.

Chapter ii. discusses “Reconciliation and Forgiveness in the light of the biblical idea of God.” It is one of Ritschl's fixed points that the thought of God controls to a great extent every theology and every religion. If, like many mediæval and some post-reformation thinkers, we make the

¹ A. B. Bruce, *Training of the Twelve*, ed. 2, 1877, pp. 286–7.

² Do these thoughts form a coherent unity?

³ Yet comp. Heb. ii. 15.

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relations between God and His world casual and arbitrary, we are in danger of losing God entirely. The true God is one who has a positive concern in the history of His world. At the same time, Ritschl is on his guard against admitting any *a priori* or perhaps even any self-commending thought of God. We are pushed back upon the empirical, historical fact of revelation. God was pleased to make a covenant with Israel. That fact, along with the Old Testament conception of God, determines Old Testament religion. God has been pleased to reveal Himself as the Father of His redeemed ones in Christ's kingdom. That is New Testament religion. The thought and the fact, the fact and the thought, are equally vital, whether amid the imperfections of the Old Testament or in the perfect light of the New. Fatherhood is all-important, but universal fatherhood is a dream.

Essentially, then, we have the same thought of God in both Testaments. Ritschl's treatment in this chapter may conveniently be gathered up under three heads. First, we have a group of attributes studied in § 12 and § 13. "Holiness, grace and love" in the Old Testament become "Love, grace and holiness" in the New. As edition one expresses it,¹ "The course of historical revelation, which reaches its perfection in the religious community of Christ, is such that we advance from regarding holiness as the central

¹ Foot of p. 91.

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feature in God to regarding love in that way." Edition two tells us¹ that the thought of holiness is all but cancelled in the New Testament. Its primary meaning had been negative. It implied the dangerous reaction of God's presence upon creaturely weakness. If it stands high in the Old Testament, that is because the law—we always find Ritschl treating the law as basal—coordinates ritual uncleanness or offences with true sins. Edition two, while largely swayed at this point by Baudissin, complains that the latter has not recognized an occasional higher view of holiness, in which the conception becomes positive. Just because He is the holy One, God pledges salvation to His people.² In speaking of God's attribute of love (towards the community of the redeemed), Ritschl characteristically warns us against mixing in the thought of our love towards God. "Whoever really loves God either says nothing about it or speaks in indirect, reserved, allusive fashion."³

Next we have two sections—§ 14 and § 15—dealing exclusively with the attribute of righteousness, one in the Old Testament and one in the New. We learn that there is no such thing as punitive justice in the Bible! The very basis of a penal theory of atonement is thus destroyed; one may sympathize with the result rather than

¹ p. 101.

² One might quote in support of this Ps. xxii. 3.

³ § 13; p. 97 ed. 1, p. 100 ed. 2, *ib.* ed. 3.

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with the process. It is *qua* Judge not *qua* Righteous one that God in the Old Testament is said to punish. The stems are different in Hebrew, and Ritschl, following Diestel, insists that the two underlying ideas are equally distinct from each other. Positively, Divine righteousness throughout the Bible means the systematic way in which God pursues His plan of saving His chosen ones.¹ Ps. lxi. 27 is tellingly quoted. If God “righteously” deals judgment to the wicked, we are asked to infer that the procedure is “righteous” as clearing the way for the final salvation of the good. “In Romans iii. 3, 5 *δικαιοσύνη* and *πίστις θεοῦ* are treated as synonymous.” A characteristic warning is dropped from the later editions: “Anyone who excuses himself from hard work at the theology of the Old Testament is unfit to expound the New.”² Even St. Paul thinks biblically of righteousness. Even the Apocalypse³ makes only a “seeming use” of the conception of penal justice. We ought not to speak of penal justice at all, but of divine anger or—in Jacobean English—wrath. The five closing sections of chap. ii. give a *résumé* of Ritschl’s views regarding this attribute—if for convenience we may so

¹ This must be at least part of the truth.

² Ed. 1, end of paragraph on p. 117 (§ 15).

³ So all editions of *Justification*, in spite of the opposite view found in a letter of 1871; *Life*, ii. pp. 115–16; comp. *supra*, p. 72.

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describe it—views already published to the world in a Latin programme of 1859.

The anxiety of the Greek-Christian mind for escape from unworthy anthropopathisms was responsible for transforming the metaphor of wrath into the fiction of penal justice. Ritschl further criticizes the favourite modern “sentimental” view started by Dippel, that wrath is a phase of jealous love; and he demolishes the semi-materialism of Weber. The idea of divine wrath grew out of sudden calamities overwhelming apostates, who in perishing forfeited not merely the natural blessing of life, but fellowship with God. Secondly, wrath was extended to cover God’s dealings with foreign nations who set themselves against His purpose of mercy towards His own. A still further modification arises when the mere purpose to launch acts of judgment is spoken of as “wrath”; but if we look closer we realize that a purpose to *act* is quite normally so described. Breach of the covenant, then, makes God angry; and later prophets give a systematic picture of a day of judgment overtaking (1) disloyal Israelites, (2) foreign foes. On the other hand, God is never said to be angry with Adam, or with Adam’s posterity merely as such. In the Psalms (§ 18) even such habitual things as persecution by foreign oppressors are referred to divine anger. In this way righteous men come to fear its touch. But the ground of their fears is sympathy with their nation, and at

the worst the fear is "hypothetical." The Old Testament (§ 19) definitely excludes the idea—though it may claim no less a man than Luther¹ as its champion—that God "hates sin but loves the sinner." The thought of habitual hatred, as distinguished from gusts of anger, goes back to Lactantius' legal theology, not to the Bible. Anger is not identical with holiness, yet it is a modification² of the primitive thought that the divine is unapproachable. Here as always (§ 20) the New Testament must be interpreted out of the Old; but we are surprised to observe how the idea of divine wrath recedes from view within the New Testament. Not even in the case of Ananias and Sapphira is the word employed, though the thought may be similar. The Epistle to the Hebrews regards the apostasy of Christians as exposing them to the final workings of God's anger, but does not *categorically* affirm this.³ So, in Revelation, sins are denounced in the seven Churches with a view to awaking repentance. "The Christian religion would seem no longer to have direct interest in the thought of divine anger."³

One exception occurs in the New Testament—the eschatological sense of the word. Here Ritschl suspects a weakening of the idea. But ✓

¹ Quoted in Schultz, *Gottheit Christi*, p. 186.

² So in ed. 1, p. 137; but p. 207 of the same ed. or of ed. 2 (p. 209 ed. 3) warns us against identifying God's *Erhabenheit* with His anger.

³ Added in ed. 2.

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he insists on finding that eschatological sense in all the great New Testament passages. At 1 Thess. ii. 16, it is intimated that God *will* deal effectively with persecuting Jews; at Romans i. 18, He *will* show His wrath against the monstrous Gentile vices; at Eph. ii. 3,¹ sin apart from grace is destined to ripen into a state calling for destruction. We are to distinguish (§ 21) Paul's certainty from a non-Christian point of view, according to which wrath is destined for all, from what Ritschl regards as Paul's higher Christian certainty—God's grace must triumph, making even sin (and the increase of sin under law) a means to the fulfilment of the gracious purpose. Nor does Romans v. connect the universal doom of death, inherited from Adam, with divine wrath. Even for Paul, only rejection of Christ (2 Cor. ii. 15, 16) seals the threat of wrath against those who have heard the Gospel. So far from "penal justice" being administered, those who suffer at the great day are "put out of existence." What have we to do with explaining such action? Salvation is what we understand, what we live by! For Christians, who dare not explain special calamities by divine anger, the latter thought "has no religious value at all, but is a homeless and shapeless theologumenon." If it is urged that Jesus on the cross felt the wrath of God—He spoke (like the psalmists He is said to have quoted) "hypo-

¹ More credibly, perhaps?

thetically ”; or—more impressively, perhaps—
 “ He who calls upon God as his God is not far from God nor God from him.” Edition one added,
 “ Though we can understand how suffering must force that dreadful doubt upon the tortured spirit.” Edition two suppresses the admission.

Chapter iii. deals with the interpretation of the death of Christ as a sacrifice for sin. After some remarks (§ 22) on Paul, and a postulate (one cannot say, a proof) that forgiveness in the New Testament is everywhere referred to the Christian community rather than to the individual, Ritschl goes on to trace the thought of Christ’s sacrificial death through the New Testament “ except in James and Jude,” and to insist against Richard Schmidt that in this thought—and not in Rom. vi. with its exceptional doctrine of salvation—have we the clue to St. Paul. It is natural that the thought of Christ’s sacrifice should so pervade the New Testament if, as the Gospels assure us, Christ gave it currency. How should Paul differ from his Master? Or from the first disciples? Why else emphasize “ blood ” in a death, like crucifixion, produced by the slow torture of pain and not literally by blood-shedding? The Epistle to the Hebrews emphasizes priesthood, and priesthood implies sacrifice. If *ἱλαστήριον* (Rom. iii. 25) is now taken as meaning “ mercy seat,” was not that sacred object sprinkled with sacrificial blood? The vagueness of John xvii. 19 suggests later reflection. In all this emphasis

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upon sacrifice the New Testament utters not one hint of penal substitution; *ὑπέρ* is not *ἀντί*.

In § 23 New Testament references to the covenant sacrifice, the sin-offering, and the Passover are dealt with. In § 24 the author seems to lose himself in archæology, as he inquires what *parts* of the sacrificial ritual are emphasized. From § 25 we are expected to carry away conclusions: the Old Testament knows nothing of penal substitution, or of appeasing divine anger, or of "covering" sin from God's sight. Sacrifice is designed to protect creaturely weakness in the divine presence. Expiation is a heathen thought, not a biblical. There is some very violent exegesis (*e. g.* of 1 Sam. iii. 14, where we are not to be allowed to suppose that sacrifice is contemplated for grave sins). Positively, sacrifice in the Old Testament means *safe approach* to God. The same view is verified without difficulty (§ 26) in the majority of New Testament writers, although the rather significant admission is made that we cannot with certainty trace in the New Testament the thought of God's physical dangerousness.—What, then, does sacrificial "approach" mean?—Paul (§ 27) must be similarly interpreted. We must abstain from any reading of his thoughts which would imply penal substitution. *Ἀπολύτρωσις* has come just to mean deliverance. But sacrificial doctrine is assuredly present. Even when, by a novelty, Paul speaks of "reconciliation," there is no reconciliation of God; and the change

in man's will is secondary to justification or forgiveness, though concurrent with it. The kernel of the sacrificial idea (§ 28) is identified in many New Testament writings with Christ's obedience in His calling—an obedience availing for sins of ignorance but not of deliberation. Col. iii. 7 means that those who afterwards repented and believed had been only in "external spatial connexion" with their unsaved brethren. This is astonishing exegesis.

§ 29 is remarkable for its brilliant summary of Paul's doctrine of the redemption of Jewish Christians from the curse of their broken law. Galatians and Colossians, unlike Romans, view the Old Testament law mainly as ceremonial. It was given by angels "through a mediator" because angels, who were numerous, needed a single representative agent; God, who is one, would have had no such need (Gal. iii. 19, 20). Such assertions about angels—angels, too, neither strictly good nor strictly bad—constitute an "apocryphal" element, due (says Ritschl) to a translator's blunder in the LXX; one supposed hint at a penal view of atonement in St. Paul is thus discredited. Colossians, indeed, reverts again to normal "sacrificial" conceptions. Other New Testament passages are written off as (1) of minor importance or (2) not necessarily to be taken in a penal sense. Edition two adds a passage upon Rom. viii. 3, interpreting it not of Christ's death but of the sinless life.

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Chapter iv. discusses "Righteousness as an attribute of Believers." It follows a similar method to that so successful in chapter i. Broad general truths are first stated; then follow more special affirmations. This chapter accordingly begins with points common to all New Testament writers, and introduces peculiarities in St. Paul's language or thought as legitimate and inconsiderable modifications. First, § 30 characteristically goes back to the "Old Testament," and studies its "idea of human righteousness." Law may be more concerned with "holiness" than with righteousness, but "the religious lyrics of the Old Testament" have the finest possible view of human goodness, whatever their "national limitations." The "prophetic development of the law"—edition two modifies the phrase, but insists that our Lord, like the men of His age, must have viewed the law as literally Mosaic and as earlier than all the prophets—gives this great teaching. Even Jer. xxxiii. 16 is interpreted of active human goodness. "Many at least" of the Old Testament repudiations of sacrifice are aimed merely at superstitious trust in the *opus operatum*.

The Active Righteousness of the Kingdom of God, in the teaching of Jesus, is the subject of § 31. Edition one already suggests that "hypocrisy" in the Sermon on the Mount does not mean deliberate imposture, but placing ceremony and conduct on one level. Presumably edition

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two means to repeat the same thought when instead of "hypocrites" it renders "actors"—as Seeley did in *Ecce Homo*.

§ 32 follows the same usage of "Righteousness" through the New Testament epistles, noting many examples in St. Paul. We are told that New Testament writers—Paul and others—consciously distinguish righteousness (as a thing of *deeds*, directed towards *men*) from self-consecration (shaping *habits* in the presence of *God*). Ritschl thinks this a most significant piece of New Testament theology. When later epistles begin to speak of "good works," Ritschl is less favourably impressed.

Why (§ 33) did not the fine insight of the apostles retain the whole point of view of Jesus? Partly, the eschatological habit of thought displaced the ethical *doctrine* of the Kingdom of God. Partly, the *practical* task of developing love within the little Churches made the Church leaders almost oblivious of the worldwide task, and of the heroic duty to love one's enemies. Yet Ritschl finds within the New Testament all the elements—he can hardly mean that he finds the crystallization—of his own doctrine about the organized Church, as a thing "of this world," in contrast with that ethical co-operation in which the "Kingdom of God" is "produced" by Christian love.

§ 34. Why did St. Paul introduce the new conception of righteousness by faith? Con-

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sciously, deliberately, exclusively, in order to keep outside the Christian Church the Pharisee falsification of religion. All were in agreement that righteousness must be completed by God's recognition and acceptance of it. Paul proposes a righteousness which consists in divine acceptance and in nothing besides ! Elsewhere¹ Ritschl adds a further point. Because the Pharisees looked eagerly to a future day of judgment, Paul teaches justification in the past, when the elect Church was accepted along with its risen Lord. Paul might have reasoned "more effectively"² if he had availed himself of the distinction between righteousness and consecration. Ritschl thinks that the Epistle to the Hebrews practically does this.

While treating the Pauline peculiarities as conscious strategy, Ritschl often diverges into more credible reports of the facts. He is well aware how much of the Pharisee there is in the intellect of Paul. In § 35 we study "Paul's conception of the Mosaic law." It is no satisfactory reproduction of Pauline thoughts to say that, if only man had not sinned, his own legal righteousness would have saved him ! The truth is, Paul has two inconsistent views of the Old Testament law, which go back to two different sets of experiences in his Jewish days. Edition three insists that self-righteousness, or "blame-

¹ p. 329 ed. 1, 332 ed. 2, 333 ed. 3, in § 37.

² Ed. 2 contents itself with saying "effectively."

lessness," must have belonged to an early period, and despair at the law's high moral ideal to days when Judaism was becoming impossible to Paul. Yet, as a Christian apostle, Paul is sometimes swayed by the one thought of the law and sometimes by the other. Again, Rom. ii. 6 is adjusted to the prejudices of Pharisaic Jewish Christians at Rome; later editions add, Roman Gentile Christians may probably have been legalists too. A footnote in edition one declares that St. Paul's belief in a recompense of evil deeds at the judgment is "more apparent than real." The deepest and most Christian thing in Paul is his belief in God's purpose to save the Church of Christ.

Justification by faith (§ 36) is sedulously kept separate by Paul from the thought of active human righteousness—which he also knows and values. Faith is a species of obedience, Rom. i. 5, xvi. 26. Yet Paul does not regard faith as itself a righteous thing before God. He makes his parallel between Abraham and the Christian, in Rom. iv., "artificial"—just to avoid any such inference. Nor is the Protestant doctrine Pauline, according to which Christ's own righteousness is transferred by imputation to sinners.¹ While some strong statements of edition one drop out, edition three still repeats the assurance that, for St. Paul, the Christian's imputed righteousness

¹ Though Ritschl very nearly adopts the Protestant formula in later life (*Justification*, iii., E. T. pp. 71, 72).

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is far from being "a fantasy or self-deception on the part of God." Yet statements of a different nature are made stronger than ever before: "Those in fellowship with Christ are not righteous in the judgment of any other than God." Edition one had defined the Pharisee error as "a confusion of elements in the religious life which the Old Testament carefully distinguishes." Ritschl impresses one more favourably when he insists—in all editions—on the harmony between the Pauline thought of justification and the general New Testament doctrine of acceptance through Christ's sacrifice.

§ 37 deals with Christian blessings supplementary to justification. St. Paul is still in view. The theory of a divine gift of active goodness is "a pietistic counterpoise to misunderstood Lutheranism."¹ Least of all could St. Paul use "righteousness" in a double-barrelled sense, meaning (in the same breath) an imputed and also an imparted righteousness. Yet it seems to be admitted that he *alternates* the meanings. The real benefit of justification is peace² with God, hope, eternal life. Or the real benefit of justification is glorying in sorrow—is faith in God's fatherly providence. Taught by the Reformers, Ritschl has discovered this at last in the New

¹ One supposes that the theory of the Christian community and the principles of Christian ethics are to pass for the whole truth in that direction.

² Subjective feelings of peace being rigorously excluded!

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Testament. The gift of the Spirit, we are told, is not connected with justification in any fashion by St. Paul. That "problem" remains for theology.¹

§ 38 expounds the sense "in which the New Testament recognizes a dependence of the state of justification upon active human goodness." The Epistle of James, outside the polemical passage in chapter ii.—Ritschl does not admit (later than 1850) that the polemic is aimed against Paul—exhibits very striking recognition of grace. 1 Peter is manifestly at home in the thought of grace, of hope, of self-consecration, but it does not dwell upon this problem of righteous acts. Paul touches on it comparatively slightly. But (§ 39), unlike Luther, Paul teaches no habitual imperfection in the Christian. In a sense, he sees every Christian as "perfect" in his calling—qualitatively, not quantitatively. This obscure doctrine of qualitative perfection is named as a reason why the problem was prevented from clearly shaping itself for St. Paul.

In 1 John alone (§ 40) do we find (1) recognition of habitual moral imperfection in Christians, and—connected with this realism in moral judgment—(2) a demand that only those who live in righteousness shall be suffered to enjoy the blessings of redemption. This "recalls Jesus'

¹ One assumes it is to be solved by the doctrine of the community taken along with the contrast between the religious and the ethical.

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teaching on forgiveness." Yet "John is far from breaking with" optimism. Leibnitz might well revive it! In doing so, he set a further problem to theology; such is the conclusion of edition one. Edition two strikes a rather different note. "On ethical problems the New Testament is not so entirely normative" as upon questions of faith.

Ritschl has been allowed to speak for himself at some length. At the end of his biblico-theological survey he leaves us less than ever clear regarding the question of authority. And his attempt to exhibit harmony where he does recognize authoritative teachings may seem to us not infrequently masterful rather than masterly.

CHAPTER VI

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, ESPECIALLY *JUSTIFICATION*, VOL. III.

Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, vol. iii. 1874; *die positive Entwicklung der Lehre*. Ed. 2, revised 1883; ed. 3, revised 1888; reprinted as ed. 4, 1895.

The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. The Positive Development of the Doctrine. E. T. (of ed. 3) by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay, 1900.

Unterricht in der christlichen Religion [Christian Instruction for Schools], 1875, 2nd revised ed. 1881; 3rd revised ed. 1886; Reprinted as 4th and 5th edd. 1890, 1895.

E. T. in Swing, *Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*, 1901.

Compare Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology: Critical and Constructive*, 1899; ed. 2, revised, 1902.

Albrecht Ritschl's Leben, chapter xv.

Thikötter, *Darstellung und Beartheilung der Theologie Albrecht Ritschls*, 2nd ed. 1887.

Mielke, *Das System Albrecht Ritschls dargestellt, nicht kritisirt*, 1894.

IN this chapter we take up Ritschl's central contribution to Christian thought—his new moral doctrine of atonement. True, he has no intention of being one-sided. He is to harmonize Abelard with Anselm. But he is resolutely opposed to rehabilitation of doctrines of penal substitution. That fact is one clue through the mazes of his thought. Another clue is his desire

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to find a remedy for the Protestant perplexity regarding the assurance of salvation. Is it logical, to bid us discover defects in all our works in order that we may rest upon God's grace, and yet to insist that we must have good works to submit lest we be moral impostors? Ritschl perceives the mischief clearly,¹ and is confident of having found a remedy.

The Atonement² is the "central doctrine of Christianity," and its statement requires "an almost complete outline of systematic theology." It is St. Paul, therefore, who defines the central doctrine; justification (instead of forgiveness) and reconciliation are his terminology. True, the Kingdom of God counts for a great deal in this volume, and for little with St. Paul; nevertheless, St. Paul is mainly followed. But Ritschl keeps nearer biblical usage than English theology does, when it talks of the "Atonement" as a synonym for the work of Christ.

Vol. iii. renews the effort of vol. ii. to construct prolegomena for dogmatic. The result is again disappointing. If one ventured to sum up inductively Ritschl's determinant thoughts, something like the following would result.

¹ p. 164 of the translation.—The biographer gives pretty full reports of the successive courses of Dogmatic lectures, in which Ritschl works his way from an early dogmatic half-orthodoxy to the characteristic positions of later years. The summarized courses on "Theological Ethic" make even less appeal to British readers.

² Comp. Prefaces.

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1 First, immense importance attaches to the doctrine of the community. Clear and full biblical authority is claimed for it, and clear and full authority in the usage of the Reformers. Conversely, the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of Socinianism—which Ritschl condemns as heartily as any other evangelical—is its neglect of the worshipping fellowship; the Church sinks into a school! Again, neglect of the thought of the “Community” is what makes chap. ii. of St. James so unfitted to afford guidance in dogmatics. § 1 of the Introduction to our volume does name this great thought; but Ritschl, almost isolated among Protestants in demanding that the central doctrine be stated in terms of the Church as such, ought to have used more emphasis.

2 Secondly, light is to be thrown on the mystery of atonement by distinguishing two stages in sin. This also has its biblical grounds. Earlier theology—particularly in dealing with atonement—is censured for making no use of it.

3 Thirdly, theology must be ruled by teleological concepts. Schleiermacher noted this as involved in Christianity, but, according to Ritschl, failed to do justice to his discovery, relapsing into a kind of pantheistic naturalism. The teleological principle will make theology truly ethical and truly religious.

4 Fourthly; the relation between theology and religious experience is discussed only in casual references. If theology is a *scientific* account of

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spiritual truth, with which side are its affinities closer? With science, or with edification? By temperament, but also by conviction, Ritschl pronounces for the former. "Theology is not devotion; as a science, rather, it is 'disinterested' cognition."¹ Negatively he implies the same view when he rebukes Hofmann for distrusting thought.² But there is some obscurity. In discussing the Reformers, vol. i. insists on a distinction between immediate religious experience, which has an intuition of Christ as a present Saviour, and the doctrinal reflexion which must insert time-links (notably, one concludes, that great link the community) between the historical Jesus and the spiritual needs of the modern believer. It is hard to harmonize this with a passage in the later volume;³ the redeemed ones "may, as their ideas take a temporal form, have the impression of a change from divine wrath to divine mercy"; but "the difference between our individual religious thinking, and the form of theological cognition *sub specie æternitatis*, should never be forgotten"; God always loved the heirs of salvation! Which dwells in the eternal—experience, or theology?

Fifthly, unity and system appear to be necessary equally to theology and to the religious life. In the case of theology, this demand helps to explain the hard arrogance of Ritschl. His

¹ iii. tr. p. 213.

² i. tr. pp. 540, 541.

³ iii. tr. pp. 323, 325.

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theories are coherent. A challenge at any one point threatens to destroy the whole. On the other hand, Ritschl cannot harmonize freedom and dependence except by "alternating" ¹ the points of view, since it is impossible for human minds permanently to place themselves at God's standpoint. Those who, declining such alternation, omit from theology subjective propositions, are said to employ a "purely dogmatic method." A duality shows itself, therefore, at the heart of Ritschl's rigorous systematization—the well-known "ellipse" with two "foci." ²

Sixthly, it is not claimed that the New Testament draws the distinction, though Ritschl seeks to discover its subconscious presence even there.³ For Ritschl, the distinction is basal. Morality confronts religion; "theological" ethics, dogmatic theology; the Church, the Kingdom of God; justification or reconciliation, the doing of the divine will. True, there is to be no external separation. Both the Kingdom of God and reconciliation have a place in dogmatic theology; if we do not make room beside "dogmatic" conclusions for others stated in terms of experience, our dogma will suffer. Similarly, Christian ethic keeps both sides in view. Yet in the end the dualism is irreducible. Morality always demands, never bestows; religion always bestows, never demands. Morality unites us to men, not

¹ iii. tr. p. 294—translation needs slight amending.

² *Supra*, pp. 10, 89

³ *Supra*, pp. 125, 128.

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to God; religion to God, not to men. Love to God and to men are two separate and “distinct” qualities.¹ “We are blessed not only in fellowship with God, but also in fellowship with all the blessed. For the former we have only God to thank; the latter we produce through our personal contribution to the common weal of the Kingdom of God.”² Thomas Aquinas may have been right in teaching that love to God justifies, if he would only refrain from adulterating it with love to men.³ The moral necessity that faith should work by love “follows from the fact that the same God *both* guarantees reconciliation and freedom from the world, *and* bestows the impulse to help in realizing the divine kingdom.”⁴

One might state as follows:—Our modern habit is to lay great stress upon goodness. We regard it as a unity, however variously manifested. If faith is distinct from works, it is still morally good, and good in an intenser degree. This may not be the full truth! It may be wise to “alternate” other representations, which exclude the remotest danger of legalism. But to our formula—or to something like it—modern evangelical thought returns, with a sense of home-coming. ✓ Ritschl will not have it! Goodness means two irreducible things bound together: *a* and *b*; morality *plus* religion; love to God *plus* love to man. This belief is one reason for Ritschl’s ex-

¹ iii. tr. p. 105.

² p. 669.

³ pp. 103–4.

⁴ p. 522 (not Ritschl’s italics).

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treme dislike to mysticism.¹ If for a moment one ceases to assert the free independent activity of the individual (of course within the community)—we are destroying morality. Others might once more aim at “alternating” representations. Assuredly there is danger in mysticism; but is there not danger in moralism? The same belief explains the unexpected form in which Ritschl criticizes the Roman Catholic position. It is Catholic doctrine to view Christianity “first and foremost as the form of a moral direction of the will, set in opposition to sin.” “Protestantism represents it first and foremost as the true religion. . . . But Christianity is” primarily “religion.”² A curiously scholastic way of stating the case!

⑦ Seventhly, we know that Ritschl declines to mark out the limits of Bible authority.³ Is not the upshot of his treatment that he sees hardly more than two sets of teachings in scripture: authoritative fragments of one great system, and—aberrations? While hailing the authority of Jesus as superior to St. Paul's,⁴ he accepts the latter's theological terminology; and yet teaching in Rom. xi.⁵ is condemned; in Rom. v.;⁶ in 1 Timothy (a “pseudonymous” epistle).⁷ Ritschl in youth had been offended by Neander's evasive

¹ Another reason is his dread that the historical Christ may be superseded.

² iii. tr. pp. 80 (81). ³ *Supra*, pp. 110, 111. ⁴ iii. tr. p. 313.

⁵ p. 459.

⁶ p. 366.

⁷ p. 131.

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handling of different New Testament teachings, as all harmonious in the end. Is there not room, is there not need, for some "alternating" points of view? If Neander wrongly exaggerated, has not Ritschl wrongly denied?

We have tarried too long over the introduction to the volume, or rather over our own view of how it might have been shaped. It is time to summarize the contents of the system. Happily this volume is translated, and we may be brief.

There are four parts: (A) "The Conception of Justification and its Relations"; (B) "The Presuppositions"; (C) "The Proof"; (D) "The Consequences." Brief titles to each of the nine chapters and of the sixty-eight sections are the only help given us in following a very complex train of thought. Plainly, Ritschl's scheme lends itself to repetitions. Nor does the meaning of his titles always declare itself. The titles of three sections (10-12) dealing with forgiveness exhibit no clear progress of thought; when one compares title and substance, one feels even more perplexity. The themes of § 52 and § 54 are almost verbally identical. Nor will the reader easily guess that § 14—"Forgiveness of sins, as a negative operation, distinguished from justification as a positive"—warns us *against* drawing the distinction; or that § 17—"Justification as a judicial act of God"—concludes that "judicial" is quite the wrong word to use; God forgives as Ruler, and still more (§ 18) as Father.

Chapter i. deals with the "definition" of Justification. § 3 in the Introduction¹ had warned us that definition is necessary for the discharge of the theological task. We must systematize usages which have a literary looseness in scripture. There is something awkward in this language. Part (C) offers "proof." Now, one does not prove a definition; one proves a thesis. Under cover of defining, Ritschl puts forward his version of the Protestant and Evangelical assertions.

§ 6. Justification and Kingdom of God, while belonging to different worlds of thought, are "homogeneous" — a characteristic term for asserting similarity in spite of fundamental difference. The Catholic view of justification as "making" righteous is not merely an exegetical error, but a religious disaster; it gives the wrong thing prominence. In its true sense, as the centre of Christianity, justification is synonymous with forgiveness (§§ 8, 14). It involves (§ 9) remission of penalties, *i. e.* of such sufferings as conscience leads a wrongdoer to regard as the punishment of his guilt. It involves (§§ 10, 11, 12) rescue from guilty fear of God, but also (§ 12 rather than § 11) from guilt as a reality. It is analogous (§ 13) to pardon among men, *i. e.* it means renewal of friendly fellowship.² It also means reconciliation (§ 15)—not of God to us;

¹ This section is dealt with in chapter vii, *infra*.

² One queries the use of the word "pardon" for this great thought.

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He was always fatherly towards the chosen community; but of us to God. Ceasing to distrust Him, we also accept His master-purpose—the setting up of His kingdom upon earth—as our own.

At this point, then, Ritschl seems to qualify the absoluteness of the old Protestant dualism. He is a champion of the theology of “both . . . and . . .”¹ but he allows a certain contamination of what Protestant orthodoxy called the “forensic” by what Protestant orthodoxy called the “physical.” The contamination is slight;² the new goodness, of course, is Godward, not manward. But the tinge of colour is there. It is unexpected. One is not sure that it is permissible.

The closing section (16) insists that justification is “Synthetic.”³ The sinner is justified; not, The believer is justified. Further, the divine sentence is an assertion of will. God chooses to regard sinners as just—an interpretation pregnant with consequences.

✓ Chapter ii. adds “The General Relations of Justification”—a further specimen of characteristic phraseology. § 17, Justification is not *really* judicial, but (§ 18) a fatherly act of adoption. If faith is (§ 19) its condition, the community comes to our rescue; it believed, before we had any being; we may share its treasure of divine

¹ *Supra*, p. 136.

² iii. tr. p. 79 (end of § 15).

³ *Supra*, p. 88.

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forgiveness. And faith contains something of love—towards God. The last three sections of the chapter are rearranged in edition two (and subsequently). The title of § 22, “Justification referred to the Community and to the Individual in it,” goes up to 20; 20, “Freedom of Believers from the Law,” is renumbered 21; and 21, “Particularity or Universality of the divine purpose of justification,” is renumbered 22. In substance the new § 20 seems to be fresh material; § 21 is practically or entirely the old § 20; and the new § 22 contains 21 and 22 of the first edition with some omissions. We lose the statement¹ that “the winning of Mohammedan nations for Christianity is all the more improbable, inasmuch as Islam excludes the Græco-Roman æsthetic and legal forms of human culture.” Another sneer at missions is also struck out. But later editions still refer to the “pietistic” desire for individual conversions and condemnation of mediæval mass methods. Edition one had added the remark that history was against the Pietists. “They employ after the event the same violence upon history which they resent in the conversion of the European peoples to Christianity; unfortunately, with less result”!² Later editions also drop a passage in which Ritschl³ had philosophized on seeds, like Butler or like Tennyson. “Experience teaches us in nature, that many organic germs and ill-developed fruits perish

¹ Ed. i, p. 113.

² p. 113, lower.

³ p. 115.

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without the quality of the species being affected; further, that individual organisms, plant or animal, may live on though lacking certain parts. Similarly, nations may persist in their historical and ethical significance, even though part of their population refuse their tasks and forfeit their prospects." This parallel may suggest "anxious questions of theodicy"; and, indeed, "the destruction of our kindred affects us very much more than a tree is affected by the fall of un-ripened fruits." But the logical inference stands!

So careful of the type *he* seems;
So careless of the single life.

Chapter iii. — "The Subjective Aspect of Justification considered in detail"—discusses faith and assurance. Roman Catholic antagonism to the latter is only half-hearted. Ritschl quotes to show how that Church employs "double weights and measures." Lutheranism used to *command* assurance. The Reformed (and many Lutheran books of devotion) put it on a syllogism: "Whoever believes is saved. But I believe." Later scholastic Protestantism introduced the *Busskampf*—nearly equivalent to the old Scottish "law work"—as a normal if not necessary antecedent to religious peace. All are wrong! If we understood *first* the thought of the Community, *secondly* the identity between saving faith and faith in God's fatherly providence, the problem would disappear or solve itself. He who

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receives Christ's revelations, and triumphs by faith over sorrow—who likewise as a reconciled soul seeks, not slavishly but filially, to do the Father's will—such a one cannot distrust God.

Part (B) is called "The Presuppositions." In order to construct a doctrine of Justification, we need one who justifies—God; we need an evil from which we are to be acquitted—sin; we need one by whom these two are mediated—Christ. Chapter iv. then deals with the doctrine of God. We postpone §§ 27–29 until later.¹ § 30 defends the divine personality on the lines of Lotze. §§ 31–34 deal with different conceptions of the idea of God, and correspondingly with different views of the moral order of the world.² § 35 contrasts the Kingdom of God with the Church, and § 36 man's dependence upon God, in both, with the complementary truth of moral freedom. § 37 gives a speculative—passing into a moral—interpretation of divine eternity. § 38—"Civil Society a pre-condition of the Kingdom of God"—is a tribute to the Roman Empire. § 39 explains "the possibility of reconciliation" in "the Kingdom of God" so long as sinful men remain salvable and are not wholly identified with evil.

Chapter v. discusses "The Doctrine of Sin." The doctrine of God is most literally one of Ritschl's presuppositions.³ But we should posi-

¹ Next chapter.

² Travelling over ground covered in Review articles. See p. 74.

³ *Supra*, p. 85.

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tively invert his meaning if we supposed that a ready-made doctrine of sin was presupposed in his doctrine of Atonement. The *fact* of sin is presupposed; but Ritschl, here as ever, insists that grace is (§ 40) “the standard of the Christian idea of sin.” Instead of speaking of original sin, we may more fitly speak of the “kingdom of sin” (§ 41)—due to the immeasurable interactions and consequences of individual wrongdoing; a position borrowed from Schleiermacher.¹ The equation between “Evil and divine Punishment” (§ 42) is unwarranted, partly because things formerly penal may be transformed if they function as healing chastisements. Sin may be forgiven (§ 43) at a lower stage. There is a tendency with some mediæval theologians—and Ritschl responds warmly—to regard the elect as God’s all along, not needing any miracle of redemption; while assuredly, for Ritschl, those ultimately lost never were redeemed.

As to the subject of chapter vi.—the Person “or Work”² of Christ—it may more accurately be described as *equivalent* to Ritschl’s doctrine of atonement than as either its presupposition or its consequence. § 44 interprets the Divinity of Christ *qua* “religious knowledge.” Briefly, Christ is known as saving us. No irrelevant dogmatic assertions may enter into this confession of faith. The same topic (§ 45) viewed as a “problem of theology” requires us to regard

¹ *Supra*, p. 99.

² E. T. p. 418.

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Christ as the purpose rather than as the agent of God in creating the world, and to take this as the true sense of scripture. § 46 pleads for continuity, not contrast, between the "two states" of humiliation and exaltation, and for a remodelling of the "three offices"—as prophet, priest, king—so that they shall no longer¹ "offer only distinctions and contrasts without reducing these to an ultimate unity." Ritschl's solution is that Christ as royal prophet fully and finally utters God to men, and as royal priest fully and finally represents men before God. We must "alternate"² the religious and the ethical estimate of Christ (§ 47), the divine and the human, the (royal) prophet and the (royal) priest. But we begin historically (§ 48) with "the ethical estimate of Christ according to His vocation" of establishing the Kingdom of God;³ we shall inevitably end, if we are loyal to Christ and to the community, with Christ as Divine, "the perfect revelation of God."⁴ "The origin of the person of Christ . . . is not a subject for theological inquiry, because the problem transcends all inquiry."⁵ Ritschl holds with *Ecce Homo*: "The 'abysmal deeps of Personality' hide this secret. It pleased God to beget no second son like Him." Christ's divinity (§ 49) is found to consist in a victory over the world which is largely a victory of faith, such as our

¹ E. T. p. 432.

² E. T. p. 439.

³ p. 450.

⁴ p. 452.

⁵ p. 451.

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own may be. As priest (§ 49) He is not our Substitute but rather our Head.¹ He was "a priest for Himself"—living the life of faith as a human person and gaining its victory in His own experience—before He became guarantee to God for all His fellows.

Part (C), "The Proof," deals with "the Necessity of Justification," first "in general" (chap. vii.), then (chap. viii.) with "the Necessity of Basing the Forgiveness of Sins on the Work and Passion of Christ." What does Ritschl mean here by "necessity"? Is it hypothetical (in some one of the many significations of that slippery adjective), or is it categorical? Does he mean that forgiveness is necessary if we are to be saved, or that forgiveness is certain from so good a God? The former, rather than the latter. Chapter vii. then affirms, Grace, not good works, must be central in salvation; while chapter viii. affirms, In spite of all alleged objections and all real difficulties, we must carry back the divine grant of forgiveness to the mediation of Christ revealed in His community (§§ 56, 59). Chapter vii. is ruled by Ritschl's dualism of the religious and the ethical. There are two necessities. Each has its claim, and each its purpose. We are forgiven in order that we may enter eternal life, *i. e.* may be victors over the world (§§ 52, 54). We are to do good in order that we may help to

¹ This is not Ritschl's phraseology. I fancy it is John Sterling's.

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create God's glorious kingdom on earth, and may enjoy blessedness within it (§ 53). The one thing "apocryphal" is the assertion, that we are forgiven in order that we may perform good works. The two streams never blend. They are "homogeneous" yet distinct. Both tendencies set us free and conduce to our blessedness.

In Chapter viii. the "Objections of Socinian and *Aufklärung* theologians" (§ 55) are repelled, mainly by a bit of Ritschl's "historical empiricism." There is no natural necessity or even probability of finding mercy in God. Such mercy is declared as a fact in Christ. Special importance is attached to Christ's "intention to found His Religious Community" (§ 56). This He purposed and this He has done. Within the community we have all blessings. Does objection arise (§ 57) "from the fact of sin continuing in the Community of Christ"? There must be no attempt to meet this (with Menken, or even in modified form with Schleiermacher) by urging that Christ gradually imparts fulness of victory over active sin. There is no such gift! In no sense! From no point of view! Christ gives all needed blessings; but we are to beat down sin within ourselves by personal effort; and that is the whole truth about the redemption of character. Do we persist (§ 58) in "Viewing Christ's saving work from predominantly negative standpoints"? No such views are lawful; not penal substitution; nor expiation, in any sense; nor

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satisfaction to the God against whom human history had so sorely offended. Do we emphasize (§ 59) "Views of Christ's saving work on individuals apart from the mediating conception of the community"? All such—even in St. Paul at Romans vi.—are "subordinate."¹ All that is scientifically valid is the doctrine of the elect and reconciled community. True (§ 60), within the community the religious experience of personal faith in Christ may and ought to come to its perfection. But immediate access to Christ, as the spring of a new righteousness in life, is not verifiable (§ 61). Regeneration gives no addition of moral power. It is pagan to look for moral power as a magical gift.

Part (D), "The Consequences," contains only a single chapter (ix.), which lays all stress upon religious consequences of justification. The world is to be ruled (§ 62), not negated. Faith (§ 63) is essentially faith in providence. The central religious virtue is patience (§ 64), or is humility (§ 65). The central religious act is prayer (§ 66), mainly, of course, prayer in common, mainly also (says Ritschl) the prayer which thanks God for blessings of which faith already feels secure—such prayer as one may offer to a Father. The three functions, faith, humility, prayer—patience dropping out—are predomi-

¹ Ritschl assumes that a doctrine of the redemption of character through the grace of Christ must necessarily be individualistic. Why?

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nantly (without exclusion of other elements in any one) the first of them religion as knowledge, the second religion as tone of feeling, the third religion as act. Taken all together they sum up "Christian Perfection" (§ 67); if the New Testament does not speak precisely so, the Reformers have given us this fitting formulation of the spirit of the New Testament in protest against mediæval views of perfection. The fuller title of this section in edition one was significant: "Christian Perfection as the subjective certainty of reconciliation." Last of all, § 68 provides that the moral side of Christianity shall not be forgotten. It deals with "action in our moral calling"—not with the endless task of obedience to a supposed statutory law. And it shows, Kantian fashion, how the dutiful mind produces for its own guidance, and freely obeys, the specialized requirements of true moral law in ever-changing circumstances. Almost the last note is an already quoted utterance of dualism: "We are blessed not only in fellowship with God, but also in fellowship with all the blessed."

After this entanglement in detail, let us try to recapitulate in our own fashion the principal novelties of the chapter.

Ritschl seeks to give us ethico-religious, or subjective, doctrines—of punishment, of God, of Christ, of atonement. He insists and repeats that nothing is to be considered as a punishment

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except what the conscience of the sufferer imputes to himself as such. One would gladly agree that righteous punishment is what conscience *may* and *ought to* recognize as such; but apparently Ritschl would hesitate to admit this translation of his formula; certainly he feels no need of it. How his formula as he gives it meets the case of the ill-instructed conscience, which wrongly refuses to regard—or wrongly regards—affliction as penal, one does not see.

The doctrine of God, again, is very largely ethical. It is even more important to note Ritschl's position, that the knowledge of God comes through Christ alone. The historical fact—that ethical monotheism, after the appearance of Jesus Christ on earth, burst its former narrow limits and spread over the lands of civilization—is at least patient of the interpretation put on the fact by faith. We cannot prove to demonstration that Christ is the Saviour of the world, but history bears a certain witness to that grand truth. At this point, at least, Ritschl is nobly Christian. He stands “through life” for the teaching of Matt. xi. 27: “None knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him.”

The doctrine of Christ is the newest thing in this volume. There has been nothing beyond partial hints of it in Ritschl's earlier writings. In seeking to give a new theory of atonement which shall do justice to evangelical faith and to

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the inner meaning of Protestantism, Ritschl does at least give us a new doctrine of Christ as the author of human salvation; nothing less than that; and possibly nothing more. It is true that Ritschl works hard to achieve a more theological rendering of his thought of Christ. Edition one already declares: "Our time-conditioned view of things cannot get rid of the antithesis between God's eternal decree and the realization of the same in time. . . . For this reason the eternal Godhead of the Son, in the sense here described, is perfectly intelligible only as object of the divine mind and will—that is, only for God Himself." From edition two onwards, words are added which Dr. Garvie has quoted: "If we discount, in the case of God, the interval between purpose and accomplishment, then we get the formula that Christ exists for God eternally as that which He appears to us under the limitation of time. But only for God; since for us Christ as pre-existent is hidden." It is worth carrying the quotation further still. "Since we cannot share the divine standpoint, we shall do well not to linger any further over this formal proof of our religious estimate of Christ."¹ It may be that the quotations given earlier² are more characteristic of the real Ritschl.

The elaborated doctrine of faith and its companion "religious functions" is almost startling. Faith in God's providence and the justifying

¹ § 49; E. T. p. 471.

² *Supra*, p. 145.

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faith which lays hold of forgiveness are not two things, but one. We have no reason to assert God's fatherliness except the revelation of Christ. To Ritschl it seems a fatal error to call providence a truth of "natural religion." Did not the Old Testament toil after such faith, almost in vain? The great "religious" gifts of God seem, to unbelief, like fairy gold which turns into withered leaves. What is this inner freedom to which we are called—this victory over the world which we may share with our Master? Patience; resignation; a "having nothing," it may be, while "possessing all things." It is a gift of inner peace; but outward sensible verification there is none—only God, only Christ.

The question has been debated whether Ritschl is reasonable or perverse when he speaks of believers as sharing the "Godhead" of Christ. Schultz concurs with him; and it is well to apprehend the kind of evidence by which they try to justify it. If Christ's Godhead is ethical before it is religious, and if faith in us is essentially a laying hold of God's fatherhood—truly, it is not easy to keep the two doctrines from fusing, as they so unexpectedly do.

Let us address ourselves now to the immediate purpose of the chapter.

✓ The Atonement, for Ritschl, is essentially a doctrine of Christ's sacrifice. To that conception all other Bible teaching on the subject is rigorously subordinated. What then does sacri-

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fice mean? Ritschl's primary interpretation—safeguard against God's physical holiness—is an obsolete thought in New Testament days. Is sacrifice merely a traditional usage? Does it impose itself on the mind by mere weight of custom? How, then, can it feed the soul, or explain the significance of Jesus Christ? Again, sacrifice in the New Testament is especially sin-offering. Ritschl and Schultz both seem to lean towards the gift-theory of sacrifice. If that theory satisfies us, then sin-offering has no distinctive meaning or message.

Ritschl accepts no light on the positive meaning of Atonement from special Old Testament sacrifices for renewal of a broken covenant. Nor does he seem to dwell on the fact that the covenant of Sinai was held to have been ratified, not to say constituted, by sacrifice. While the covenant holds, sacrifice avails; when the covenant is broken, sacrifice is idle. The explanation why God forgives is—His covenant purpose. He needs no propitiating, so long as there is any possibility of His proving propitious. What is sacrifice? With immense expenditure of biblical and theological learning, Ritschl unveils the shrine—and it is empty. Or, if that is too harshly said; Do Ritschl's assertions—that Christ's obedience in His vocation is the principle which makes it sacrificially precious to God, and that Christ destines to us in the community the results of His life and death—do these really

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compose into a coherent faith? Or are they broken echoes of grander truths?

✓ What strikes one finally in this volume, as a theory of atonement, is the ease with which one could cut out sin and all its consequences, leaving Ritschl's theology almost unchanged. It is well, as F. D. Maurice urged, that we should not begin our thoughts of religion "after the Fall." It is well, with Ritschl, to explore the life of faith in God and in His providence. Positive religious "functions" are as precious as moral renewal. But do we not need something more? That God resolved to admit certain human beings into a community of eternal life; that Christ accepted the divine purpose allotted to Him, and accomplished it in a supreme fidelity which triumphantly endured all tests; that the sins of the redeemed were only half-sinful and so could easily be forgiven; that other sinners were—hardly punished in righteous anger, rather "cast as rubbish to the void"; is this the truth of God and the mind of Christ? I for one cannot believe that the sin of the world is a separable accident of the mission of Jesus, or of the faith and life of the Church which He redeemed by His blood.

CHAPTER VII

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS

Rechtfertigung, vol. iii., especially §§ 27, 28, 29, 1874.

Herrmann, *Die Metaphysik in der Theologie*, 1876.

Herrmann, *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit*, 1879.

(Schultz, *Gottheit Christi*, 1881.)

Kaftan, *Das Wesen der christlichen Religion*, 1881; ed. 2, 1888.

Ritschl's review of the *Wesen*, *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1881.

Ritschl, *Theologie u. Metaphysik*, (1881), ed. 2, 1887.

Ritschl, ed. 2 of *Rechtfertigung* vol. iii. (note the revised § 3, as well as §§ 27-29), 1883.

(Herrmann, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, 1886; ed. 2, 1892 [E. T. 1895]; ed. 4, 1903 [E. T. 1906]; ed. 5, 1913.)

Ritschl, ed. 3 of *Rechtfertigung*, vol. iii. 1888; E. T. 1900.

Kaftan, *Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion*, 1889; E. T. 1894.

F. Traub, *Ritschl's Erkenntnisstheorie in Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche*, 1894.

Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith*, 1899; ed. 2, 1902.

On "Value-Judgments"—

Max Scheibe, *Die Bedeutung der Werturteile für das religiöse Erkennen*, 1893. (Follows Lipsius. Combines valuation with another more metaphysical point of view.)

Otto Ritschl, *Ueber Werthurtheile*, 1895.

Max Reischle, *Werturteile und Glaubensurteile*, 1900.

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On "Values" generally, compare further—

H. Höffding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, E. T. 1906.

Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907.

H. Münsterberg, *Philosophie der Werte*, 1908.

Urban, *Valuation; its Nature and Laws*, 1909.

And earlier works as named by Reischle.

WITH the third volume upon Justification Ritschl entered on a fresh stage in his life of controversy. This was partly due to his breaking new ground, when his Dogmatic volume incidentally raised the problem of philosophical justification for the Christian creed. Ritschl's views gave scandal alike to the orthodox and to the radicals; younger men, fully more interested than he was himself in philosophy proper, rushed forward to give him their support—a support mingled with friendly criticism; and the clamour grew. Henceforward students of Ritschl are inclined to devote only too much attention to philosophical prolegomena. Henceforward, also, Albrecht Ritschl ploughs no lonely furrow. Schultz gives a detailed statement of the new Christological doctrine. Herrmann and then Kaftan deal not only with apologetic issues, but with religion or dogma. However these minds differ, they all in some sense go back to Kant. And they all desire a theology closely in touch with the religious life—a theology unalloyed with alien elements.

(1) In 1874 Ritschl lays down the main lines upon which he and all his comrades will work,

though certain particular assertions are destined to disappear even from Ritschl's later editions. Again and again he declares that "Religion and theoretical knowledge are opposite activities of the mind," though dealing with the same "field of objects," *i. e.* "the world and mental life."¹ In recognizing that religion does not exist in order to minister to any—even the highest—intellectual curiosity, we verify the assertion "with which we started" of "the difference in kind between religion and theoretical knowledge."² We shall have to cross-examine Ritschl upon other questions affecting philosophy besides this proposal to define the frontiers. But this is his starting-point; and while we are studying him we must begin here. We can also recognize it as ranking among the primary motives of his partners in the other boats.

(2) Passing on from form to substance: we note in edition one an assertion to which Ritschl always adhered; with which Herrmann fully concurs; to which there are plain parallels in Kaftan, even if Kaftan criticizes; and which

¹ Vol. iii. ed. 1, § 27, p. 170.

² *ib.* § 28, p. 178. Prof. Otto Ritschl calls our attention to an interesting attack on "the old false theory of knowledge and the old bad metaphysics," § 45, p. 357; also to a definition, § 44, p. 343: "We know the kind and the qualities of a thing—its definite character—only by its action on us; and we regard the kind and the scope of a thing's action as the thing's essence." This foreshadows what Ritschl will formulate some years later; see *infra*, p. 181.

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was adopted by Ritschl's old friend and subsequent adversary, Lipsius. This is the celebrated analysis of religion as springing from a twofold root, being due on one hand to man's physical position as a helpless part of nature, and on the other hand to his irrepressible moral claim. Dr. Garvie is more severe in criticism even than Kaftan. He describes Ritschl's analysis as "a pathology and not a biology," quoting against it one of the translations of a hymn ascribed to Xavier, "My God, I love Thee." Since Dr. Garvie pronounced this verdict, William James's brilliant book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, has adopted Francis Newman's contrast of the "once born" and the "twice born"; or—as an alternative form of expression—James will contrast "the religion of healthy-mindedness" and "the sick soul." Who can help recalling sacred words? "They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick; I came not to call the righteous but sinners." Ritschl, indeed, is not dealing wholly or even mainly with the desperate sickness of sin. Perhaps that is a misfortune. But, if so, Ritschl is not too pathological. Rather he is not pathological enough. On the other hand, Christian faith does not tell merely of disease but of remedy. Not the sick soul—the healed soul! ¹

(3) On the basis of this appeal to human need,

¹ The Latin hymn is legitimate devotional rhetoric; but theology will take it with a grain of salt.

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Ritschl in edition one goes on to formulate after Kant the outline of a reliable theistic argument. In vol. iii. Ritschl always deals with the *Critique of Judgment* rather than with Kant's other ethical writings;¹ but later editions suppress the interesting censure passed in vol. iii. ed. 1² upon the *Critique of Practical Reason* as falling back into "eudæmonism," by which term German theologians mean hedonism. Indeed, edition one concedes that, upon one possible interpretation, there is a hedonistic taint even in the theism of the *Critique of Judgment*; but *first*, the interpretation is probably incorrect; and *secondly*, edition one holds that the entire line of thought within the *Critique of Judgment* which might lend itself to a hedonistic gloss is a mistake, viz. *the assertion that our knowledge of God is purely practical*. Ritschl in 1874 resolutely corrects this finding of Kant's, and claims that the correction is true to Kant's deeper meaning. "The original intention of Kant is to combine in one our knowledge of freedom as a reality with our knowledge of natural causation," as itself a reality of lower type.³ If we could not call this "theoretical knowledge,"⁴ we might still be Christians; but *theology as a science would be impossible*. So also we must say⁵ that this idea of God is an indispensable "scientific hypothesis." "Acceptance of the idea of

¹ These come in for their share of attention in vol. i.

² § 28, p. 188. ³ p. 189. ⁴ p. 191. ⁵ p. 192.

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God is by no means practical faith; it is an act of theoretical knowledge." This interpretation of religious faith as involving true theoretical certainty held its ground almost everywhere in edition two, but was cancelled in edition three. And yet we shall have to notice presently how hesitatingly—nay, in how self-contradictory a fashion—Ritschl recanted. On the other hand, we must recognize that, even in the first edition, it is only one special train of thought, dealing with moral realities, which is said to give "theoretical" certainty of God.

(4) Another attempt found in edition one to define the peculiarities of religion follows Lotze more directly than Kant. Religion always works with the conception of a whole; and every train of thought which works with the conception of a whole is religious. From this view also we shall find Ritschl receding—and again with much self-contradiction. The view of things in edition one is at least coherent. Ritschl held that religion needed to grasp the unity of the world. By this he meant the world of nature; he did not mean nature and man, or nature along with man and with any other rational creatures who may anywhere exist. Least of all did he mean the universe taken along with its Maker. Having grasped all nature as a unity, religion measures man against it and proclaims his superiority—a superiority safeguarded by God. Dr. Garvie points out that in edition two this idea of whole-

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ness as belonging to the essence of religious thought is being displaced by the doctrine of Value-judgments. That is a new formulation. Edition one speaks indeed of values; but it does not put forward the thesis that the difference between religion and science lies in the fact that valuation is essential to the first and accidental to the second.

We turn next to the early contributions of Herrmann and Kaftan. Herrmann's little treatise of 1876—*Metaphysics in Theology*—puts upon the agenda of debate, more deliberately than Ritschl had ever done, the proposal to banish metaphysics from the interpretation of Christianity. But one would not have anticipated from this treatise the line which Herrmann follows in the longer work of 1879. We learn in that book that metaphysic is as far removed as religion itself from being a pure theory. It is due to the hidden working of a practical impulse. The beginnings of metaphysic exist in every mind. We cannot wonder that men who have no better help should be dazzled by its glamour. It suggests for belief three noumena—an odd triad, for which Herrmann makes himself responsible: the idea of the soul, the idea of the thing-in-itself, and the idea of the world-whole (in Ritschl's sense, apparently). "Dogmatic" metaphysic supposes that we can make definite assertions about these great ill-defined conceptions. We

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cannot! All we can *know* is part after part without a whole—the “never-ending” (*grenzenlos*) procession of finite phenomena in boundless time and boundless space, or the never-ending scientific inquiry where each answer contains the germ of a fresh question, for ever and ever more.

Here then is a new effort to draw, on Kantian principles, a scientific frontier between faith and knowledge. As a student of Kant, more at home in Kant's thoughts if not more loyal in admiration for him than Ritschl was, Herrmann ought to be able to achieve success if anyone can. He tells us (in 1879) that he agrees with the interpretation of Kant given by the neo-Kantians of Marburg, while he declines what they *add* to Kant—an attempt to obtain results *for knowledge* from the practical philosophy of the master. (Here one *contrasts* the Ritschl of edition one!) On the other hand, Herrmann does not consider that he is tying up Christianity with the basis of the Critical philosophy. If any other system will allow him to contrast Nature and Spirit, and to distinguish “independent knowledge” from “the domain of the concrete moral ideal,” theology will not inquire “whether in other respects philosophy is deistic, pantheistic, theistic, or anything else”¹—an offer which probably means a good deal less than at first it seems to convey. It is perplexing

¹ *Metaphysics in Theology*, p. 21; comp. Garvie, p. 66.

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to find presently that pure intellect seems to be restricted to *Mathematics*.

There are other difficulties. Ritschl is apparently a genuine libertarian.¹ We have seen how vigorously *Justification*, vol. iii., asserts the fact of freedom. Herrmann's devotion to Kant goes so far as to include the antinomy of freedom and causation, and the tremendous assertion that, if we had the necessary data, we could calculate human conduct in advance as exactly as eclipses. Again, Ritschl refuses to accept psychology as a basis for philosophy of religion because of its appealing direct to the individual and making no place for the *Gemeinde*; Herrmann, because psychology deals with mere facts: it is a branch of "zoology"—the moral ideal occupies a place by itself.² With all their spiritual sympathy one for another, the leaders put forward very divergent intellectual schemes. Dr. Garvie has analyzed with fine penetration the Christian motives which operate in the Ritschlian rejection of Speculative Theism. What wise Christian can withhold sympathy from the effort? The actual Ritschlian achievement in philosophy of religion—that is another matter. To tell the human intellect, with Herrmann, that there are certain questions it never

¹ In spite of disparaging references in *A. K. Kirche* to the "apologetic" assertion of freewill by the Greek Fathers.

² Even Kaftan finds reasons for ruling out psychology; *Wesen*, p. 11.

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asks, is surely wasted breath. In some minds, the thought of a part cannot exist without the corresponding if difficult thought of a whole.

We pass into a different atmosphere when we turn to Kaftan's contribution in the *Wesen*. Kaftan is an empiricist. The *Wahrheit* reveals him, quaintly enough, as an enthusiastic admirer of J. S. Mill's philosophy. True, he is an empiricist of an unusual, perhaps a paradoxical, type. He agrees with Kant in holding—in a modified but really intensified sense — “the primacy of the practical reason.” All man's spiritual certainties must have been historically created; nothing can be naturally given—that is his plea. He attaches great value to discovering the genesis of moral ideas; a non-empiricist does not see why. Moral ideas have no “apriority” for Kaftan—by this perhaps he only means innateness—but they are distinctive!

In another way his empiricism shapes the plan of the *Wesen*. We are to gather the nature of religion from a study of empirical facts. Ritschl and Herrmann, in their zeal for positions borrowed from Kant, have worked with an “ideal” of religion as if it were a “definition.” They are wrong! In defining the essence of religion, we must include only those elements which are held in common by all forms of religion, of every shade and colour. The essence of Christianity, when it is discussed in Part II. of the book, is similarly to be based upon facts. One conceives,

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then, that Kaftan's criticism of Ritschl and Herrmann, for interpreting religion in terms of man's moral need, is actuated by his empiricism. Ritschl and Herrmann had thought to simplify the process of study by discarding much waste material and concentrating upon higher forms. Kaftan resolutely insists upon beginning at the beginning. Religion seeks (1) natural good things upon earth—savage religions; (2) moral good things on earth—national cults; (3) a supernatural, non-ethical, good—mystical Brahmanism; (4) a superearthly¹ moral good, the Kingdom of God—Christianity. Kaftan's attack becomes more formidable when Dr. Garvie participates in it. In the latter we cannot explain it by empiricist sympathies.

The present writer cannot help agreeing with Ritschl's review in the *Theol. Literaturzeitung* against Kaftan—and incidentally against Dr. Garvie—that it is impossible to work on the philosophy of religion without being actuated by one's conception of the religious ideal. If it is legitimate for Kaftan to report that religion seeks "natural" (in opposition to "moral") goods and ultimately one superearthly good—in this revealing its true nature; why may not other theologians report that religion reveals its true nature when it offers to supply man's moral necessities—then, and not till then? Or how will the empiricist policy work? Social phenomena

¹ Kaftan insists on this definition, against Ritschl.

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do not carry their names written on their foreheads. None of them is labelled for us, "I am a religion," or "I am not a religion." The student has to decide, in the light of facts but of facts helped by theory, how to classify and when to distinguish. If theories without facts are "empty," facts without theory are "blind." One must still believe that the poorest savage who pesters the spirits for "cows" or for "children" or for other "natural earthly goods" is hungering for God all the time and blindly seeking Him. Else—must we not hold that the different religions are separate entities, misleadingly huddled together under the shelter of a general name?

We turn now to speak of what is perhaps the most outstanding result of the *Wesen*, the rise to popularity of the phrase "value-judgments."¹

Apart from possible affinities in thought with the Reformers (not in phraseology), or apart from doubtful connexions with Kant and de Wette, the origins of this phrase belong to the ideas of Herbart and of Lotze. By the former, all judgments which are not theoretical and *indifferent* are classed together as "æsthetic." But Herbart was a thoroughgoing intellectualist, seeking to develop all the wealth of psychical content from the interaction of separate intellectual "presentations." A change, highly welcome

¹ Compare Note C in Appendix: "Jesus has for the Christian consciousness the Religious Value of God."

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to the Ritschlian divines, is found in Lotze, who not merely attaches importance to the world of values and to the subjective process of valuation, but connects the latter process with feeling. Neither in him nor in the Ritschlians is this intended to connote hedonism. Pleasure and pain are to be a thermometer, registering degrees of value. The value recognized is not of necessity a pleasure-value, any more than the temperatures registered by a thermometer are necessarily or usually the temperatures of a mass of quicksilver. Yet one may doubt whether, with the best intentions, Lotze and the Ritschlians do not frequently diverge into a hedonism false in itself and inconsistent with their own deeper beliefs.

The actual compound, Value-Judgment (or "Judgment of Value": I follow the commoner usage¹) has been traced to a little-known member of the school of Herbart, Ign. Pokorny, 1869. It appears, outside of the Herbartians, in an address of 1871 by a philosophical writer, Rümelin, one of whose volumes Albrecht Ritschl knew and valued. It appears once again within the school of Herbart (Oslawsky; 1873). Next, in the pages of Herrmann's *Religion* (1879) it begins to seek for recognition from the friends of Ritschl. In that volume the word occurs incidentally, without explanation or definition.

¹ Some would prefer the Saxon term "worth"; but it would not lend itself to the Economic applications of "valuation" which recent study includes.

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There are several occurrences before those put on record in the authorities named at the head of this chapter. What I take to be the first of all—p. 40—is significantly followed by a quotation from Lotze. It is also worth noting that the term does not once occur¹ in Herrmann's *brochure* of 1876, the *Metaphysics in Theology*. In Herrmann's usage, *Werthurtheil* always seems to refer to a specific feeling of *self*; but the Lotze tradition—accepted even by the rigorous Herrmann—gives to this feeling a wealth of varied reference; much that is hedonic; much that is ethical. Herrmann's accurate knowledge of Kant enables him to cite one passage from Kant himself² in which feeling is said to be appealed to in all practical belief—surely an exceptional utterance!

By the end of the decade the term was manifestly "catching on." It occurs thrice at least in Schultz's *Gottheit Christi*³ (1881). And it becomes a matter of conscious theory and definition with Kaftan, in the *Wesen* (also 1881). Ritschl, in his review of the same year, proposes a correction; "Value-judgments" occur everywhere, but the "indirect" ones of science may be disregarded. However, he does not in this article employ the phrase "value-judgment"

¹ I believe.

² "Kritik d. reimer Vernunft 607"; quoted in *Die Religion*, u.s.w., p. 63.

³ pp. 2, 343 n., 440; the preface is dated Nov. 1880.

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except in summarizing Kaftan. The *Theology and Metaphysic* of the same year does not contain the term.¹ Finally, Ritschl introduces the phrase into edition two of *Justification*, iii. (1883), since when it has fairly held the field. He now speaks of "independent" and "accessory" value-judgments, rather than of "direct" and "indirect." Finally, in the posthumously published *Fides Implicita* ² (1890), it has been noticed that he recurs to the description of the "religious judgments of faith" as "direct value-judgments."

Dr. Garvie has praised Kaftan for avoiding Ritschl's assertion—a great deal may be said both for and against it ³—that religion "consists in" judgments of value. Faith, according to Kaftan, enunciates "theoretical judgments," ⁴ but those theoretical judgments which emanate from faith are "based upon" judgments of value. All judgments are either "theoretical," or else are "value-judgments" of three sorts—natural, moral or æsthetic. The last Kaftan dismisses as of no visible importance for theology.⁵ Of the other two, religious value-judgments must be rigorously classed with natural desires *because*

¹ Ed. 2, 1887, has it not (comp., however, *Werthbestimmung*, p. 57); one presumes ed. 1 was similar in this respect.

² pp. 68, 70.

³ Comp. Note D in Appendix (the Definition of a Value-Judgment).

⁴ A note to E. T. of *Truth of Christian Religion* (ii. 220), employs as a synonym a term with still more questionable associations, "ontological."

⁵ Is that certain?

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they begin with these and *because* they must at all costs be distinguished from moral judgments. A judgment of value expresses a relation to facts; a theoretical judgment expresses a fact. Kaftan's second edition (of the *Wesen*) rejoins to Ritschl that he knew Judgments of Value were ubiquitous; apparently he had not thought the fact needed emphasizing.

Obviously it will be dangerous if careless readers should combine Kaftan's definition with Ritschl's usage. According to the former, value-judgments do not affirm existence. According to the latter, religious affirmations consist in nothing but value-judgments! No wonder the scornful men accused the movement of thorough-going scepticism. It adds to the confusion when Kaftan's *Dogmatik*¹ praises Ritschl's emphasis on the contrast between *Seinsurtheile* and *Werthurtheile*—precisely the contrast which Ritschl declined to draw! It is no sufficient safeguard when Kaftan adds that “Ritschl's own language is at the least liable to be misunderstood.”

Dr. Garvie has suggested that Ritschl desires us to content ourselves with *πίστις* to the end, while Kaftan bids us advance to *γνώσις*. Great respect is due to every one of Dr. Garvie's conclusions, but I cannot concur with him here. First, verbally, it happens that Kaftan definitely repudiates *γνώσις*.² But also, substantially,

¹ p. 37, ed. 5.

² *Wahrheit*, u.s.w., E. T. i. pp. 14, 15; *Dogmatik*, ed. 5, p. 240.

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the assertion is hard to accept. If we suppose a value-judgment to be subjective and non-objective; and if we declare that our gravest theoretical judgments are to rest upon unstable subjective foundations; what matter if we produce most admirable plans for the upper storey? Prof. Max Reischle¹ has told us that "none of the more notable followers of Ritschl have been so mad" as to suppose that they can settle the question regarding the truth of religion by the appeal to value-judgments. What does Kaftan himself say? He asks, "Is knowledge of facts or is *Werthbeurtheilung* supreme?" And he answers, "For the highest truth, judgments of value must be decisive."² This empiricist, this enemy of *a priori* ethics, is not more solid or more cautious but more recklessly subjective than any other of the school. Religious truth with him is a mere velleity. I cannot understand him otherwise.

1881, as we know, saw the first edition of Ritschl's *Theologie und Metaphysik*. While he makes some friendly references to Herrmann's *Die Religion*, and breaks a not unfriendly lance with Kaftan³ over the latter's admission of a

¹ *Werturtheile u. Glaubensurtheile*, p. 108.

² *Wesen*, ed. 2, p. 217.

³ Kaftan's tenderness for the mystical is akin to his effort to discover a general essence of religion as such. He makes a half-apology for the word (*Wesen*, 1887, ed., p. 262), attacks catholic mysticism (*ib.* p. 361), denounces a

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certain mystical element in religion, he is mainly occupied in trouncing his orthodox antagonists. Part I. deals with Luthardt, who in 1878 had charged Ritschl with banishing all metaphysics from theology, and with other sins. One may conjecture that Herrmann's *brochure* of 1876 furnished the ground for the first charge. Ritschl now deals with the problem of metaphysic in a fashion of his own. He does not, as we might perhaps have expected, separate epistemology from ontology, praising the first and banishing the second. He takes the two together, and tells us that he must of course employ his own metaphysics in his theology. One metaphysic he is resolute to exclude—the traditional scholastic view, going back to Aristotle, which formulates an abstract doctrine of the thing without advert-ing to the distinction between things that are mental or moral on the one hand and merely physical things on the other. Ritschl insists, against Luthardt, that both the cosmological and the teleological arguments are metaphysical in this sense. A more helpful criticism perhaps is that which affirms that neither of these arguments really leads us outside or beyond the world. At the same time, Ritschl repels Luthardt's view, that there is danger of the cosmological argument proving pantheistic. Pantheism, he says,

“religious” mysticism which dislikes divine personality (p. 405). He has vindicated the word. Has he done much more?

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is a Brahmanical, not a metaphysical mode of thought. Is this a hint from Kaftan?¹ The ontological argument is strangely passed over as being, in the sense in which Ritschl is speaking, non-“metaphysical.” And Kant’s moral argument is left out, because “obviously” it depends upon Christian ideas. This sentence foreshadows Ritschl’s withdrawal from the assertion of *Justification*, iii. ed. 1, that a moral argument demonstrates the being of God “theoretically.”

Part II. is aimed against Frank of Erlangen, who severely censured Ritschl for not placing a doctrine of the Absolute at the head of the doctrine of God. Ritschl makes merry as he recalls how “the Absolute” attracted him once, in his own callow youth. He insists that it means, What stands out of all relations; also, A “Thing”; for every “thing” considered as a unity fulfils the definition of *causa sui*. In worshipping the Absolute under the name of God, Frank is reverencing “a metaphysical idol.” Or again; Frank worships an omnipotence which is loving, but Ritschl a love which is omnipotent! Ritschl further attacks the orthodox Philippi for building up a doctrine of God out of separate unconnected elements. This criticism might seem to appeal to speculative preferences. But Ritschl is confident that it has directly practical significance.

A third Part attacks Ritschl’s *bête noir*, the

¹ Comp. *supra*, p. 165.

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doctrine of a mystical union between the individual believer and Christ. Mystical union would never have been talked of, had an intelligent faith in the Reformation view of Christianity held its ground. Ritschl points out that the first orthodox Lutherans who employ the new term choose it as a symbol of something unknown, ineffable, and (he thinks) meaningless. Critics of his own may rightly desire something in advance of moral union, *as they understand* the latter. They are wrong in seeking a mystical, *i. e.* "metaphysical," *i. e.* Neoplatonic supplement. "The Neoplatonic God is just the idea of the world." Special joy is given to Ritschl by a passage in Gottfried Arnold, where the highest stage of mystical experience is described as "metaphysical."

Part IV. directly attacks the Neoplatonic metaphysic. It may be postponed till we speak of the next edition of *Justification*, vol. iii.

Part V. follows. Ritschl's task might seem now to have been accomplished. "Apart from the doctrine of God, Dogmatic has no opportunity of setting up any metaphysical thought as a theological truth. The remaining themes of theology are so peculiarly things of the spirit [in contrast to nature] that metaphysic can only come into consideration as a formal rule for the study of religious entities or relationships." But "every scientifically cultivated theologian" must have his own theory of knowledge, and must

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consciously employ it! And Ritschl, having been denounced as a subverter of Christianity by Prof. H. Weiss of Tübingen, retorts the charge upon his enemy. He and Weiss employ different metaphysics. His is modern, Weiss's is ancient. His is right, Weiss's is wrong. His is pro-Christian, Weiss's is anti-Christian. One great offence of Ritschl's had been the assertion that we must "alternate" in theology propositions asserting man's dependence upon God with others affirming human freedom. Will, to Weiss or to Luthardt, is only imperfectly real. The real reality must be a substance, not a will, and the substance must be either human or else divine. But what Weiss champions, according to Ritschl, is not Reformation orthodoxy. The post-Reformation theory of *unio mystica* bears the impress of the heterodox A. Osiander. Do critics bid Ritschl follow Schleiermacher? He knows more about that master than their prejudices have ever allowed them to see! He learned his own obnoxious [subjective?] method partly from Schleiermacher, partly from Schneckenburger.¹

Part VI. closes the discussion with a specimen of the faults of the scholastic method. The example chosen is the post-Reformation debate on original sin. Neither the extravagances of Flacius, nor the evasions of the more orthodox, yield anything that sober Christian feeling can

¹ Comp. *supra*, chap. i. p. 12.

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endure. In contrast with them, Melanchthon in his early period is quoted with great effect. We know God “non speculativis cogitationibus, ut loquar verbis usitatis, sed practicis cogitationibus, hoc est, cum corda perterrefacta agnitione peccati reiiciunt se in Christum, et in eo apprehendunt promissam misericordiam.”¹ “Scriptura docet nos de Filii divinitate non tantum speculative sed practice, hoc est iubet ut Christum invocemus, ut confidamus Christo;” and so of the Spirit.²

More important than the “explanations and polemics” of the 1881 pamphlet is the remodeling of some important sections—especially 3 and 28—in 1883 (*Justification*, iii. ed. 2). The process goes still further in edition three (1888). In order to sum up the effects of Ritschl’s second or third thoughts, we may review the points which we singled out from edition one.

(1) The effort to define frontiers is more vigorously pressed than ever.

(2) The twofold root of religion is still asserted.

(3) Whether influenced by Herrmann or by Melanchthon, Ritschl breaks with his assertions of edition one and goes over to Kant. It is, after all, by practical and not by theoretical knowledge that we come to know God as revealed in the moral life! This is a very noteworthy change from asserting that we have a theoretical

¹ p. 61; quoting lectures of 1533.

² p. 62; quoting *Corpus Reformatorum*, xxi. 366.

knowledge of God, with which scientific theology stands or falls, even if the same train of argument is now commended to us as "practical" knowledge. Unlike Kant, Ritschl in edition one conceived that *mind dealing with materials from the moral nature attains theoretical knowledge*. Edition three, looking to *the field whence the evidence is drawn*, agrees to call the process of reasoning *practical* and non-theoretical. Much may be said for both views; therefore also, much may be said against each view! Ought we to draw the inference which Ritschl proclaims in regard to the Flacian controversy? Do we need a restatement of the question at issue?

Unfortunately Ritschl stands condemned for the way in which he makes known his change of opinion. What he gives in one breath he takes back in the next. Many hostile critics have dwelt upon these extraordinary phenomena. A friend of Ritschl's can only plead guilty, and appeal for a lenient sentence. The facts are these; he repeats the old view.¹ He reasserts the same position in new statements.² He introduces even in edition two a paragraph cutting down severely the significance of Kant's proof.³

¹ Ed. 1, p. 190; ed. 2, p. 207; ed. 3, p. 212; E. T. p. 222 ("Kant wrongly let himself," etc.).

² Ed. 2, p. 207 = ed. 3, p. 211 = E. T. p. 221 ("If the exertion," etc.). Also ed. 3 (newly), p. 212, E. T. pp. 222-3.

³ Ed. 2, pp. 206-7 = ed. 3, pp. 210-11 = E. T. p. 221 (Kant "expressly limits the idea of God to the sphere of religious knowledge").

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Finally, leaving unchanged the argument of p. 192, ed. 1, edition three inverts the conclusion! "This acceptance of the idea of God is no practical belief but an act of theoretical knowledge,"¹ becomes "This acceptance of the idea of God is, as Kant observes, practical faith and not an act of theoretical cognition."² Did ever a "scientific theologian" so express himself before? One can only exclaim with St. Paul, "Thou that teachest another, teachest thou not thyself?"

(4) The case is little better in regard to Whole and Part. The influence of Lotze upon Ritschl's mind has weakened; we again infer that the influence of Kant, powerfully represented by Herrmann, has strengthened. Yet here once more the maturer Ritschl blows hot and cold. What he had yielded, he yielded perhaps rather to weight of authority than to clearness of conviction. Edition one had treated the thought of a whole as invariably religious. If the thought appears in science, religion is infecting scientific knowledge. Herrmann agreed that the conception of a whole was invariably practical, but held that it need not be religious—it might be metaphysical. Ritschl now pronounces his own former thesis unsatisfactory upon two sides. First, there may be religions without any conception of a whole. Lower religions lack it. Here one is tempted to think that Kaftan's

¹ Ed. 1, p. 192 = ed. 2, pp. 209–10.

² Ed. 3, p. 214; E. T. pp. 224–5.

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batteries have made a breach in Ritschl's ramparts. It is the manner of Kaftan to approach religion from its lower phenomena; it is the manner of Ritschl to believe that you cannot study religions to any purpose unless a conception of the religious ideal forms itself in your mind. If Ritschl is right on the main issue, I hardly see why the fact that some religions are not consciously dealing with the whole of things should destroy his old position.

The other objection to the old view is found in what Ritschl now regards as a fact—that "every philosophy" includes the effort "to comprehend the universe under one supreme law."¹ Alongside of this, we find the unpurged leaven of edition one: "The intermingling and collision of religion and philosophy always arises from the fact that the latter claims to produce in its own fashion a unified view of the world. This, however, betrays rather an impulse religious in its nature, which philosophers ought to have distinguished from the cognitive methods they follow."² Nor is this all. A new sentence in the later editions re-states the old view. "The wish to comprehend the whole is itself something additional to disinterested science."³ Could perversity go further?

¹ § 28; ed. 2, p. 190; ed. 3, p. 194; E. T. p. 203.

² Same §; ed. 2, p. 194; ed. 3, p. 198; E. T. p. 207. Comp. ed. 1, pp. 178-9.

³ § 29; ed. 2, p. 201; ed. 3, p. 204; E. T. p. 215.

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(5) We now have to add a new entry to our previous list. The old attempt to distinguish religion from science by the difference of "the objects with which they respectively deal" being, however irresolutely, disclaimed, there is need and room for another set of landmarks. And this is held to be found in the exercise of different mental functions. Science works with uninterested theoretical judgments, but religion with judgments of value. Edition two of *Justification* (1883) already lays down the new affirmations. Among "independent" value-judgments, two classes are mentioned—moral and religious. Apparently Kaftan's influence leads Ritschl to make the distinction between these two sharper than ever. I cannot think the term "independent" other than singularly unfortunate. Ritschl probably means by it, judgments in which the element of valuation is of independent significance or importance. The phrase *sounds* as if it meant that judgments of value were independent of fact. The new doctrine ought to be more happily expressed. *There is a God* is, for Ritschl, a value-judgment; God is the greatest possible joy to the saint and¹ the greatest possible terror to the sinner. To think of God while omitting His relation to us—not to think of Him continuously as the being "with whom we have to do"—is irreligious trifling. The Ritschlians are expounding and

¹ But would Ritschl care to emphasize this?

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developing the Protestant doctrine of faith, with which Ritschl's own last publication deals.

(6) Edition two of *Justification*, iii., also contains a deliberate pronouncement on Theory of Knowledge, elaborated from the statement in *Theology and Metaphysic*. We are told that there are three possible views. *First*, there is the scholastic view, which Ritschl associates with the great name of Plato. A thing is more than its qualities; and knowledge of the thing is other and deeper than knowledge of its manifestations; the vague "memory image" helps to create this false impression. *Secondly*, the Kantian¹ view: A thing is more than its qualities or manifestations—and we know only the latter! *Thirdly*, Lotze's view: We know the thing precisely in its qualities. Ritschl holds by the third.

One might describe this as a reasonable ideal of knowledge. It sets before us what knowledge aims at. Also, in some respects at least, it usefully formulates Lotze's advance upon Kant.² Yet one must agree with Ritschl's critics that the formula is too thin to be of much service in philosophy. It is an aspiration rather than an achievement. It puts the question, not amiss; it does not contain the answer. Ritschl further gives it a religious colour by connecting know-

¹ New since the statement of 1881 (*Theol. and Metaph.*).

² Yet it may be right to report that, according to the sympathetic criticism of Traub, the third position is really the genuine Kantianism!

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ledge of a thing *in its qualities* with knowledge of God *in His revelation*. One doubts whether this is quite fair. The point with Christianity, especially Ritschlian Christianity, is this, that God is known in certain historically and morally conditioned revelations. Briefly, God is known in Christ and only in Christ. One may believe this with all one's heart; and yet one may consider it an assertion belonging to a different region from that of technical epistemology. The question is, In *which* manifestations God reveals Himself. Any scheme of theology could adapt itself to "Lotzean" metaphysics. Lotze himself was no Ritschlian. On the whole, it seems a piece of controversial vehemence, unworthy of Ritschl's better self, when he affects to find the deepest difference between his own views and those of his critics in their respective metaphysics. Ritschl possesses attraction for the religious mind in that he seeks to make Christian theology more Christian. Were there no such hope, one would never "take off one's coat" to elucidate or to vindicate his meaning.

Leaving the attempt to draw a clear line between religious knowledge and science, we turn to consider some other issues in regard to Ritschl's philosophy. What is *the service of philosophy to theology*?

(a) It may furnish the theologian with his tools, and become part of his formal outfit. To

use the term which Ritschl applies to the Christian theologian's use of Comparative Religion, it may play a "regulative" (but not a "constitutive") part. Herrmann (1876) concurs in this; metaphysics must define the contrast between nature and spirit in a way which will furnish "systematic theology" with its "weapons."¹ Dr. Garvie makes the suggestion that Christianity might do better to produce its own metaphysics. The problem is difficult; and the present writer would be the last to compromise the distinctiveness of Christianity. Yet he fears the result of Dr. Garvie's programme might be to honour one type of intellectual philosophy as orthodox, and to brand another type as heretical. Are not almost all types of mind and thought to be baptized into the Kingdom of God? We have had to acquiesce in a Christian ethic. Dr. Garvie may be right in favouring a Christian metaphysic. Shall we be asked next to construct a Christian logic? And a Christian psychology? And (I suppose) a Christian epistemology? If not—why not, on the premises implied? But, if we are asked to do all this: To what good end? This matter was discussed of old, not in relation to religion as such but in relation to the Bible. Orthodoxy used to insist that "reason" was to be employed as a formal method for determining the sense of "revelation," after which reason must adopt an attitude of passive obedience. It

¹ *Metaphys. in Theol.*, p. 21.

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proved difficult, well-nigh impossible, to entrust so much to reason as faith's handmaid while refusing to allow her any personal activity. The remedy of superseding reason by a more Christian or more regenerate logic would surely be a desperate one.

(b) Reason may be asked absolutely to demonstrate the being of God, and to make theology a science; though *not* apparently to demonstrate the truth of Christianity. This was the teaching of *Justification*, vol. i. The later Ritschl will not admit any such material use of reason; nor will Herrmann; nor Kaftan.

(c) If constructive apologetic is retrenched, there may still be room and need for a defensive apologetic. When earlier views of theology as a science become impossible in the light of the admission that the theologian cannot prove his case to the theoretical intellect, Ritschl's philosophy still undertakes the humbler task of "justifying the claim of theology to be a science" by "proving that the conception of personality can *without contradiction* be applied to God."¹ Edition one had made the bolder claim that this argument was to serve as "the crown and culmination of the philosophical proof of the necessity of the thought of God."² Further

¹ § 30; ed. 2, p. 213; ed. 3, p. 217; E. T. p. 228 [present writer's italics]. Traub considers that even this is illegitimate.

² Ed. 1, p. 194.

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still; editions one, two and three all contain telling arguments against materialism and pantheism. In edition three these passages cannot be understood otherwise than as defensive; they cannot be so much refutations of error as evidence that the adversary of Christian belief has failed to prove his case. And, in the present writer's judgment, they are employed in the same interest even in edition one. For even in that edition moral experience is the one source of demonstrative proof.

(d) A still humbler task for "reason" would be that of showing the logical harmony between different parts of the Christian position. Edition one repeatedly deprecates this view of reason's task.¹ The later editions seem at times to imply it; "for religious cognition the existence of God is beyond question, since the activity of God becomes to us a matter of conviction through the attitude we take up to the world as religious men."² Moreover, in all editions,³ the "proof of the necessity of forgiveness" addresses itself exclusively to those who "concede at least one element in the Christian view of the world and of self." So we have the odd result in edition one—with wandering echoes in later editions—

¹ *e.g.* § 29, pp. 190, 192—"Something more than a reflection upon the internal coherence of religious belief." One passage survives (E. T. p. 222), one disappears (p. 224).

² § 29; ed. 2, p. 203; ed. 3, p. 207; E. T. p. 218.

³ § 54; ed. 1, p. 464; ed. 2, p. 491; ed. 3, p. 499; E. T. p. 530.

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that Kant's ethical proof of the being of God is "not merely a reflection upon the internal coherence of religious belief," while his implicit contribution to the Christian thought of forgiveness is absolutely "modelled on Christian ideas."

Types of philosophy.—We have next to inquire what type of philosophy is presupposed in the divergent utterances of Ritschl or in the positions of his friends.

The present writer ¹ has been in the habit of recognizing three traditional types of thought: Empiricism, which extracts all knowledge out of the data of experience—Fact is all! Idealism (of the Hegelian type), which traces everywhere the victorious march of necessary principles—the Idea is all! and Intuitionism, which explains knowledge partly from experienced matter of fact, partly from principles slipped into the mind ready-made by the wisdom of the creator. A fourth type appears in Kant, who distrusts facts and distrusts ideas, but finds a revelation of truth in the conscience. And a fifth type might be established, perhaps under the name of phenomenalism; a type nearer to scepticism than empiricism itself is. While a more naïf empiricism believes it can account for all knowledge out of "presentations" which are "given" to the mind; this type of opinion is fully half-persuaded that individual facts—lying on the top of each

¹ e. g. art, "Theism" in *Encycl. Brit.*

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other like shot in a heap—are real, while all relations between facts are mental figments.

Positively, all the Ritschlian leaders are learners from Kant; ¹ negatively, they are all in vehement recoil from Hegel, partly in the interests of morality, partly in the interests of faith in Christ. When they recoil to the point of giving decisive importance to the conscience, I believe they do well; though even here difficulties arise. Herrmann, and other true Kantians among the theologians we are studying, ignore the sceptical element in Kant. Apparently they have less faith in metaphysics than their master had. Kant never threw off the thought of a possible or imaginable body of *a priori* truth, though the longer he looked at it the more it dwindled. He contrasted with this ideal the knowledge gained by the special sciences, and disparaged the latter. With Herrmann the contrast is between knowledge *qua* (theoretical) knowledge on the one hand and the process of moral *Erleben* on the other. When science comes to an end, it is not for Herrmann because “our” knowledge is exhausted, but rather that *the possibility of knowing*—theoretically—has ceased. Another respect in which the three leaders agree follows from this dependence upon Kant. They have no use for intuitionism. Kant has, at least to that extent, “awakened them from their dogmatic slumber.” The present hour has little patience with any-

¹ Kaftan, with very peculiar limitations.

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thing so old-fashioned as intuitionism, but it is coquetting with something not dissimilar under the name of Realism. The Ritschlian leaders will have nothing to say to realism. The thought of a return not back to Kant but back beyond Kant, back to philosophical dogmatism, has no charm for them. In this sense, at any rate, they share Kant's idealism.

The man who, upon system, goes in his recoil from Hegelian intellectualism the whole way back to empiricism is Kaftan. To be empiricist without being naturalistic is almost a *tour de force*; yet the same extreme recoil appears in Ritschl when he is mainly historian and not so much moralist. Revelation, for him as for Kaftan, consists in sundry given facts; whereas it must seem that human experience with no *a priori* standards of judgment would be totally unable to distinguish true revelations from shams, and must be at the mercy of the loudest shouter. Herrmann has declared his readiness to maintain his philosophical basis for Christianity even if he had to accept the "empiricist" grounding of the axiom of causality which some (it appears) have imputed to Kant. I do not apprehend that Herrmann would persevere in his task as a theologian if he had to concur with Kaftan in stripping "the moral law" of its apriority; though he disengages apriority from the fiction of innateness.

When Ritschl appeals (as in *Justification*, vol. i.) to Kant's "scientific" establishment of moral

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truth, he appears to make his nearest approach to Herrmann's profound Kantian ethic. When more historically minded, Ritschl approaches Kaftan in his extreme recoil from Hegel or from "Platonism." Again, when and so far as the value-judgment takes the form of an appeal to *feeling*, we seem to be at the mercy of empiricism. If the value-judgment is to be safe and helpful, it must have moral authority behind it, and there must be no pedantic antagonizing of morality and religion. There are times when a polemical recoil seems to drive Ritschl almost into phenomenalism, justifying Dr. Garvie's summary—"God is, so to speak, lost in His kingdom, Christ in His vocation, the soul in its activities."¹ Idealism in Ritschl is most clearly represented in the demand for systematic unity in theology. What individual facts can warrant that claim?

One more question may be raised. What is the *Basis of Certainty* (a) in ordinary knowledge, (b) in the knowledge of God? Dr. Garvie blames Ritschl for raising at least the first half of this question. Still, it may assist clearness of thought if we know upon what epistemology a theologian relies.

In *Justification*, iii. ed. 1, p. 185, Ritschl allows a great deal to *feeling* and *will* in establishing the reality of an objective world. "Theoretic knowledge" does not afford the supreme guarantee. "The actuality of things stands firm in percep-

¹ *The Ritschlian Theology*, ed. 2, p. 62.

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tion, memory and imagination; the immediate impression of it arises continually in feelings of pleasure and pain, and in reciprocal action between things and our own will." Then he goes on to apply the same tests to the knowledge of God. "The imaginative idea of God in religion is freed from the suspicion of being an empty imagination, because corresponding feelings and movements of will give our spirit the certainty that it is taking its place in the world—or above the world—as a peculiarly constituted whole. This experience guarantees the actuality of God, in convincing us of the activity of God." Such a view appears to myself rank subjectivism. Again, it seems to belong to that dogmatic mode of thought which Kantians of all types have supposed that Kant destroyed. If the value-judgment is meant to be a full proof of reality, we should have to pass the same censure upon that doctrine. Before he has devised a formula regarding value-judgments, though several years later than 1874, Ritschl again speaks similarly: "The feeling of the self which accompanies our spiritual activity is the sufficient ground of certainty for the knowledge of all that which conduces towards our actual existence in the world as active beings and beings of a peculiar value."¹

A second view refers certainty to the peculiar solidity of moral truth. This is the steady teach-

¹ *Theol. and Metaph.*, p. 50; I quote ed. 2 (1887), but assume that the passage occurred in ed. 1 (1881).

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ing of Herrmann; it is implied in Ritschl's attitude towards Kant in vol. i. of *Justification*—the historical volume. Only Kaftan upon principle rejects this doctrine; but much of Ritschl's detailed treatment appears to me inconsistent with it.

A third basis of certainty is historical revelation. This is maintained by all leaders of the school; most notably by Herrmann, who concentrates revelation in what one of our own theologians has called "the fact of Christ." Only, in bearing witness to this fact, we must not allow ourselves to arouse suspicion that a poorer historical reality has been distorted into a divine miracle by man's awful needs or by his excited hopes.

We have had to blame Ritschl for much vacillation. Suppose he were to make his defence, what might he say? This, perhaps. There is unity and harmony between many at least of my seemingly divergent statements. The self-feeling of which I speak has ethical motives and colour; it implies ethical values. "Metaphysically," if—he might say—I must use the phraseology of others; metaphysically then, in *your* sense, this self-feeling involves the crucial distinction between the natural and the ethical. All mysticism appears to me to undermine the principle of this vital truth; much of it does so in practice. What is announced as a view of the

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world or of Christianity deeper than morality turns out to be shallower and more naturalistic. So, too, when metaphysic proposes to "think together" the two regions—Lotze's world of forms and his world of values—I observe (Ritschl will say) that we are back precisely at the pre-moral heathenish thought of God. It is no wonder if at one time I denounce your bad metaphysic and praise my good one, but at other times rather beg men to turn to anything except metaphysics for help—to living experience, or even to empiricism; to conscience; to Christ. For indeed I believe in all these, and in their harmony with one another.

We may not be able to accept the plea; but it may help us towards the acknowledgment that Ritschl has been occupied with a difficult, a necessary, a Christian task. And it may lead us to ask whether there are not mischievous tendencies in Ritschl's critics on the right and on the left. He—blustering waverer that he is—he has not hit the gold. It is hardly probable that the extremists have shown better marksmanship.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HISTORY OF PIETISM

RITSCHL desires to be a reformer of Protestantism. His programme is a simple one. He summons men to return to the inner principles of the Reformation. The Pietistic reformers, whose story he now tells, have anticipated him in a way which he cannot approve. Hence his task is largely one of exposing them. In praising the readableness of the book, Prof. Otto Ritschl thinks to explain that quality in part by the fact that his father is dealing here with manifestations of the religious life and not with dry doctrine. There are tokens of sympathy, but the general tone has to be and is unfavourable. Instead of returning to Luther, Pietism is charged with prolonging the mediæval reform of manners, notably the Franciscan. Hence from Ritschl's point of view this history is a pathology. About non-Pietist churchly types of Protestantism, nothing is said unless by accident. Naturally we hear a great deal about Spener. Ritschl takes the piquant view that the chief author of Pietism was never a Pietist himself. Spener then, incidentally, may show us something of the workings of normal Lutheran faith in God

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through Christ; and others of the healthier Pietists do the same thing in a measure. Yet the author necessarily views his task largely as an exposure.

One observes how confidently Ritschl takes for granted the results of his previous work, and how convinced he is that he is the real champion of Luther's spiritual insight. The preface to vol. i. admonishes us that he judges all things from his standpoint "within the Lutheran confession." Primarily, Ritschl criticizes Pietism like a wise broad-churchman, who prefers the service of God and men in society to that type of piety which flees "far from the world" into a monastery, or into some spurious Protestant imitation. But this is only one side of the matter. Here, as always, Ritschl is much concerned with the doctrine of Providence. Here, as always, he is convinced that we owe the revelation of God's Fatherhood to Christ. Justifying faith means self-committal to the God who has sought and found us. Unlike monks and nuns—even, as one female Pietist plaintively says, unlike Catholic priests—evangelical Christians are exposed to all the storms of care; yet we may be made more than conquerors through One that loved us. The recluse Christian is not merely a shirker of the moral task, or a deserter from the post God gave him; he dishonours by lack of trust the God to whom he professes special devotion.

Ritschl begins his task by saying something

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about predecessors. He complains that Schmid's sketch of Pietism is simply an unconfessed extract from Walch's history of the Pietist controversies; and he warns us that too much has been made of these controversies and too little of the religious aspirations out of which they grew. His own studies have been given not to such dry-as-dust polemics, but to hymns, devotional books, biographies. He finds more to praise in Goebel, who explained Pietism as a recrudescence of the impulse due to the Anabaptists. But he differs from Goebel regarding the value of that impulse. Goebel held that Anabaptists and Pietists had been trying to complete Luther's half-done task. Ritschl held that the Protestant reformers and these irregulars belonged to entirely different types. "Luther did not aim directly at reforming the Christian life, but at reforming doctrine and public worship; or he worked for the improvement of life indirectly, by reforming the moral principles of education."¹ If Zwingli wandered into the other region, he was exceptional; and his deepest sympathies, too, were given, like Luther's, to the recovery of the Gospel. Hence Ritschl is led to trace back Pietism through Anabaptism to mediæval monasticism with its mystical devotion.² Going further back still, we find the beginnings of this tendency in Neoplatonism or even in Valentinian Gnosis. The powerful influence of Bernard checked the development of

¹ *Pietism*, vol. i. p. 35.

² *e. g.* vol. ii. p. 417.

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definitely non-Christian views within the Church. He taught men to believe in the grace of God through Christ. Still, he was too indulgent towards the joys of love-making between the soul and its Redeemer. It was lamentable when Protestant Pietism turned back from the teachings of the Reformation to mediæval blunders.

We are not to think, however, that Ritschl explains the rise of Pietism by a simple reference to pre-existing Romanism or pre-existing mysticism. He has something subtler¹ to offer us. Direct Romanist influences are recorded, as in that strange bird of passage Labadie, or again in Brakel the older, all whose ancestors down to his father had been Roman Catholics.² Or again, Ritschl calls attention to Tersteegen's gallery of religious models, almost all of them saints of the Counter-Reformation. Yet he seeks the primary causes elsewhere. Once more, he is not disposed to allow great influence to the workings of Boehme or others like him. Perhaps he undervalues these influences. Boehmist conventicles occur before Pietism; Boehmists denounce existing churches as "Babel," before any Pietists take up that extreme position; the English Boehmists use the watchword "Philadelphia," which appears (earlier than Spener) in a project of 1631,³ and which forms the inspiration of Zinzendorf's earliest efforts.

What is Pietism? The word appears in the history of Lutheranism as a nickname attached

¹ *Infra*, pp. 208-9. ² Vol. i. p. 275. ³ Vol. ii. p. 137.

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to the disciples of Spener, who himself gave occasion for it by calling his conventicles¹ *Collegia pietatis*. Ritschl, with apologies for possible misunderstanding, applies the name to earlier similar manifestations within the Reformed churches of the Netherlands. The statement that "Spener was not a Pietist" is balanced by the assertion that "Lodensteyn was the first Pietist of all." The historical denotation of the name is to be expanded, to suit its connotation. The very oldest nickname would seem to have been "Precisians," growing out of a dissertation by the orthodox Calvinist Voet of Utrecht,² *De Præcisitate*. The same early group called themselves "the Fine ones,"³ to which their enemies added, surely at random, the Roman Catholic names Beguines and Begging Sisters, and also the name Quakers.⁴ Of more importance is the great name Puritan,⁵ claimed in the Netherlands "essentially in the same sense as in England."⁶ It is not to be supposed that these Continental Precisians and Puritans were necessarily, in Ritschl's sense of the word, Pietists. Other elements have to be discovered before he allows himself to use that designation. This, in part at least, justifies his refusal to extend to England a survey already pushed as far as Holland. He recognizes parallelism, but not identity, between the Pietism which is his theme and the

¹ He also himself spoke of *ecclesiolæ in ecclesia*.

² I. p. 112.

³ From Lam. iv. 1, 2? i. p. 338 n.

⁴ p. 155.

⁵ p. 112.

⁶ p. 343.

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“Independentism” or other extremer Puritanisms of England.

An earlier definition of Pietism than Ritschl's, Schneckenburger's, had been greeted by Ritschl on its appearance with enthusiasm.¹ According to that view, Pietism was piety of the Reformed type intruding into the Lutheran churches. Further study led Ritschl to modify the definition. He retained in part the impressions which had once made him accept it. He always recognized, in the precisianist tendencies of ethical life among the Calvinists or other Reformed, the starting-point of Pietism. Pietism “had a certain right to life within the Reformed churches”² as an effort to make their recognized discipline a reality. Correspondingly, Pietism did not prove so inevitably disintegrating within the Reformed as within the Lutheran communion.

(1) The first feature of Pietism, according to Ritschl, is the making use of conventicles—unofficial gatherings for promoting the Christian life. “The characteristic social structure of Pietism is the conventicle.”³ In this Ritschl sees the illegitimate Protestant parallel to the monastic orders of Catholicism. Correspondingly, he charges those who practise conventicle piety with necessarily claiming superiority over other Christians,⁴ who follow no such usage. And it may be that “Conventicles” are only safe when they are practised in the clear conscious-

¹ *Life*, i. p. 266 (1854).

² *Pietism*, i. p. 447.

³ *I. p.* 371.

⁴ *p.* 101.

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ness that they are lawful but not obligatory—a consciousness sorely apt to fade away.¹ On the other hand, British piety recoils from Ritschl's dislike and contempt for unofficial prayer meetings. He seems to hold that you may innocently join a *Kränzchen* for the pursuit of any secular knowledge or amusement; but, if you join with fellow-Christians for your soul's profit, you are under suspicion of being a nasty hypocrite. Could Ritschl find room for the Student Christian Movement? Will anyone who knows it dare to disparage that great work of God?

(2) Conventicles may not be Pietistic, though (apparently) they must be bad. The second great mark of Pietism is a desire to reform the existing state of the Church, and to do so by means of these irregular fellowships. Pietism, then, is “a society which demands the reformation of the Church, and at the same time withdraws as far as possible from the public interests of the Church,”² to concentrate upon its sectional strivings and ideals.

(3) The third great mark is the danger of sectarianism, or of what Catholicizers call schism. The voluntary religious fellowship may come to count for more than the Church's official worship. It may organize, as in Methodism, a rival Church with sacraments of its own. Or, like the Salva-

¹ This principle would perhaps condemn the Wesleyan compulsory class-meeting. It was not formulated with any such purpose!

² I. p. 191.

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tion Army, it may offer a many-sided religious fellowship from which sacraments are deliberately omitted. Ritschl always fears the tendency to secession. In Lutheranism, where Pietism is so exotic, he thinks the result almost inevitable. If it is avoided or minimized, as when Francke corrects the bad effects of Spener's leniency, we are in the presence of a miracle of personal influence, like Bernard's when he tamed and half-Christianized mysticism. The history traced by Ritschl in section after section ends, as if in a *reductio ad absurdum*, in a secession. In Holland, in the Reformed Churches of Rhenish Prussia, on a smaller scale in Württemberg, he sees this with a shudder, and bids us shudder with him. Rather singularly, he sees a different but hardly a better outcome from the central Lutheran Pietism—Spener's. Apart from a small brood of extremist sects, Halle Pietism led up rather to the *Aufklärung*—Spener doing "much more pioneer work for it than" the heterodox "Dippel"—or else it led back to a high and dry orthodoxy. Zinzendorffian Pietism Ritschl does not trace to the end of its career. The end, indeed, is not yet! But he depicts it in several phases—first rising, like Halle Pietism a century before it, to supremacy; then becoming an extravagant confessional orthodoxy (Lutheran, not Reformed); then waning, and likely to make way for sound Lutheran-Ritschlian Protestantism.¹

Even on Ritschl's own principles, one doubts

¹ Comp. Preface to vol. iii.

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whether these warnings are justified. The smaller and earlier sects—Labadie's separation from the Reformed, or the sects who broke away from Spener's movement—may be due simply to the dangers inherent in the conventicle. But one feels sure that different motives from these had a share in creating the sober Continental Free Churches of later growth. One may not agree with all their motives. One may smile at the old-fashioned Dutch attitude towards psalms and towards hymns. But one desires to contemplate these Churches with detachment, if sympathy is forbidden, and to give them fair play. Unless separation, whether from the State or from a corrupt Church, is always necessarily sinful, we shall not be prepared to "say, A conspiracy, concerning all whereof this people say, A conspiracy; not to fear their fear, nor to be in dread thereof." If separation from the world unhappily involves separation from some professed Christians, even the latter separation may be a duty. Ritschl's enthusiasm for Church-and-State will not even consider such a plea.

(4) Less definite, yet still demanding some attention, is the doctrinal change noted among the Pietists. They think less of forgiveness; or they lay disproportionate emphasis upon the moral task. Technically, this deviation manifests itself in the doctrine of saving faith. So respected a theologian as the old German Reformed Lampe is found affirming—in later life—that the divine sentence of justification is a

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recognition of the inherent value of faith. Similar teaching is found in the great Bengel.

(5) Preoccupation with the moral task is no guarantee against Antinomianism. And, even when that worst of heresies does not arise, soberer Pietists may show signs of sickly morality. A few specimens may be quoted here. Sex problems repeatedly receive undesirable handling. Labadie had asserted that original sin would not be transmitted if parentage was perfectly free from animal passion. A child was born to Labadie's disciple Yvon. For some minutes, we are told, it did not weep. The news was carried to Labadie, who exclaimed *C'est un enfant du règne!* Presently, by good fortune for its earthly prospects, the little one burst into a loud cry. This also had to be reported to Labadie, who could only remark that the "vessels" could not have been so "pure" as one had hoped.¹ Another misfortune was the appearance of the Harold Skimpole type in certain quarters; e. g. among the Reformed, in Jung Stilling; among the Lutherans, in Bogatzky. Tersteegen, on the other hand, earned his bread by honest toil. Yet he is very markedly of the cloister. He treats marriage, perhaps even business, simply as a hindrance to spiritual communion. Another complaint from a Pietistic quarter speaks of a foolish imitation of mannerisms. "Almost all the scholars of F. A. Lampe limp, because he limped a little.—It is a fact!—Tersteegen was

¹ I. p. 233 n.

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ordered by the doctor to drink *Pontak*,¹ and his friends all drank it without its being prescribed for them; and they smiled like their master, and shook hands in the same way. Zinzendorf's manners, too, were copied as far as possible by his adherents." ² We have not spoken of downright fanatical immorality. That occurs at least once, but Ritschl explains it by theosophical not by Pietistic influences. The guilty sect conformed to Romanism, but, finding no comfortable quarters at Paderborn, drifted on to Altona like other extremists. And there they seem happily to have died out. The lesser moral weaknesses we mentioned have no connexion with the reforming aspirations of Pietism, but are only too characteristic of its temperament.

(6) Much more important is the connexion with Mysticism. Here, indeed, we have to distinguish. Some of the great leaders have nothing of it. In the Netherlands, Lodensteyn is tinged with it, and Labadie brought it out of Romanism with him; Teelinck inclined to it; Brakel and Witsius "worked out the complete mystical theory." Yet, on the whole, the Pietism of the Netherlands threw off the infection. In the Reformed Churches of North Germany, Mysticism of the Quietist type found a notable representative in Tersteegen. On the other hand, neither Spener nor Francke is mystical, nor are the chief representatives of Württemberg Pietism. Zinzendorf, according to Ritschl, holds a peculiar

¹ Apparently a French wine.

² I. p. 534.

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position. He believes in a quick and joyful conversion which seemed to Tersteegen to savour of "levity." Both these men "belonged to the extensive spiritual family of St. Bernard, and to no other; but Zinzendorf belongs to the branch of Thomas, Tersteegen (as a Quietist) to that of Duns." Ritschl could not so loudly insist that "mysticism is the effort to be sure of one's salvation here and now," or that Pietist piety is mystical piety at the heart, if he had not this historical thesis to maintain, that Pietism is a throw-back to mediæval monasticism. He complains that, as early as Lodensteyn,¹ an unwarranted effort is made to contrast "healthy" and "morbid mysticism," and to identify the former with Reformed theology at its best. Admissions made by Voet in favour of Tauler as an individual are unwarrantably applied by Lodensteyn to mediæval mysticism in general. "Love to Jesus," according to Ritschl, is not typical Christianity and certainly not typical Protestantism. The lover, according to St. Bernard, forgets the greatness of the Beloved in the rapture of ecstatic intercourse.² But the evangelical Protestant will never for a moment cease to call Jesus Lord. And the bond which unites us to the Saviour is not our poor love, but faith in God's gift and purpose of grace. In this book, Ritschl is more occupied with the Catholic than

¹ I. pp. 167-8. Comp. something similar cited from a Lutheran critic of Pietism, Loescher, ii. p. 408.

² I. p. 49.

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with the Pantheistic affinities of mysticism. On either ground his condemnation is emphatic.

(7) The character of the mystical tradition even in Christianity is largely erotic. As soon as the individual rather than the Church is regarded as the subject of Christian experience, Ritschl forecasts danger. The danger grows urgent when the metaphor of marriage is transferred from "the Bride the Lamb's wife" to the individual soul. There pours in from the Song of Solomon a tide of dangerous "spiritual" teaching. With a just pride, Ritschl points out that Luther had understood the Song in its historical and literal sense. But the *unio mystica* came to be defined; and Bernard's influence carried away with it many orthodox Protestants and an even larger proportion of Pietists.

Here again we have to be on our guard against extreme severity. Ritschl calls¹ the language which speaks of union with God *in one spirit* the very signature of mysticism, apparently forgetting a fact which he notes in the immediate context,² that the language is St. Paul's.³ In the New Testament, of course, it is an *obiter dictum*; to make it central may upset the balance of scriptural thought. Yet the occurrence of such language even once is a guarantee to those who reverence St. Paul that mystical language may be employed to express Christian truth. It proves, too, that even so delicate and perilous a thing as sex-mysticism has a message

¹ I. p. 128.

² p. 129.

³ See 1 Cor. vi. 17.

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for us. Those physical processes which have been described as "the sacraments of love" must be capable of spiritual significance. This is the ground upon which erotic mysticism may demand partial acceptance from Christians to-day. We cannot pretend, like so many of our fathers, that the Song of Songs is a designed allegory. But we cannot deny that a love between man and woman, which while it is passionate is in its own sphere pure, reveals something of the God whose name, in a far higher region, is the same word—love. This truth assuredly is delicate. Much dealing with it must be perilous. Yet it is truth and no lie.

On mysticism in general one might pronounce a similar judgment. Religion seeks to give a voice to unspeakable things, which it is not possible for a man to utter. In this bewilderment, flinging out words at an object exceeding abundant in its greatness beyond what we can think, Christians will hardly accept an embargo upon mystical imagery. The thing will break through all tariff barriers. But let us be on our guard against the dogmatists of mysticism. Historical Christianity is not an exoteric scheme, with mysticism as its higher and finer esoteric interpretation. Mysticism is a legitimate and suggestive exoteric parable, very good as poetry, but dubious as fact. The reality beyond all other realities is communicated by Jesus Christ. *This is the true God and eternal life. My little children, guard yourselves from idols.*

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(8) Another charge which Ritschl brings against Pietism is that of promoting dangerous social excitement. This accusation is almost inseparable from his belief in the connexion of Pietism with Anabaptism. He states his view unflinchingly. "The historical expert must maintain that Cocceius, Labadie and their successors, by their expectation of a brilliant inward and outward transformation of both Church and world, have damaged Protestantism, no less than the well-meant hopes of the political *Aufklärung* and of doctrinaire liberalism imperil the moral health of the peoples."¹ It is an extreme view, but it may contain a needful warning for us. Ritschl specially fears Millenarianism—although the greater Pietists were cautious; Bengel receives praise from Ritschl for postponing the age of glory to a decent distance. Here as elsewhere Ritschl ignores the amount of primitive Christianity which enters into what he condemns as Pietistic.

(9) As an outgrowth of their optimism, historical or millenarian, we note the Pietists' interest in the conversion of Jews and heathens. This is found in different forms. There is the purely academic belief of Lampe² or Tersteegen³ that God will convert the Jews when it pleases Him, before the end. There are actual efforts at mission work, sometimes—as Ritschl sneers—

¹ I. p. 267.

² p. 451; Lampe expects spontaneous conversion of the heathen too.

³ p. 493.

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“learned from the English.”¹ The founding of the London Missionary Society is recorded with visible ill-will.² All this is characteristic of the Ritschl who wrote *Justification*, iii. ed. 1. He has some strange tales to tell of early Protestant missions.

(10) Lastly, we may mention the ever-recurring belief in the restitution of lost souls. Of course, this belief is not universal among Pietists. Some, like Lampe, combat it. Some, after professing it, surrender it again. But it is constantly making itself heard. It is a genuine though not an invariable characteristic. Whether we embrace the belief or not we must surely be moved to find, in this gallery of deeply earnest if not always morally wise spirits, so much exhibition of the largest possible hope in God's mercy. Even Bengel holds the doctrine, though he shrinks from teaching it publicly.

Such being the outline of Pietism as Ritschl conceives it, we have now to glance at the different phases which he detects in its history.

He arranges his materials confessionally; within each confession, geographically; only within each limited geographical area, chronologically. Pietism begins in the Netherlands as “an evolution of Calvinism, to the detriment of its Protestant character, under conditions which existed at that time” nowhere else. “For since the great mass of the people took Lutheran views of life, and

¹ p. 522.

² p. 533.

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therefore rejected the moral rigour of Calvinism, its leaders found themselves compelled to concentrate upon special societies"—conventicles—"in order effectively to reform the people's life."¹ Voet, who somewhat enlarges the *quasi* conventicles recognized by the orthodoxy of his Church, is a forerunner. Cocceius, who has no taste for conventicles, is a forerunner in a different way. By his study of the covenants and economies he prepares men to look eagerly for a golden age. Lodensteyn makes the decisive move: Labadie comes, troubles the Church, and disappears again; mysticism has its votaries but wins no great success. Dutch Pietism is mainly of two types. The first type, as already noted, was interested in the precise regulation of Christian life. Afterwards arose what called itself "evangelical Pietism," more interested in the beginnings of conscious personal Christianity, criticizing the traditional type as legal. Modern evangelistic leaders might criticize in its turn that "evangelical" Pietism which demanded so terrible a struggle as the price of peace.

Next we are taken into the Reformed Churches of Germany and Switzerland. The districts immediately abutting on the Netherlands were largely influenced by the religious history of Holland; while the course of things in Mid-Germany is characteristically explained; Pietism there "at once became separatist, since Church discipline was wholly absent; and therefore

¹ I. p. 192.

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Pietism could not hold its ground within the Church, or make others believe in its legitimacy.”¹ With the exception of Lavater, who belonged to Zurich, most if not all of those named to us in these chapters are Germans. There is Lampe of Bremen, who united in himself the two streams of Dutch Pietism, precisian and evangelical, and whose influence kept the dogma of predestination a living force in his circle of churches down to Krummacher in the nineteenth century. There is Joachim Neander, remembered by his hymns, and praised by Ritschl because, when he was disciplined by Church authority for Pietistic irregularities, he submitted uncomplainingly and gave up the offending practices. There is Tersteegen, the godly lay recluse, memorable as a hymn writer, and notably Quietist. He moves Ritschl to pay an unusually graceful though guarded compliment. “Tersteegen’s letters, the most direct revelation of the man, impress me always like a cool room with softened light, in which one recovers from the heat and the conflict of work and the blinding rays of the sun. It is not, indeed, our calling, to enjoy rest in any such hermitage; but it does one good to have been there, even though one must return quickly to work and to the battle of life.”² There is Lavater, the liberally minded clergyman, the physiognomist, the friend of Goethe; influenced for the worse in the direction of *Aufklärung*, Ritschl tells us, by Spener; and, in spite of fine

¹ p. 398.

² p. 492.

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Christian qualities, attaching a disastrous importance to verifiable answers to prayers offered up for outward blessings. Yet he has no exaggerated sense of human "nothingness,"¹ like Lampe; no cultus of the Saviour's wounds, like Zinzendorf. Of later date still is Jung Stilling, joined in the same accusation of *Aufklärung* with Lavater, Spener again being blamed. Ritschl, not without reason, describes Stilling as a diletante, and as a Pietist of a novel type—one who is a bit of a man of fashion. English literature owes directly to Stilling's autobiography some of the most effective passages in Shorthouse's *Little Schoolmaster Mark*.

Anna Schlatter is one of the devout and honourable women of Pietism. She had unchurched her husband, a good plain burgher; for a time she suffered bitter sorrow when her daughters, under a sinister influence, began to express fears that Mamma herself was unconverted after all. But the worthless religious guide of the younger women was unmasked, and they gave their mother once more that respect which, in spite of all, was due to her character. There is Samuel Collenbusch, who adds—to Lampe's and Tersteegen's—a third leading type of Pietism within the German Reformed Church. His interest is once more concentrated upon holiness of personal character. Yet Collenbusch is

¹ And yet surely it is Lavater who sings—

“That I am nothing, thou art all,
I would be daily taught.”

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not an old-fashioned precisian; he believes in a Christian's call to the culture of virtues. He appears in fact to be a favourable if early specimen of the preachers of a higher Christian life. There is Krummacher, and there is Kohlbrügge—the former indirectly and by way of preparation, the latter directly—responsible for the setting up of a Free or separated Church in Rhenish Prussia. In the same chapter we meet with the Roman Catholic allies of Pietism whose story is told in Fleming Stevenson's *Praying and Working*, and with the man who, after his transition to Protestantism, did so great a work for the rough boys of Hamburg—Gossner. It is strange to read of Lutheran Auld Lights (*das alte Licht*) in Holland about 1794; from their ranks came forth Collenbusch to his task among the Reformed of Germany. Not less strange is it to learn¹ that “in many churches of the Reformed on the lower Rhine, during a whole century, the impressed, the awakened and the converted—or those who wished to pass as members of each class—stood up at the part of the sermon directed to them, and remained standing till that part was finished.”

The second and third volumes are devoted to Lutheran Pietism, but they make no effort to bring the story to so recent a date as (*e. g.*) Krummacher's. Perhaps they contain less of variety than vol. i.; on the other hand they unfold, section by section, a more compact and coherent tale.

¹ p. 434, note.

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Once again, before dealing with Pietism proper, we have to hear something about its antecedents. Apart from the doctrine of *unio mystica*, the main preparatory influence recognized by Ritschl within Lutheranism is Arndt's *Wahres Christenthum*, a well-known devotional book, full of mysticism. Thus mysticism is early at work in the Lutheran circles moving towards Pietism. Although it fails to capture Spener or Francke, who praise Arndt, but do not borrow this particular commodity, early hymns are quoted in proof of the fact that mysticism and the eroticism of the Song of Songs were at work. Certainly the gentleman who promised himself "a thousand kisses" from the "sweet mouth" of Jesus¹ had little to learn from any quarter in the way of bad taste.

It was Spener's intention, by the use of that novel instrument, the conventicle, to revive the life of the Church. Ritschl thinks he can prove that Spener copied (not earlier German conventicles, though such did exist, but) a Lutheran conventicle at Amsterdam, which in its turn, he has no doubt, was imitated from the practice of the Reformed in Holland. Spener writes in the bewildering Lutheran fashion about the baptismal assurance of grace. He will not sanction the demand, which some were accepting from "English books," that a convert must know the precise date of his conversion.² He has none of the legal precisianism of Voet or Lodensteyn.³ Only slowly and by degrees does he come to the thought of

¹ II. p. 78.

² p. 114.

³ p. 134.

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completing Luther's reformation.¹ He has none of the canting "language of Canaan."² He is and intends to continue an essentially orthodox Lutheran. Ritschl's curious charge of *Aufklärung* is partly based on Spener's blending adherents of different confessions in the same conventicle,³ partly on his connecting assurance with good works.⁴ Or he detects something of indifference towards dogma in the confinement of Spener's interest to religious life.⁵

And yet Ritschl is respectful towards Spener. He even finds a good sense for the assertion that theology ought to be the work of the regenerate. One would have expected Ritschl to blaze out against the impropriety of distinguishing regenerate and unregenerate, in a Christian land and a land of Infant Baptism! But he prefers to connect the Pietist requirement with his own view, that no propositions are legitimate in theology except such as minister practically to piety. This is a more sympathetic strain than the scientific hardness which sometimes characterizes Ritschl's judgments.

The most serious charge brought against Spener is one of excessive gentleness towards the wilder Pietists, *e. g.* the Petersen pair. Of the male offender Ritschl has a low opinion; "the only Pietistic element about him was—his wife." The growth of radical Pietism is interpreted as due

¹ p. 140.

² Based on Isa. xix. 18—possibly a corrupt text.

³ p. 159.

⁴ p. 116.

⁵ p. 567.

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partly to Spener's fault, partly to the fatal unsuitableness of Pietism to a Lutheran environment. It needed the judicious influence of A. H. Francke to save part of Spener's legacy for the Lutheran Church.

Yet in some ways Francke was more of an extremist. He had known shattering doubts, terminated by an acute conversion, when he had prayed almost in the words of the old anecdote, "O God, if there be a God, save my soul if I have a soul"—he had prayed, and light and peace came. Henceforth he insisted, not indeed that every one must doubt like him, but certainly must struggle and must believe like him. Francke also was severer and more like the Calvinists in his treatment of "Things indifferent." His strong side was his faith in providence.¹ Lack of system, as with most Pietists, was a characteristic weakness.² Ritschl, however, is not quite sure of Francke's attitude towards providence; "the fact rather was, that he waited until circumstances showed themselves favourable." His works of philanthropy are memorable, and his services in securing foreign missionaries for that strange patron of the Gospel, Frederick V. of Denmark. The temporary association with him of Spangenberg—afterwards so important in the history of Moravianism—is also of interest. Ritschl is impressed with the fact that Lutheran orthodox Pietism (so to call it) was almost wholly an upper-class movement—a plain sign of weak-

¹ pp. 273-4.

² p. 274.

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ness. He also thinks there was a grave declension from the manly vigour of Spener or Francke to an effeminacy like Bogatzky's.

Vol. iii. opens with a survey of Pietism in Württemberg. Here we are still in Lutheran territory, but under very different conditions. There is a strong tendency towards political liberty. This brought clergy and peasants into sympathy, and separated them from the nobility. Again, the more intense separatists must have emigrated from Württemberg at an early period; nor was there so much orthodox polemic as in North Germany. As a result, the leaders of Württemberg Pietism are free from separatist leaven, and yet are gentle in their judgment of separatists. There is Beata Sturm, whose admirers compare her to a *nun*. There is Moser, a fine Christian character, making a discriminating use of the teachings of other Pietists; no blind follower of the crowd; "the best disciple of Spener."¹ There is Pfaff, who is criticized not merely as of doubtful orthodoxy, but as a character of less solid goodness. Yet he also is devoted to Spener's aims and programme. There is Bengel, the first text-critic of the New Testament in German Protestantism, persisting in the task in spite of narrow-minded censures from Francke junior. Bengel is "the Cocceius of Württemberg,"² though hardly by conscious discipleship. He knew better than the later Halle Pietists that there may be different types of

¹ p. 40.

² pp. 76-7.

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conversion.¹ He is really more loyal to Luther and to Spener than they are.² He and Oetinger are free from the mediæval leaven. The latter, though a Universalist, is gently dealt with. Württemberg Pietism would know nothing of this doctrine, but there may have been a sense of something half comprehended. A popular legend tells how Oetinger was once overheard preaching to a congregation of *ghosts*. Another Pietist—Reuss—is criticized as formulating the cold intellectualist eighteenth century apologetic of credibility.³

The *Aufklärung*, says Ritschl, frightened the party of separation back towards the Augsburg Confession.⁴ It is strange to read of the disciples of one of the older leaders of this tendency, Pregizer, attending church worship at least occasionally, but shaking their heads gravely when they heard doctrine to which they could not assent. To this day the conventicle flourishes in Lutheran Württemberg.

Last, not least, we have Zinzendorf and his community. We must be prepared to find Ritschl fiercely opposed to that ardent and devoted if strangely erratic spirit. Ritschl is before all things a Churchman. His zeal for the *Gemeinde* is meant to be a vindication of the sacred essence of Christianity as a religion. Zinzendorf, first

¹ p. 65.

² p. 68.

³ p. 125.

⁴ Though they expressed their acceptance with modifications, in their new denomination.

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and last, felt it impossible to attach this almost superstitious value to the Established Churches of Protestant lands. He begins with a "Philadelphia" programme. When he welcomes to his territories Moravian refugees, he goes on to erect for them a new strange church, which is—and is not—to be Lutheran. Theoretically, these proceedings were incorrect. Practically there may have been touches of what was vacillating, ambitious, uncandid. Zeal for home missions in Zinzendorf is a new offence to Ritschl; it means the spread of this hybrid Moravianism. And zeal for foreign missions counts little or nothing in his favour. Curiously enough, as a theologian, Zinzendorf gives great satisfaction. He is a kind of Ritschlian before Ritschl. Has he not called the Saviour an "Amtsgott"? His mystical and erotic elements are of course condemned, though with a wise reticence.

All in all, a reader who is not a thoroughgoing Ritschlian will think better of the Pietists than their historian himself did. That this should be possible is one of the best testimonies to the historian's impartiality.

CHAPTER IX

YOUNGER LEADERS AND NEW DEPARTURES

Hermann Schultz : (a) *Lehre von der Gottheit Christi*, 1881.

(b) *Grundriss der Apologetik*, 2nd ed. 1902, Amer. tr. 1905 (reviewed by present writer in *Journal of Theol. and Philos.*, Dec. 1905).

(c) *Grundriss der evangelischen Ethik*, 2nd ed. 1897.

(d) *Grundriss der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 1890.

W. Herrmann : (a) *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, 1886 (reviewed by present writer in *Theol. Review and Free Church College Quarterly*, vol. i. 1887); 2nd ed. 1892 (E. T. 1895); 4th ed. 1903 (E. T. 1906); 5th ed. 1913.

(b) *Ethik*, 3rd ed. 1904 (*Grundriss der theol. Wissenschaften*).

(c) *Christlich-Prot. Dogmatik*, 1906 (*die Kultur der Gegenwart*).

Comp. M. Goguel, *Wilhelm Herrmann et le Problème Religieux Actuel*, 1905.

Julius Kaftan : (a) *Das Wesen der christlichen Religion*, 1881, 2nd ed. 1887. Review by A. Ritschl in *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1881.

(b) *Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion*, 1889 (reviewed by present writer in *Critical Review*, 1890), E. T. 1894.

(c) *Dogmatik*, 1897, ed. 5 and 6, 1909 (*Grundriss der theol. Wissenschaften*).

And other works.

Theodore v. Haering : (a) *Das christliche Leben ; Ethik*, ed. 2, 1906, E. T. ("Ethics of Christian Life)," 1909.

(b) *Dogmatik*, 1906, 2nd ed. 1912, E. T. 1913.

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New Issues—Sense of “ Kingdom of God ”—

J. Weiss : (a) *Jesu Predigt vom Reiche Gottes*, 1892, 2nd ed. 1900, enlarged and modified.

Comp. *ib.* : (b) *Die Nachfolge Christi u. die Predigt der Gegenwart*, 1895.

W. Bousset, *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum*, 1892.

Albert Schweitzer : *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906 ; ed. 3, 1913 ; E. T. from ed. 2, *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, 1910.

Real historical Position of Luther—

Ernst Troeltsch : (a) *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*, 1906 (*die Kultur der Gegenwart*).

(b) *Luther u. die Moderne Welt*, 1908 (*Wissenschaft u. Bildung*, pamphlet).

Comp. further : (c) *Wesen der Religion u. der Religionswissenschaft*, 1906 (*die Kultur der Gegenwart*).

(d) *Die Wissenschaftliche Lage u. ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie*, 1900 (pamphlet).

Original Contents of the Gospel—

Adolf Harnack : *Das Wesen der Christentums*, 1900 ; E. T. (“ What is Christianity ”), 1901.

The “ History of Religion ” school ; comp. Max Reischle, *Theologie u. Religionsgeschichte*, 1904 (five lectures), with authorities there quoted ; also Haering’s *Dogmatik* and Troeltsch (c), (d), *supra*.

It is time for us to say something about the group of men who stood nearest to Albrecht Ritschl, all of them partially independent of him, yet all with great and admitted obligations. The oldest to be named is the late Hermann Schultz, well known by his *Old Testament Theology*. While it is interesting to consult his brief statement on the three main systematic issues, we are mainly concerned with his older and larger

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work on the Godhead of Christ. Schultz makes the strongest claim to have arrived by a personal development at ideas in essential agreement with those of his colleague. In his preface to the *Gottheit Christi*, he tells us that he had designed to discuss the whole of Christology in order to show that—not the sequence of events in the life of Jesus, but—the fact of Jesus' recognition in His Church as the Christ is vitally important to faith. Changing professorial duties had interrupted and delayed the work. Meantime *Justification*, iii. appeared, and Schultz felt that much of his task was superseded. "Ritschl's work has been a very welcome opportunity for remodelling my statement, so as to make it, I trust, in many ways clearer and more convincing. But in all essential matters" Ritschl's statement "could only strengthen convictions which I had held for years."¹ He dedicates his book to Ritschl; and a note on p. 510 praises some of the older theologian's work almost patronizingly as "essentially correct."

Under the new conditions Schultz confines his work to the special assertion that Christ is God, and—within that great doctrine—to the *communicatio idiomatum*. He is working out for himself in detail a suggestion, which also occurs in one of Herrmann's earliest books,² that this Lutheran doctrine contains the hope of a new Christology. Schultz further tells us³ that

¹ *Gottheit Christi*, preface.

² *Metaphys. in Theol.*, p. 54.

³ *Gottheit Christi*, p. 10.

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Ritschl in an *obiter dictum* sanctioned the same hope. On the other hand, there seems no such hint in *Justification*, iii.; not even in later editions subsequent to the appearance of Schultz's monograph. Nor does Kaftan say anything of this nature in his *Dogmatik*. Therefore, if once more we discover real sympathy in our group of independent leaders, that sympathy has its limits.

Schultz's methods largely resemble Ritschl's. There is something of the same half-pedantic professional learning. As Ritschl tries to attain a higher view of the Atonement by cross-questioning not only the greatest minds but the lesser men—a Hunnius or a Heidegger or a Maccovius—so Schultz carries his appeal not only to Luther but to Brenz and “Kemnitz.” Ritschl, however, does at last give us clear moral outlines of doctrine. Whether satisfactory or the reverse, his own views are not scholastic. Schultz does not emerge so completely. There are two elements in his appeal. First, he relies on Luther's central achievement, the re-discovery of the personal Christ. Secondly, he tries to exploit the more technical Lutheran bias in Christology. It is, of course, conceded that all the historical schools of Lutheranism, from the Reformer downwards, presuppose the doctrine of two Natures in one Person; but, unlike the ancient school of Antioch, or the formula of Chalcedon, or the *reformiert* theologians, Lutherans are biased towards unity, which in orthodox Christology

is apt to mean the swallowing up of Christ's humanity by His divinity. And, if the result is bad, it may conceivably be the least mischievous result which the traditional assumptions permit. Harnack has taught us that Monophysitism—the child of the school of Alexandria—represents the real religious interest of the Eastern Church. To non-Lutherans, the Lutheran Christology appears as a new Monophysitism; and in Schultz's book we find high compliments paid to Cyril. And yet Schultz's own view is neither Cyrillian nor traditionally Lutheran. He hopes that, by removing the old dogmatic basis—the doctrine of two Natures—he will extricate from the suggestions of Luther and Lutherans a new Christology, in which Christ's humanity and divinity will not be discrepant or even opposite things, but rather will imply each other. As he himself expresses it, we are to learn “how the Divine as truly Divine may be found *in* what is truly human, and not side by side with it.”¹ The *communicatio idiomatum*, and it alone, is a form of thought permitting us to view clearly “the revelation of Divine life in a human manifestation, and the elevation of human life to Divine value and meaning.”²

The “communication” had been only an affair of language in patristic and mediæval days. It was to be taken seriously by Lutherans, after Luther himself had given the signal. Christ's *manhood* acquires Divine attributes—*e. g.* “ubi-

¹ p. 16.

² p. 19.

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quity”¹—especially at the Lord’s Supper; Schultz protests against making the issue too narrowly sacramental, but he tries in his half-pedantic way to show a marked religious superiority in Luther’s view of the sacrament over Zwingli’s. Even out of the technicalities of the scholastic Lutheran doctrine, with help from criticisms of his own, Schultz tries to elicit normative truth and a revolutionized Christology. One cannot state the details.

Schultz has been classified by Haering as representing a more positive or more orthodox view of Christ’s divinity—on the basis of His absolute humanity—than Ritschl possesses. The evidence appears to be ambiguous. There are certainly very strong statements in Schultz which travel in the direction of orthodoxy. We cannot doubt his sincere purpose to confess that—as he repeatedly expresses it²—“this man is God.” Christ’s Godhead is to be *Wesenhaft*.³ We must maintain the confession of his “Homousia.”⁴ On the other hand, Christ is a “human God.”⁵ He owes His existence to a “creative miracle.”⁶ The Bible is “geocentric,”⁷ and we are to be resolutely geocentric also,⁸ taking no account of any possibilities with which we have no immediate

¹ Originally a sneer of Calvinist critics, but proudly accepted.

² pp. 286, 371; comp. 697, 710. ³ pp. 540, 695.

⁴ p. 541. ⁵ p. 673. ⁶ pp. 656–7. ⁷ pp. 388, 464.

⁸ p. 709. The *Dogmatik* warns us not to extend this requirement to *Science*.

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personal concern. "He is for us the truth, the light, the love, the life, equal in essence to the Father. God is in Him essentially and for ever."¹ Yet ² "Dogmatic must allow itself no utterances which are incompatible with 1 Cor. xv. 28, *i. e.* with the conviction that the kingdom of God in itself is greater than the kingdom of Christ, although for Christian piety the two absolutely coincide. The revelation of God in Christ is included in the greater revelation of God, and has in that its end and its aim."

Perhaps the meaning is this. The Godhead which is in Christ is the absolute Godhead of the most High; but Christ Himself is man; and there is no ground for asserting that a communicated Deity is the sole possession of the human race. To mankind it comes through Christ alone; but it goes beyond Christ. In dependence on Him, all His people within His community attain a divine humanity; Schultz agrees with this much-questioned and surely questionable finding of Ritschl's.

At other points Schultz seems to brush aside some of Ritschl's personal eccentricities. He quotes sympathetically Luther's statements, so repugnant to Ritschl, that God hates sin but loves the sinner,³ and exercises penal justice.⁴ He knows of Fatherly anger,⁵ of holy love.⁶ He corrects the Ritschlian exegesis of Romans viii. 3,⁷ of the Johannine prologue,⁸ of the Pauline

¹ p. 697.

² p. 710.

³ p. 186.

⁴ p. 194.

⁵ p. 514.

⁶ p. 566.

⁷ p. 409.

⁸ pp. 361-8.

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references to pre-existence.¹ These last Schultz plucks up courage to interpret in their natural sense; he also dares affirm that they cannot bind the Church of to-day. On the other hand, he agrees with Ritschl in essential matters such as the ethical interpretation of Kingdom of God.² He is in agreement, too, when he discovers the roots of Socinianism in orthodox mediæval teachers;³ when he severely condemns modern kenotic theories. The much-flattered "mysticism" is for him also no better than nature magic.⁴ There are other points in which he coincides with Ritschl's earlier years against his later views. Thus he retains a Trinitarian summing up of his theology;⁵ the Trinity seems to have disappeared from Ritschl's dogmatic since the beginning of his Göttingen period. Also Schultz permits himself to say that Christ "became God." Ritschl's later condemnation of the phrase⁶ affords Schultz's critics an opportunity for damaging attacks.⁷

We have already had occasion to mention Herrmann's earlier writings. The most impor-

¹ pp. 420-1.

² pp. 375-7.

³ p. 162.

⁴ pp. 91, 128.

⁵ p. 625.

⁶ "The thought of man becoming God in time is as impossible as the thought of God becoming man in time"; first Göttingen lectures on Dogmatic, 1864-5; *Life*, ii. p. 25. Earlier courses spoke of "der Gewordene Gott" (*Life*, i. p. 283), confining Christ's Godhead to the state of exaltation.

⁷ Grau, *Selbstbewusstsein Jesu* (1887), pp. 271, 726-7.

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tant of all his books is *The Christian's Communion with God*. Like Schultz's *Gotttheit Christi*—and even more largely in proportion to its size—it is built upon quotations from Luther. Looking back from it, one can see the outline of Herrmann's characteristic theology and religion in the 1879 volume. But Prof. Otto Ritschl is quite right when he tells us that there is a divergence from Ritschl, slight and unemphatic in the first edition of the *Verkehr* but growing clearer in later issues. Henceforward visibly Herrmann has the one message to deliver. There may be something of the narrowness of concentration in this man; there is much of its strength. He characteristically varies the general Ritschlian attitude.¹ Personal religion, which for Ritschl was a dangerous contraband, to be cautiously admitted in small quantities, is for Herrmann all-important. And he is aware of this contrast. Ritschl, it is true, praised the fine devotional quality of *Verkehr*, ed. 1. But Herrmann has to lament that while the "Romish remainders in Protestantism" were chiefly embittered against Ritschl, yet "those who owed him much felt painfully at times that they were listening to the cries of deeply wounded religion."²

For Herrmann, Apologetic and Dogmatic are to be achieved at a single stroke; they are not

¹ It is still Herrmann's conviction that there is no Ritschlian school. Ritschl neither could found a school, nor wished to do so! *Dogmatik*, p. 611 (1906), comp. *supra*, p. 44.

² *Dogmatik*, p. 615.

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to be separated from each other, in Kaftan's fashion. As Dr. Garvie tells us, Herrmann's apologetic has two foundations—the moral nature of man¹ and the historical Christ. Both foundations are necessary. We have no liberty to select one and neglect the other. The man who is not “morally in earnest” can never understand what “blessedness” is; the man who does not look in his helplessness to Jesus Christ will never attain to blessedness. If Herrmann writes upon Ethics, he tells of Christ as the Person at whose touch ethical life arises. And, if he begins to speak on Dogmatic, he pushes back to the recognition of our moral needs and dangers as giving a meaning to the gospel of Christ. He is a convinced Kantian; but he agrees with Ritschl that the neo-Rationalism of *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* does no justice to Kant's own practical philosophy. Again, the vision of Christ which Herrmann proclaims is a perception of His “inner life.” Christ thus apprehended becomes “a fact” in our own life, and “overpowers” us. Not external events, but the personality and character of Jesus—these are knowable, are verifiable.

Herrmann is in earnest with the negative implications of his test. He insists, against Ritschl, that we must not include even the resurrection of Jesus among the immediately verifiable certainties.² This insistence is partly

¹ Though this wording of ours might not satisfy Herrmann!

² *Dogmatik*, p. 612.

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due to Herrmann's jealousy of mere probabilities in religion. Faith must be certain, or it has for him no warrant at all.

Again, Herrmann substitutes for the Ritschlian appeal to the New Testament—and indirectly to the Old Testament as well—this central impression created by the personality of Jesus. He names Kaftan and Kattenbusch, among Ritschl's disciples, as having specially welcomed Ritschl's return to an older emphasis on the Bible. Schleiermacher, according to Herrmann, struck a truer note, especially in the *Reden*; Herrmann ignores the vague romanticist basis of that book on the rather unconvincing ground that Schleiermacher must have presupposed Christianity, though he neglected to work out his assumptions. The *Dogmatik* is held to be of considerably lower value, on account of its endeavour to reproduce wonted Church teaching. Yet it is the *Dogmatik* which regards Christian theology as a description of faith; and it is the *Dogmatik* which calls religion "Absolute Dependence"—a phrase Herrmann reverences; for such dependence is "only possible in the free submission of free souls."¹ Hofmann, and even in measure Frank, with their theology of the regenerate life, come nearer the truth than Ritschl; he was more hampered than the Erlangen Lutherans by the doctrinal tradition! Yet Herrmann will not test experience subsequently by scripture, as the Erlangen divines do.

¹ *Dogmatik*, pp. 596-7.

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Some have praised and some blamed Herrmann for this concentration upon a smaller focus of authority than Ritschl's. The new method escapes dependence on doubtful findings in New Testament criticism. Also—as Herrmann notes—he is not tempted to the non-natural exegesis of Ritschl or Hofmann; they have almost rivalled orthodoxy in wresting the scriptures! Whether we praise or whether we blame, let us note this change and remember it.

The central thing, then, according to Herrmann, in Christianity and in human life, is the impression produced by Jesus on the moral mind of man. It has been well said of Bishop Butler that the God he worshipped was a magnified human conscience. There is not less of conscience in the religion of Herrmann than in Butler's; but Herrmann has the happiness to worship a God who is not merely our judge, terrible in righteousness, but our Redeemer and Saviour. Again, in contrast with evangelicalism (from Paul downwards) which postulates knowledge of the death of Christ, Herrmann will not regard even that event as belonging to the necessary primal certainties. What is primary, what is certain, is the impression of the moral glory and strength of Christ. Such a force cannot be considered anything except a reality. It is no cunningly devised fable. Nor is it a mere postulate; it is a fact, and reveals itself as the authority emancipating and completing our own inner life. For when, in this fashion, Christ comes into the life of any

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man who has discovered his helpless moral need, Christ makes all things new.

Faith, then, is the Alpha and Omega of Herrmann's dogmatic theology. He suggests a quaint threefold division ¹—first, faith struggling against the world; secondly, faith struggling against sin; thirdly, faith triumphant. This he has not worked out; but he has explained in its light the high and sacred place he gives to the Bible. Our Bible is the classic book of faith struggling in its twofold struggle, of faith celebrating its single and eternal victory. If one hardly dares say that *Deep calls unto deep*, yet the deep experiences recorded in scripture call piercingly, so that even we must hear; and our hearts sing their response in feebler yet living notes.

Herrmann has established, then, one small vivid circle of light, where the soul of man, wistfully seeking the good but hitherto baffled, meets God in Christ. This is faith; this is religion. The exact description of faith—or of religion—is theology; the whole of normative theology. Outside this innermost circle, which is uniform in all Christians and is absolutely certain, there extends a wide circumference of appealing but less authoritative thoughts. From 1886 onwards Herrmann describes these as “the thoughts of faith.” They occur largely in the Bible and in all genuine religious experience. But not one of them, biblical or extra-biblical, has either the certainty or the authority of faith itself. There

¹ *Dogmatik*, p. 625.

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is in all minds one faith, which arises when God shines into our heart by the vision of the face of Christ. With equal naturalness and necessity, there are many differing non-authoritative "thoughts of faith" in the many minds that learn of Christ.

One is made to recall a dialogue by Mr. Henry James, in which a cultured and sympathetic man talks with some women who try to drag him into their discussion. At every turn he makes the comment, "I know what you mean!" They can extract nothing more from him. Just such is Herrmann's attitude towards the thoughts of St. Paul or St. John or later lesser saints. He will be found unfailingly sympathetic, inflexibly non-committal. There is no great Christian thought you can name to him which he will not greet with a glow. There is none to which you can tie him. Is there a vein of intellectual scepticism here? Is the theologian's mind warped? One cannot help thinking that, in course of time, Christians who love Christ and who cease launching anathemas at each other will be able to reach a wider basis of agreement. It is true that, as living persons, we must experience the common salvation each in his own way. Yet surely in his own way each experiences *the same*; and we have a most personal interest in the thoughts of others who worship with us the same God and follow the same Saviour.

One result of Herrmann's attitude towards the *Glaubensgedanken* is his repudiation of that thought

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of system in theology which Ritschl so emphasized. In 1879 he had accepted Ritschl's view; a correctly treated "Dogmatic" was to be "a whole, just as the personal spirit is a whole. Such a whole can be vindicated by proof as universally valid."¹ In 1906 he has come to feel it a gain that we are free from any such fetters. "Orthodox theology showed great tact in avoiding system and choosing the looser form of *loci*,"² which gave individual doctrines of scripture uncurtailed—not sacrificing any one of them to the supposed requirements of logic.

Once more Herrmann shows concentration when he makes his escape from what one sometimes ventures to call the Protestant dualism, a thing which Ritschl had seemed to intensify. Herrmann closes the gaping wound. There is no redemption except for the man who is seeking God and goodness. There is no finding of goodness for anyone except in the God who has expressed Himself to us in Jesus Christ. There is no failure to find on the part of any who truly seek.

If Herrmann seems far removed from the normal utterances of Christian faith, yet—has he not insisted that without personal faith in Christ no one is right with God? And that no one possessing such faith can be wrong with God? Are not these tenets absolutely central

¹ *Die Religion*, u.s.w., p. 431, with reference in footnote to Ritschl, *Justification*, iii. p. 11.

² *Dogmatik*, p. 625.

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to Christianity? If there might seem danger of purely erotic or sentimental Christianity, the fault is in our formulation. Herrmann has taken the best of precautions in limiting Christ's offer to the "morally earnest man."

And yet the theology and religion of William Herrmann impress one as a steep and narrow path, on which few feet will ever be able to follow the dauntless pioneer. Individualist as he is in regard to the "thoughts of faith," loneliness in regard to *faith* will not satisfy him. He insists that the strange mountain track where he climbs is the king's highway, trodden by all the saints of the past, destined to be used by all the saints of the future. His novel forms of speech or turns of thought are for him identical with essential Christianity. Alas! one cannot see things so. His is one form of expressing the Christian appeal—a form in many ways peculiarly adapted to twentieth-century needs among cultured persons in the West; the exclusive form of God's appeal? Surely not. One thinks there is a Christianity very near that of the New Testament for which the forgiving love of God is the first word and almost the last. "I have written unto you, my little children, because your sins are forgiven you for His name's sake." One thinks, too, that Christianity is something a shade less bleak and bare than it seems on Herrmann's pages. But one offers these criticisms with all possible diffidence in the presence not only of great power of thought but of deep and pure

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Christian goodness. One may not be able to walk with this great leader. Far below him, very far behind him, one's course may be. But at the last of all may the end of his pilgrimage be the end of our journeyings, and may his God be ours.

We turn to a mind of a different type when we proceed to say something about Prof. Kaftan—more especially about his *Dogmatik*. We have already noted that the apologetic task, never specifically handled by Ritschl, is dealt with in full detail by Kaftan. We have also noted that, unlike Herrmann, he separates Apologetic and Dogmatic. Apologetic is to establish the nature first of religion, then of Christianity; thereafter it is to establish the grounds for accepting the latter. Dogmatic is to state the contents of Christian faith. At all costs we are to avoid the behaviour of old-fashioned apologetics, which fought an endless series of skirmishes; which hoped to know and to demonstrate the facts asserted in theology instead of demonstrating “religion.” Herrmann views matters very differently. He makes his way straight to the central moral experience.¹ That is the fact he proposes to demonstrate. For him accordingly, apologetic and dogmatic are not two things but one.¹ Whatever its difficulties, Herrmann's view is profoundly impressive. One observes, however, that Schultz's apologetic makes appeal to Kaftan,

¹ Herrmann, *Dogmatik* (as above), p. 623.

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and that the apologetic sections of Haering's *Dogmatik* are built precisely on Kaftan's lines.

Kaftan's *Dogmatik* reveals a large measure of agreement with Ritschl. There is the twofold study of Kingdom of God and Atonement; the appeal to scripture; the ideal of a theology¹ "extending not a hair-breadth beyond (the contents of) faith." Kaftan, however, if not precisely in the same sense as Herrmann, moderates Ritschl's emphasis upon system. The unity of theology is to be a unity of spirit. It does not much matter how we group the topics! The traditional *loci* may serve. Yet a reader of the *Dogmatik* cannot think that Kaftan's detail is well balanced.

At several points he seems to push aside eccentricities² of Ritschl's. There is, in common with Herrmann, warmer emphasis on *redemption*—a conception which Ritschl thrust into the background. Atonement in the Old Testament is demanded by sin, not by creaturely weakness. Penal justice is clearly acknowledged. The "transferability" of Christ's deity—favoured by Schultz as well as by Ritschl—is disclaimed. If Christ's deity includes much that is transferable to us, it stands also for that which is unique and untransferable.

At other points again Kaftan may seem to be

¹ p. 178.

² There is danger of subjectivity in the use of such terms! Unless many fellow-workers and followers strike out the same questionable positions from Ritschl's scheme?

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going half-way back towards traditional orthodoxy.¹ With all his fondness for the "clean cut" in Apologetic, he tends in Dogmatic to break off sharp edges. There is at least a suggestion of half-and-halfness, of the *Vermittler*. He will separate the treatment of the Person from that of the Work of Christ. The divine and the human in Christ are not a unity; they stand for separate features in the spiritual history of the Master. A doctrine (if not *the* doctrine) of the Trinity is formulated.² While disowning historical—one might more fitly say, *unhistorical*—mysticism as definitely as his fellows, he wishes to make a place for mystical, *i. e.* immediate, dealing with God. One would have thought that no one who had passed through the mill of the critical philosophy could have proposed to mark off God in this objective fashion from the world and the self; but then Kaftan is hardly a true Kantian. He takes up a similar mediating attitude towards the Absolute. Ritschl's warnings are to be carefully noted, but he "carried them too far." Ritschl has vacillated on many questions of philosophy and is certainly open to correction; but one distrusts the rule of *μηδὲν ἄγαν* in the world of thought. The Three Offices of Christ are reinstated without reference to Ritschl's striking systematization. In regard to the origin of sin, Kaftan goes back to positions

¹ Classification here is perhaps even more uncertain.

² The same was certainly true of Herrmann's class lectures on Dogmatic in the summer of 1899.

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which Ritschl abandoned.¹ Although the primary question is that of the *nature* of sin, there *must* have been a fall into sin on the part of the first human beings. We infer this from the doleful facts of to-day! A non-empiricist finds it hard to grasp what an empiricist thinks he has gained by such discoveries. Kaftan is no believer in a Covenant of Works. In original sin he does perhaps believe.

Unlike Herrmann's, Kaftan's Dogmatic seems to resolve itself into a string of postulates — *e. g.* regarding omnipotence, providence, miracle. The assertions postulated all doubtless occur in scripture, and that fact lends them a fuller measure of authority; but the ultimate nerve of proof, according to Kaftan, seems to be the judgment that such truths are precious or desirable. The judgment as to fact rests upon a judgment as to value. Even the Christian revelation seems to be, with Kaftan, hardly more than a postulate. We know it is a fact because it deserves to be one, exhibiting as it does the highest possible union of religion and morality. This Apologetic and Herrmann's diverge greatly. The latter's has the difficulty of seeming to confine all real religion and all real morality within Christianity. Kaftan's has the danger of losing itself in externals, and of never attaining to real authority.

It is difficult not to think that Kaftan's book is padded with a good deal of irrelevant historical material. An account of the contents of Chris-

¹ Ritschl's *Life*, vol. i. pp. 235, 384-5.

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tian faith hardly ought to be swollen at every turn by a record of what orthodoxy made of Christianity—an orthodoxy which the author of the book largely disclaims. On the other hand, the theological movement initiated by Ritschl finds its least provocative statement—the statement which will appeal most strongly to the average mind—in the Berlin professor’s cautious and sympathetic, if at times half-hearted, *Dogmatik*.

It may be permissible to make a passing reference to the *Dogmatik* of Haering. This is a remarkable achievement. One might criticize it as suffering from a fault in manner not unlike Lotze’s. Both he and Haering make a mystery of their personal opinions up to the last possible moment, divulging their own beliefs drop by drop. With Haering, caution also takes the form of a judicial summing up between different views; *e. g.* on the existence of a personal devil; or, in a graver region, on the personal pre-existence of our Lord. Sometimes a definite verdict is ultimately announced, but not always.

Haering has learned largely from Ritschl. He deliberately adheres to the line of “apologetic” which runs back “through Ritschl and Schleiermacher,” or—as he sometimes prefers to say—“runs back to Schleiermacher and Kant.” On the Atonement he has a more positive finding than Ritschl’s in a doctrine of vicarious repentance such as British theology knows in John McLeod Campbell, or more ecclesiastically tinged in

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R. C. Moberly, or—less ecclesiastically again—in the essay of the younger Mr. Moberly in *Foundations*. Ritschl opened fire upon his proselyte in edition two of *Justification*, iii.; but Haering stuck to his guns and makes an excellent fight. Perhaps there is no more timely message to serious theologians to-day than this *Dogmatik*. It presupposes an Apologetic appealing to the religious experience, and to nothing else. It suggests that evangelical Christians who believe in the personal pre-existence of Christ must bear with other evangelical Christians who find that belief unverifiable; on the other hand, that the more radical minds must not be impatient or contemptuous towards the conservatives. A movement which can inspire such a book as this has not exhausted its promise either to the world of thought or to the higher world of life and faith.

Besides noticing the sequence of theological utterances by the leaders of the school, we have a less comfortable task in noting various challenges which, from within the school itself, have been directed against several of the foundations of Ritschlianism.

Albrecht Ritschl died in 1889. In 1892 his pupil and son-in-law, Johannes Weiss, whose recently announced death is so great a loss to theology, published some seventy pages on *Jesus' Preaching of the Kingdom of God*. As all the world knows, this essay, and more especially edition one of it, is the classical formulation of

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the rigidly eschatological interpretation of the "Kingdom of God" even as conceived by Jesus. We are shown that in the contemporary mind the divine kingdom was a thing supernatural—only indirectly moral; a thing of the future—only in a rhetorical sense a present reality. That brilliant fanatic of the eschatological view, Albert Schweitzer, reproaches Weiss with the concessions of edition two, and seeks to explain not merely Jesus' teaching but even His personal development by the clue which eschatology furnishes. On re-reading Weiss's 1892 pamphlet one is impressed with its forcibleness. To a large extent its positions have commended themselves in debate. It is possible that we ought to seek mediating positions, and so secure a larger truth. But, if the Kingdom has a definite primary meaning, according to which it involves the overthrow of the present world, it is doubtful whether we can in any true sense bracket with that meaning an "ethical" kingdom. The inner significance of the great hope—it is both a great hope and a great fear—may be God's reign in men's hearts. But could the New Testament age possibly use "Kingdom of God" in a spiritualized sense? If not, we must recast many of the primary positions of Ritschlianism.

Again, it may be possible—Weiss himself thought it was—to employ Kingdom of God (modernized or spiritualized) as the framework for a dogmatic system. But that becomes a different thing if we know that we are not literally

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reproducing Jesus' teaching. In any case, we must regard our Lord as having been much less of a theological lecturer than Ritschl led numerous readers to suppose. There may be gain for us here, as well as losses and trials. It may be that the "other-worldliness" of the apocalyptic mind served in God's providence as a vehicle for the unworldliness of the Saviour. On the other hand, it looks as if the thought of Jesus had not consciously penetrated the error regarding times and seasons which beset the whole piety of the age. Even if we resisted Weiss's evidence as to the proper sense of Kingdom of God, other evidence must force the admission that Jesus accepted the imminence of the Last Day. Ritschl checked as if by violence the conviction that eschatological excitement goes back through the apostles to the lifetime of the Master. Such violence is no longer honest.

Another interesting early book by Weiss contains some forcible criticisms on Herrmann. It discusses *The Following of Christ and the Preaching of To-day*, and therefore is an effort at mediation, making extensive concessions to the modern mind. It actually seems to take for granted that there will continue to be large sections of the Christian Church knowing nothing of personal religion! Herrmann is charged with the sin of leading men beyond dependence on the Church into a personal private relation to the Master; the danger of fanaticism is thought to be deplorably near. Both Ritschl and Herrmann are charged with

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psychologizing widely and with being one-sided, not to say modernist, in their interpretation of the New Testament doctrine of the Spirit.

Another serious blow to the foundation assumptions of Ritschlianism was dealt by Harnack, when he proclaimed in popular lectures (1900) that Christ does not enter into the contents of Christ's gospel; only "God" and "the soul." So brilliant an historian does not speak without having registered many facts which might seem to support his finding. If we are right, as probably we are, in accepting a difficult tradition, then it is true that Jesus judged with comparative gentleness words spoken against the Son of Man. It is true also that his denunciation of the Galilean towns is not aimed against their disbelief of His Messiahship, but against their lack of *repentance*. It is further true that—apart from the Fourth Gospel—Jesus' claim is an undertone and a background rather than a dogma put forward as authoritative. But the background remains. Harnack is fully aware of it and calls his readers' attention to it. He does not anticipate that other line of radical theory which refuses to admit that Jesus thought of Himself as Messiah. But in the upshot Harnack treats the personality of Jesus as a separable accident of the Gospel. He resolves the high title "Son of God" into a unique knowledge—so he construes Matt. xi. 27—but a knowledge separable from the knower. This powerful mind,

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once a teacher of Ritschl's *ipsissima verba* in the *Unterricht*,¹ has placed itself within the current of that radicalism which sees in Jesus a prophet or teacher, nothing more. Even the eschatological school may be of value in such an emergency. Whatever the eschatological Christ was to His own thoughts, He was not a negligible detail of the Gospel.

Another attack from a friendly quarter is Troeltsch's view of Luther and the Reformation. This goes far beyond challenging individual excrescences in Ritschl's form of statement. The view common to all the Ritschlian leaders, that Luther opens up a new and deeper insight into Christianity, is set aside. We are told that Luther is essentially a mediævalist, while we ourselves are essentially modernist. The world has been forced out of Mediævalism, Catholic or Protestant, by the radicalism of the Reformed Church, of the smaller sects, and then of the Enlightenment. Strangely enough, one finds Troeltsch drawing from Luther his own programme² for the modern religious mind. In that programme there is no distinctive place for Christ.³ The author of the programme owes his primary loyalty not to Christ but to modernism. He will be as much of a Christian as his Modernism permits; as little a Christian as

¹ Ritschl's *Life*, ii. p. 337.

² See his pamphlet noted above, *Luther u. die moderne Welt*.

³ One is not attacking the personal Christianity of the writer, but his theology. The latter one is forced to condemn.

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his Modernism requires. Learned and powerful though his contribution to history may be, his mind is in the grasp of anti-evangelical pre-suppositions. If Ritschl capriciously inverts ordinary estimates, Troeltsch forfeits the element of truth contained in Ritschl's most freakish suggestions. We are not bound to accept the authority of such a critic. His religious estimates have more to do with his findings than his immense knowledge of history. Those to whom Christ is the light of the world will still regard as the essential thing in Luther the great fact that he *Christum recht verstand*.

One cannot date or define with precision the rise of the History-of-Religion school. Still, it is a conspicuous element in the contemporary religious situation; and, as has repeatedly been observed,¹ the new school is largely recruited from theologians who had belonged to the Ritschlian tendency. The change in their thoughts is partly due to reaction from Ritschlian excesses. Ritschl explained Christianity narrowly out of the Old Testament, if even more centrally out of the personality of Jesus. Such historical theories lent themselves as vehicles to a supernatural faith. They permitted the interpretation that God intervened peculiarly

¹ Comp. Reischle's pamphlet noted above. He quotes Gottschick in the same sense. Of names made prominent in Reischle's narrative, A. Eichhorn, Gunkel, Bousset were personal pupils of A. Ritschl; Scheibe, Grill, Heitmüller apparently were not.

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in Israel, uniquely in Christ. The History-of-Religion school stands for explaining Christianity, as far as possible, by contemporary conditions. More is made of Judaism; less importance is attached to the earlier classical age of the Old Testament. Judaism itself is held to have been infected from other faiths; and there are scholars who more boldly still assume direct borrowing—perhaps in the sacramental theology of St. Paul—from non-biblical religions. Gunkel has actually thought that “a syncretistic religion” is a fitting description for Christianity. A curious variant of these views appears when Albert Schweitzer tells us that, in the spirit of their century, Jesus, and John the Baptist before Him, invented sacraments as eschatological safeguards.

It appears, then, that the historical basis of Ritschlian supernaturalism is gravely threatened. That basis need not have been crowned with a supernatural structure, nor need the new basis now proposed to us exclude supernaturalism. Yet anti-supernaturalism is the predominant bias. That such an attitude should prevail, and prevail among men largely trained in Ritschlianism, is a blow to the school and a menace to the task of theology, whether apologetic or dogmatic. We shall not fear ultimate failure; but we must not promise ourselves immediate success. There will be difficult lessons to learn—of generosity in dealing with non-Christian religions, of firmness and caution as we defend the supreme treasure of our faith in Christ.

CHAPTER X

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

TIME enough has passed, since the Ritschlian movement of thought began, to sift out essentials from the mere accidents that accompanied them at first. Albrecht Ritschl's personal eccentricities of opinion have been largely dropped; at the same time, his eminence as a thinker becomes more and more manifest. Even a friend who criticizes him, as Haering does, considers Ritschl the dominant figure in the movement. In this concluding chapter we shall say nothing further about temperamental peculiarities. Nor shall we expect anything so unreasonable as to be shown the precise dogmatic views of Ritschl, positive and negative, holding the field. Even the capable biographer, the loyal son—so far as this present writer has been able to consult his works or to form an opinion regarding them—cannot, with the best of goodwill, quite recover his father's attitude and outlook. With a similar reserve, one may suggest that the younger Ritschl is scarcely the truest inheritor of his father's spirit.¹

¹ Prof. O. Ritschl (*Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1899, col. 250) holds (1) that freewill *versus* determinism is a problem for psychology, (2) that psychology rules out freewill. Would either affirmation have seemed to Albrecht Ritschl endurable?

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The historical positions of the school have been little if at all modified. Substantially they remain as they were. Kingdom of God in the Gospels means a present ethical reality. This being granted, we must reach an interpretation of Paul separated by no appreciable discontinuity from the thoughts of Jesus. Modern study of religions had helped Ritschl to formulate the distinctiveness of Christianity, and in doing that was supposed to have done its all. If we should think that such historical bases as these are scientifically ill-secured, we must conclude that much of the Ritschlian synthesis is premature. The spirit and aim of the movement may abide. Its actual constructive work will need remodelling.

In regard to philosophy; we must once more content ourselves with what has been already said on personal points such as the waverings or ambiguities of Albrecht Ritschl. Seeking for what is essential and permanent in the movement, we note one great bond of union. All members of the school, so far as the present writer is aware, repudiate a constructive system of rationalism or idealism. They are all in recoil from Hegel. Negatively, they will not tolerate, in Christian faith or Christian theology, speculative doctrines of the Absolute.¹ Prof. Garvie thinks them mistaken, even on their own premises. If faith and (scientific) knowledge were two separate things, a theologian ought not to trouble himself at all

¹ Slight qualification is necessary in regard to Kaftan; comp. *supra*, p. 237.

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about metaphysical findings. Yet surely the school had some reason for caution. Not a few types of metaphysics enter into conscious rivalry with Christian belief. If Dr. Garvie's hypothetical recommendation were accepted—if philosophy were left to go its own way, unscrutinized—there would be danger of a doctrine of Two Truths.¹ What guarantee could be given that theses which faith rules out might not be demonstrated in philosophy? That need not follow, but it might; and the Ritschlian leaders intend to take precautions in good time.

Within this measure of agreement, marked divergences occur. Let us record some of these in regard to *miracle* and the allied topic of *freewill*. (a) According to old-fashioned Natural Dualism our world contains a region of absolute law flanked by a region of absolute immunity from law; and miracle is an interference with the law-region on the part of Divine freewill. This is the highest and boldest of all possible dogmatic affirmations on both points—on freewill, and on miracle.

(b) It may be held that there are two views of things: that, from one point of view, all is determined; that, from another point of view, all that concerns ourselves is of the nature of re-

¹ According to late mediæval Nominalism, a doctrine might be true in philosophy and false in theology. I have heard Prof. Herrmann repudiate such trifling with truth. He will assert two "realities"; he will deny with all his might two "truths." See *infra*, p. 254.

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sponsible personal activity. This is Herrmann's position, in agreement with Kant. From such a scheme of thought, miracle as a thing to be scientifically formulated—miracle as an exception to natural law—disappears. Of course, the more simply religious conception of miracle holds its ground, for which Ritschl also may be quoted. Miracle on this view is the conspicuous and wonderful act of God for our help; whether within or apart from laws of nature, we neither know nor care. The present writer's main difficulty in accepting Herrmann's position on natural law is the fear of a Twofold Truth. If, as Kant and Herrmann both affirm, a human action phenomenally considered is as much necessitated as an eclipse,¹ can the same action be morally "free"? We prefer libertarianism, whatever difficulties may attend it.

(c) Kaftan throws himself into a strong current of modern opinion. Since he began to write, the current has been reinforced by Prof. James Ward's two series of Gifford lectures; while in British theology an important monograph by Dr. H. R. Mackintosh presupposes a similar philosophy. Laws of nature are to be depotentiated. They are useful fictions of the human mind, due to a very partial view of facts—if our summary is brusque, that may make it all the clearer. If, then, objective reality contains no laws, freewill ceases to be a problem. In any

¹ Kant, *Critique of Prac. Reason*, p. 231; Abbott's tr., p. 193; Herrmann, *Die Religion*, u.s.w., p. 220.

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region where the fiction ceases to be useful, we drop it, and all goes well. As to miracle, a conciliatory theology like Kaftan's accepts the miracles of the history of redemption, regarding them (more decidedly than Ritschl or Herrmann might admit) as exceptional facts. What hinders? He has made us jettison our scale of probabilities. Of course, Kaftan is too much in sympathy with Ritschlianism to undertake a demonstration of revealed truth by means of miracle, like eighteenth-century orthodoxy. One must agree in part with these views. It must be true that laws of nature are not, for God, a special hindrance to His working, intermittently—but very rarely—set aside. Yet can we disrate and drum out of the service the very concept of natural law? In any case, Kaftan says "yes" and Herrmann "no."

(d) The old Hegelian idealism, as worked out in our country even by Green, *first* denied libertarian freewill; freedom was a pleasanter aspect of necessitation as seen from a sufficiently lofty philosophical standpoint. *Secondly*, Miracle was denied, with the utmost metaphysico-religious intensity. Law was the first and last word in the orderly reasonableness of things. God is "immanent" in natural causation—and is bound hand and foot by it.

What follows is put forward as the merest tentative suggestion. Too often British writers have taken on themselves to lecture distinguished

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foreign minds, under pretext of interpreting them to the insular reader. One has every wish to avoid that example; but one cannot wholly refuse to outline conclusions—whatever may prove to be their fate.

(1) One would greatly like to see an attempt at bringing the spirit of Ritschlian theology into alliance with some more positive and constructive metaphysic than his or his friends'. A writer already mentioned in these pages, Prof. Troeltsch, has pleaded for a "religious *a priori*" in the Philosophy of Religion. The result in his case may fail to satisfy us. One can understand how, in face of such possibilities, Albrecht Ritschl should try to make good his appeal to "historical empiricism." Metaphysic may become a rival to the distinctive revelations found in Christ! Yet one is not satisfied that such a result necessarily flows from believing in constructive metaphysic.

For instance, if we should suppose that Theism is competent, it would not follow that the argumentative demonstration, *A God exists*, enters into any real competition with Christ's message, *The God for whom I speak desires and purposes to be your friend*. Personally, one may incline to hold that Theism is not demonstrable apart from (a) the moral life, and (b) its culmination in the Christian life. Intellectual argument may leave us to the very end wavering between Theism and Pantheism. But even if not—does demonstration of a God-fact reveal God's Fatherly heart towards

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us? Unless we make that foolish affirmation, Christianity stands unchallenged.

(2) Whatever is true of religious *a priori*, there must be an ethical *a priori*. There must be an independent root of certainty in the conscience; developed biologically and historically how you will—*i. e.* in whatever way you can *prove* it *has been* developed—but veracious, authoritative, self-commending. It may be in itself incomplete. We may need God, as revealed in Christ, to round it out and bathe it in its true glory. But, on dark days of doubt, the inner law and the human tie will still be near and strong if heaven is hidden. And he who does not love the brother he has seen cannot love the God whom he has not seen. Still further, the moral *a priori* is not the rival of faith. It is rather a postulate than an affirmation. It says to us, Such things must be. Christ says to us, “Behold, these things are! Better than in your best dreams.”

(3) Another caution must be stated in regard to the relations between the findings of intellectual philosophy—if such are to be respected—and the more immediate convictions of Christian faith. It is one of Ritschl’s fixed assumptions that, if we put any trust at all in metaphysic, we must grant metaphysic the last word upon all disputed points. It may possibly be the case that this is generally assumed in German theological debate.¹ But one thinks that an *a priori*

¹ The late Principal D. W. Simon, who knew Germany well and was anything but favourable to Ritschl’s views,

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philosophy may arise which will hand on tentative results to be remodelled by the moral and religious consciousness. We must not keep posing the dilemma: True or false? From Hegel we must learn to establish provisional positions, and to reach affirmations that are relatively true, feeling certain that no future evolution of thought will destroy our assertions—rather it will transmute them into worthier forms—yet also feeling certain that the form in which we hold and treasure truth is not the highest possible.

(4) One ventures to doubt the possibility of dividing the world of knowledge into two regions which are eternally to co-exist without having any intercourse one with the other. It is more probable that they must be “thought together,” whatever of difficulty and danger that task may involve. This may be the only escape from the intellectual dishonesty which speaks of “Two Truths.” One possible example has already been noted. It may be the case that intellectual reasoning leads up towards belief in God. Or, if we cannot be certain of that; it is conceivable that monism—the unity of all things, assumed in human knowledge, and more and more verified as knowledge advances—has a religious significance. Or, again, one might contend that modern doctrines of evolution imply the discovery of a growing purpose in nature, and therefore to

has said to me that great allowances must be made for peculiarly German conditions when we are passing judgment on what we deem defects in men like Ritschl.

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some extent confirm religious faith. The old Design argument, if thus understood, may still be living and serviceable to-day. Ritschl, of course, thinks differently. He writes off doctrines of evolution as a fantastic modern mythology.¹ It is an interesting but hardly a convincing estimate. If there were nothing in this world which made it look like God's world, faith would be too utterly a paradox.

(5) Instead of conceiving two regions—one of religious certainty; the other, of religious insignificance, if in some parts of scientific worth—one may rather believe in graduated certainty. Herrmann has a single narrow intense certainty—faith in God. Ritschl has a much wider given certainty—the general religious teaching of the Bible, *minus* certain ill-defined “apocryphal” elements. But, according to each theologian, one hair-breadth beyond the region of absolute religious certainty there begins a region of absolute religious meaninglessness or negative freedom. Ritschl's whole system because it is a system demands acceptance. What has not secured admission into the system is to abide in the outer darkness. Herrmann disclaims system; but he knows of a single experience, called faith, which is uniform in all Christians; besides which nothing else has any claim that can be tolerated. It would surely be worth while to try to work out a view of religious and moral certainty as graduated, and of a debatable country round it, in

¹ E. g. *Fides Implicita*, p. 83.

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regard to which religion and science may and must exchange *pourparlers*.

(6) Yet, strangely enough, one feels constrained to urge upon the Ritschlians the necessity of more frankly recognizing the limits of our knowledge in matters of religion. There is a familiar image which compares utterly illegitimate theological dogmas to astronomical theses regarding the back of the moon—that region of our satellite which never turns earthwards. Of course, it is possible that, in the progress of science, we shall learn unexpectedly by indirect processes what the back of the moon is like. And it is also thinkable that propositions or facts which seem irrelevant to religion may hereafter prove to be indirectly connected with it. On the other hand, it is at least possible that they never will. Hence it may be a Christian duty to be “icily indifferent” towards such affirmations. We should not really enrich astronomy by guessing hard what the back of the moon may be like. Nor do we really enrich Christian theology when we add to it affirmations which have no discoverable bearing on the moral and spiritual life. Such a bearing *might* be one day discovered? Or even one day revealed? The significant fact is that, so far, it is not!

Let us take one example.¹ Honest exegesis of the New Testament will hardly fail to report

¹ Will the reader please note that what is spoken of *here* is not the doctrine of Christ's personal pre-existence, but of His creative activity?

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that several passages think of the Son of God as the divine agent in creation. Christ made the nebula in Orion; fixed it in the sky; has kept it in its place through ages which it makes the mind giddy to measure; will dispose of it again when He has fulfilled His purposes with it. Now, it is a grammatically and logically flawless proposition that the First Person of the Godhead made the worlds through the agency of the Second Person of the Godhead. But what that means—what difference it would have made to us, or to the nebula in Orion, if the Eternal Father had made the worlds apart from the mediation of the Son—no soul of man can see. Had we lived in the first century, believing that this little planet was the centre of all things, with angels peering into its affairs (and into no others) from above, with the pit gaping precisely beneath it—we also, in the first century, should no doubt have found it a natural expression of our Christian faith, that the Logos had acted as the divine agent in creation. But we belong to an older and sadder age. We are twentieth-century minds, with many new difficulties in the way of belief. It is no part of our duty to weight with precarious theories that central gospel which we preach to others and by which our own souls live. But, if it is not our duty to do this, it certainly cannot be our right. Personally, we may believe the dogma, if we choose and if we can. But we must not insist upon it in presenting the gospel to our age.

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The Ritschlian thesis is hardly less open to criticism. It affirms that nature is to be explained from the religious point of view not ætiologically but teleologically and only teleologically. The Kingdom of God is the upshot and purpose of all creation—the kingdom where Jesus reigns and God through Him. What, then, of the nebula in Orion? This apparently, that—for reasons unrevealed and undiscoverable—the nebula had to be just what it is in order that Jesus Christ of Nazareth and His gospel might be just what they are.¹ Well! It may be true. God alone knows what necessities—or what high spiritual expediencies—connect seemingly brute facts with supreme moral purposes. But, on the face of things, it does not look as if any such assertion were true. And I for one, as I decline to hamper myself with the old dogma *Christus creator*, so I refuse to become responsible for a new dogma, affirming that the nebula was necessary to the Christhood of Jesus. What, then, is the relation between Jesus Christ and the nebula in Orion? With the utmost reverence, speaking in God's presence, I answer that I neither know nor care.

It may further, indeed, be true that the whole physical universe is nothing else than a school-room where souls are trained. It *is* true that that is the supreme fact about the universe;

¹ It may be that no Ritschlian means this. I can only report that their concurrent testimony seems plainly to say it.

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very emphatically is it supreme for us, souls whom God is training. Earthquakes, comets, suns, systems of suns—it may be they are calculated exclusively for us; pictures or diagrams hung on the walls of our schoolroom, and nothing besides. It would be in some ways a relief if this gorgeous tapestry of nature, so fascinating but so bewildering too, were rolled up like a scroll, and if God and the souls He has made were left, face to face, unbewildered.

His mercies ever shall endure
When this *vain world* shall be no more.

It may all be true; but who will guarantee it? Let us confess our painful, our humbling ignorance. Let us admit as more probable that unknown necessities—or unknown high moral expediencies—have gone to the shaping of the earth and the heavens. Oh, much indeed “remaineth unrevealed”! Yet, amid all uncertainty, we have God, we have Christ; and they are certain. The penalty of claiming too much knowledge is that the central certainties fade.

We return now to the biblical and orthodox affirmation that Christ was the agent of the Eternal Father in framing the worlds. Why, it will be asked—why hesitate to accept a tenet which can be so described? Because we believe that the true sense of such formulæ consists in their bearing on experience; and because the practical truth underlying the statement that the Logos was creator is this—God is partially

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revealed in nature, but absolutely revealed in Christ and in Him alone. On the one hand, nature partially reveals God. There is too much tendency in Ritschlianism to obliterate this confession of our faith, and to view nature exclusively as that from which God rescues us,—a scriptural truth,¹ undoubtedly, but not the whole truth. On the other hand, the supreme and exclusive revelation which redeems and saves, is Jesus Christ. This, and nothing else, as Ritschl has pointed out, is the purport and pith of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel. If elaborated dogmatic certitudes throw this truth into the shade, they may be doing honour to the husk of revelation, but they destroy its kernel.

The essential and abiding features of the Ritschl movement may be stated in a single word—concentration. Our apologetic must become a concentrated apologetic, our dogmatic a concentrated dogmatic. The great argument for Christian faith, the great theme of Christian faith, are one and the same. *How* do we know? By concentration upon Christ. The moral nature and needs of man furnish that to which Christ makes His appeal; but that which makes appeal to us, with authority, with saving power, is Christ Jesus. *What* do we know? We know the Christ upon whom faith concentrates itself.

As to a concentrated apologetic: (1) one possible thesis—dogmatic, however, rather than

¹ Comp. Eph. ii. 12.

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apologetic, and dogmatic in a bad rather than in a good sense—explains the concentration of power to save in the single figure of Christ by the fact of human sin. The suggestion—perhaps we might say, the assertion—is that, sin apart, the human race could have worked out its salvation, not, perhaps, without the heavenly Father or without the power of His Spirit, but without Jesus the Son of God. This assertion was very clearly formulated by Rothe,¹ a theologian of the generation before Ritschl; it meets us more than once on the pages of Ritschl's friend Schultz.² One can work out for oneself the fanciful picture of an unstained humanity inferring from the barest hints of nature a trembling hope in God, and keeping faith alive upon these scanty rations until death rent the veil for each believing soul, and ushered it into the joy of God's presence. On the other hand, sin is a pervasive and basal fact in our religious life. Theories which eliminate it are daring things.

(2) The alternative assertion—human dependence not simply upon God, but essentially upon God in Christ—might take different lines. It might commit itself to a heightened "historical empiricism." There is no knowledge at all of God, among men, except precisely where the influence of Jesus tells! Or it might appeal to the connectedness of mankind as a race, and interpret the central position of the Son of Man

¹ *Zur Dogmatik*, ed. 2, p. 59.

² E. g. *Apologetic*, E. T. p. 51.

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by the fact that it is God's good pleasure to save us not one by one but in a fellowship which links each to all. The extreme dogmatic development of the latter position is the assertion that Christ would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned. But usually, if not always, such a doctrine ceases to relate itself to man's moral needs and becomes a cosmological speculation: Incarnation as the crown of evolution! It is not thinkable but that the self-manifesting God should employ this supremest method of manifesting Himself!

One ventures to suggest that both assertions—what we have numbered (1) and what we have numbered (2)—really trench upon the unknowable. We have no materials for answering the question, how the human race would have developed in the absence of sin. We have no materials for affirming how God under such conditions would have revealed Himself. It is possible for us to raise these questions. It is not possible for us to answer them. Our only wisdom, therefore, is to let them be, and to concentrate upon what we know—that we have sinned, and that God in Christ is our Saviour.

(3) Another difficulty has been raised in regard to the Old Testament. If Christ alone reveals God, what of those who trusted in God before Christ? The strangest conundrums have been based upon this query, and have been addressed to Ritschl; as if the older dispensation of God's grace could in the nature of things be intelligible

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apart from the culmination it attained in Christ ! If it were necessary to dogmatize regarding modern Judaism, one must affirm that, when Christ is left out, the religion of the Old Testament is now in the position of a "creed outworn"; that those who trust in God to-day without confessing Christ destroy, by their silence, the only real justification for their faith. They have no ground for believing what they do; or rather they would have no ground for so believing, unless God had done more for mankind than they know or admit. But the most proper answer to such conundrums is to appeal to the New Testament, and above all to Matt. xi. 27. It is not Albrecht Ritschl but the Founder of the Christian religion—He to whom we trust ourselves; whom we worship; through whom we know and love and worship God—it is He who tells us that there is no other way to the Father save through Him. We do not need to solve the conundrums with which a profoundly irreverent orthodoxy pelts the Ritschlians. We need but know Christ, and remember His words.

(4) Other difficulties relate to the faiths of the world outside the circle of Bible revelation. These difficulties indeed are great. One thinks of a respectable citizen with conservative instincts, like Plutarch, striving to piece together a tenable creed out of things little better than fragments of decaying superstition. One feels that Plutarch may have done the best that was possible under his conditions. Nay, one feels

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with a sinking heart that, if God had allotted to oneself a place in the age and the society to which Plutarch belonged, one would have had no better prospect—perhaps none so good.

Personally, the present writer believes without a shadow of doubt that God extends the knowledge of Christ to those who have passed into another world, if this world has given (1) no opportunity at all or (2) no real opportunity of closing with the gospel. Such a belief is not formulated in the New Testament. It did not fall within the horizon of an eschatologically minded age. Nor had that age had time to feel the force of those deeply Christian motives which urge upon one's mind the belief in question. I repeat that personally, and as a Christian, I could not feel life endurable unless I held this belief. When one has fought one's way through doubt to certainty, one has the unshakable assurance that God understands us perfectly—here we stand; we can do no otherwise; so help us God!—and that we, in such measure as weak disciples of Jesus may, but also, in such measure as we need—understand God. Yet one does not pretend that this can be anything more than personal belief, or than one of those extreme inferences which lie on the far border-line between the sacred and the unmeaning. By such personal faith one lives; but one cannot force it on others, or preach it as part of the message. There may be unimagined ways in which God accomplishes that twofold purpose—of testing or judging men,

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and of saving them—which gives our life its meaning. So far, however, as one's thought can reach, this is what one holds—

That God saves men through Christ alone.

That He loves all.

That it is impossible God Himself should reveal a fixed purpose of leading each soul in the end to bliss, without thereby destroying the moral meaning of choice.

That the revelation of Christ raises the responsibility of those to whom it comes, making possible the attainment of greater heights—or a more terrible fall.

That it is inconceivable Christ should *merely* intensify human chances, bright and dark. That it is immeasurably better to know Him than never to have heard of Him. That God does His best for every one; which best is Christ, and knowledge of Christ—if not here, then elsewhere; if not now, then after the dense veil of death has been passed.

(5) On the revelation of Christ to non-human races of moral beings, if (as we may well suppose) such exist, it becomes us to be silent. Here we pass beyond possible relation to our own moral needs and succours. The pages of the New Testament may exhibit beginnings or hints of such doctrines. But not angelology itself, and still less the soteriology of the angels, has any place in the confession of Christian faith. Those who would insist on framing such definitions

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are seeking to grasp that elusive material which haunts the back of the moon.

Dogmatically, no less than apologetically, we are to concentrate upon Christ.

(1) It may seem, indeed, that God is no less central to Christianity—to Christian faith, to Christian theology—than Christ can be. It may seem so? It *is* so! Those who have reached God—logically or illogically, legitimately or irregularly—have reached the one sure foundation. They are heirs of God. But if, in point of fact, to know God is one part (or rather one aspect) of the gift which Christ alone bestows, then, in bidding men concentrate upon Christ, we do not bid them forget God—we tell them how for the first time they may learn concerning Him. One aspect of the needed Christian concentration is to “know the Father.” He who truly “knows the Father” has all that life, has in essence all that heaven itself can give him. But this knowledge is Christ’s gift.

(2) Everything, therefore, in the prospects of Ritschlianism turns upon the solvency of its new Christology—or, if you will, upon the prospect of a Christianity without any Christology as traditionally known. God is One, without a second to Him actual or thinkable. And Christ is One, for He is the only way to God. As such, He shares God’s “glory” or divineness. When we see in Him the world’s only Saviour and only hope, we are calling Jesus “Lord.” To do this is not a

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single fragment detached from an extensive series of true dogmas. It is Christianity; it is religion; it is faith; it is salvation. "The record is this, that God has given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not life."

(3) If we try to push further back, the doctrine of Christ's personal pre-existence presents itself as the natural utterance of Christian faith. Nothing else could so sum up the meaning and the distinctiveness of Christ's life. A relation between the pre-existent One and the business of creation, or of cosmic providence, we have ruled out as irrelevant to faith. But pre-existence itself is a confession which has stronger claims upon us. As the close of Christ's earthly life on the cross concentrates the meaning of the whole—all for God; all for man, but nothing for man's sin; nothing for self—so the beginning of the earthly life in one great act of sacrifice, if it were only symbolically true, is yet a symbol which one can hardly conceive that Christianity will ever drop. Ritschl criticized his disciple Loofs' attempt to vindicate Christ's pre-existence as a religious truth, arguing that, if we admit intellectual certainties at all, they override the religious point of view. We have seen reason to distrust that argument. Yet we can hardly place Christ's personal pre-existence within the limits of that primary and abiding message which saves.

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(4) In the same spirit we might make room for a Trinitarian doctrine or formula. Salvation comes to us from the Father through the Son; from the Son who lived and died and rose again for us, through the abiding Spirit. Any attempt to treat the doctrine of the Trinity as throwing light upon philosophical riddles is irrelevant to faith. Any attempt to enforce the later orthodox view—that the Trinity is a revealed “mystery,” to be assented to, but never even fractionally to be understood—that is high treason against Christ. Such a view suits the Church of Rome, but is mere self-murder for the children of the Reformation. They ought to know better what faith is.

(5) It is in a different direction that one may suspect undue limitation of religious belief on the part of Ritschl and his colleagues. All, or almost all, of them exclude from theology what we may call a doctrine of the salvation of character by the grace of Christ. With Herrmann—probably the most rigorously concentrated of all—salvation is faith. It is indeed also goodwill, so far as faith can be interpreted as implying the good will; but in no other sense. One accepts the statement that, in becoming Christians, we do not cease to be moral. It must be a truth that the beginning, the middle, and the end of the Christian life is achieved by the exercise of personal choice. But is that affirmation the only sense in which truth addresses us? May we not also argue that, in becoming moral, we do not

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cease to be Christian? One has ventured to believe that the vital element in Christianity is the assertion, Through Christ alone, but with absolute sufficiency through Christ. The assertion holds good, as the Ritschlians tell us, of the knowledge of God. Such knowledge is not a part of salvation but the whole of salvation seen from one side. We accept the belief from Christ—He makes it credible—that, in spite of endless moral difficulties, God is perfectly and gloriously good. When we add Christ to other evidence, we can believe in God; rather, we cannot but believe. So with the blessing of forgiveness. And not less so, surely, with the new life! True, we cannot make this a matter of as immediate demonstration as Herrmann's appeal to faith. Yet it is Christian to hold that new moral life is the gift of Christ, the sure gift of Christ, the gift of Christ alone. And the assertion will not lack its sufficient proof.

A hostile critic will ask whether such a modified Ritschlianism as one has sought to outline is anything better than a velleity—a capriciously chosen fragment or group of fragments out of a larger body of doctrine into which the tooth of modern doubt gnaws further and further.

One can only testify to strong personal persuasion that there is a unity and coherence in that which one gets for the moral life from God through Christ, such as is found nowhere else; that, both in thought and in life, this faith of

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ours works; and that our faith is not weakened but purified by dropping extraneous elements. Upon the ethical and spiritual principle one is perfectly clear. In the intellectual formulation there are, and may continue to be, profound difficulties. This Something which one has, however imperfectly, isolated, grasped, revered, *is Christianity*. "God has given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son." If anyone adds on extraneous elements—*e. g.* a doctrine of Christ's personal pre-existence *on the ground* that we have independent information of the fact as a fact (*viz.* in the New Testament)—he may be saving traditional orthodoxy, but he is saving it at the cost of Christianity itself; and the cost is too heavy. Great efforts are made to advertise an alleged loopline, by which we may attain religious certainty—even, one judges, may attain mystical religious communion—apart from Christ! Non-Christian mysticism, or mysticism as a truth higher and deeper than the Gospel, is a deadly thing which ends in death. Along this loopline innumerable trainloads of passengers are dispatched; but not one company, not one soul, gets through. Either they must come back, and enter in by the gates into the city; or they must stay for ever outside. Our primary apologetic duty is to make men trust the right thing—God's message through Christ—and distrust the wrong. Our apologetic duty, did I say? It is our primary and fundamental *Christian* duty. Whatever Ritschlianism has done or left undone, it

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has meant this; it has sought this; it is seeking this still, and seeking will find.

The attitude of a Christian theologian may be summed up in a few words from St. Paul, greatest of all our teachers save One.

Having the same spirit of faith, according to that which is written, I believed, and therefore did I speak; we also believe, and therefore also we speak;

Commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.

Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ. But, if any man buildeth on the foundation gold, silver, costly stones; wood, hay, stubble—each man's work shall be made manifest; for the day shall declare it, because it is revealed in fire.

I know nothing against myself. Yet am I not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me is the Lord.

APPENDIX

NOTE A

"DOGMA" AND THE ADJECTIVE "DOGMATIC"

THERE is no less ambiguity in the Ritschlian use of the above words than in Ritschlian references to "Apologetic." (1) Herrmann exchanges one view for another. (*a*) In his early writings he employs the adjective as a term of praise, equivalent to "religious" in contrast with what is merely "metaphysical." But (*b*) on the first page of his *Dogmatik in die Kultur der Gegenwart* he emphatically declares that "we must not mainly understand by a 'Dogma' a definition upon Church authority. Such a definition is only the last stage in a long process, which has all along been actuated by the thought of a *revealed doctrine*. And that conception is the main element in 'dogma.'" Here Herrmann differs linguistically from most of his comrades.¹ But for the moment what concerns us is that "*dogmatic*" *has become an epithet of blame*. (2) Kaftan runs the two usages side by side. (*b*) He *denounces* that historical type of "dogma" which is due to a mixture of Greek and especially of Platonic philosophy with Christianity; but (*a*) he *demand*s a "new" dogma. (3) Harnack, of course, insists on the historical definition.

If one is to read Ritschlians with advantage, one must keep asking oneself which aspect or which signification of the "dogmatic" they have in mind.

¹ In preparing a short article on "Dogma" for the *Encyc. Brit.* I could not call to mind who was responsible for the assertion I have just quoted from Herrmann; and, though I consulted several well-informed friends, none of them was able to supply the reference.

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NOTE B

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TÜBINGEN SCHOOL AND OF RITSCHL'S RELATION TO IT

1831. Baur on *The Christ Party at Corinth* in Tübingen Year Book.
1831. Baur on *The Pastoral Epistles*.
1841. Schwegler's *Montanism*.
1842. Georgii's review.
1845. Ritschl, while still at Heidelberg, defends Baur (in Zeller's *Theol. Year Book*) against Dietlein on *Primitive Christianity*.
- 1845-6. Ritschl at Tübingen.
1845. Baur's *Paulus*; the first larger work from Baur's own pen, stating Tübingen conclusions. E. T. 1874-6.
1846. Schwegler's *Post-Apostolic Age*; first complete statement of Tübingen results.
1846. Ritschl's *Gospel of Marcion*.
1846. Baur's article on same subject in *Theol. Year Book*.
- 1846-7. Ritschl's first lectures at Bonn—beginning of divergence in criticism.
1847. Ritschl's review of Baur's *Paulus*.
1847. Baur on the *Canonical Gospels*.
1847. Ritschl proposes to defend Cureton's three Syriac epistles of Ignatius. Baur declines for the *Year Book*.
- 1849-50. *Early Catholic Church*, ed. 1; semi-Baurian.
1850. Volkmar in the *Tübingen Year Book* refutes Ritschl, Schwegler and Baur as to Marcion and Luke.
1850. Hilgenfeld's *Critical Investigations into the Gospels of Justin, the Clementine Homilies, and Marcion*; concurring with Volkmar, u.s.
1851. "I have regained Baur's favour by criticizing him! No one has achieved that before."—*Life*, i. p. 168.
1851. Baur's *Marcusevangelium*.
1851. Ritschl's recantation as to Luke and championing of Mark's priority, *Tübingen Year Book*.
1851. Lechler's *Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Age*.
- 1851-7. Comp. *supra*, p. 60.

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- 1851. Ritschl works again on the Curetonian Ignatians, without eventually publishing.
- 1853. Baur's *First Three Centuries*.
- 1853. First personal meeting of Ritschl and Hilgenfeld.
- 1854. Ritschl, *Caius or Hippolytus?* in *Tübingen Year Book*.
- 1854. Visit to Tübingen; friendly intercourse with Baur; constrained with Schwegler.
- 1854. In working for a second edition of *Early Catholic Church*, Ritschl becomes conscious of his wide divergence.
- 1854. Reviews the modified Tübingenism of a book by Hilgenfeld on the Gospels in Zarncke's *Lit. Centralblatt*.
- 1854. Zeller on *Acts*; E. T. 1875.
- 1856. Anonymous review for Zarncke of Schwarz's *Contributions towards a History of Recent Theology*. Final break with Baur.
- Jan. 1857. Death of Schwegler.
- 1857. Second edition of *Early Catholic Church*. "Fundamental antagonism to the Tübingen theory."
- 1858. Ritschl abandons visit to Zeller at Marburg because Baur is Zeller's guest.
- 1859. Baur's volume on *The Tübingen School* speaks of Ritschl's "recantation" and "standard of revolt."
- 1860. Zeller's anonymous article on "the Tübingen Historical School" in v. Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*.
- Dec. 2, 1860. Death of Baur.
- 1861. Ritschl's sharp reply to Zeller in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*.
- 1861. Friendly meeting with K. R. Köstlin, once of the Tübingen School.
- 1867. Interview with Hilgenfeld at Jena, "at any rate not unfriendly."—The rest is Silence.

NOTE C

"JESUS HAS FOR THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS
THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF GOD"

THIS phrase occurs in A. B. Bruce's *Apologetics* (1892), p. 398, as his own *credo*. It has been largely quoted, even within inverted commas, as "Ritschl's." That is not

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literally true; and there are two reasons why one hesitates to accept the phrase as a fair summary of Ritschl's thought. First, it suggests to the English reader that Christ has *for us* and not for others—possibly not for God Himself—the religious value of deity. Secondly, it suggests to the same reader a further qualification. Christ may possess religious deity while lacking some other kind—perhaps metaphysical! Ritschl does not mean to introduce either qualification. One who calls “There is a God” a “value-judgment” has no belief in the competence of metaphysics, and does not detract from the glory either of the Son or of the Father by insisting on their “value” for human needs.

With this formula in mind, the present writer, while reading or re-reading his Ritschlian authorities, has sought for German parallels to Bruce's phrase. He has been a little startled by the success of his search. The nearest parallels of all are among the earliest—in Herrmann's *Metaphysic in Theology* (1876). “This confession, the final element in a Christian's view of life [Weltanschauung] that *Christ possesses for him the value of Godhead*,¹ is no concurrence in a metaphysical proposition but is a religious judgment, since it stands inseparably related to experience [Erleben] of the value of religious blessings [des religiösen Gutes] ².” Twice on p. 77, and a third time on p. 81, we read “Jesus for us is equal to God.” If the Bruce formula is held fairly to represent these statements of Herrmann's, we get the interesting result that the formula is older than Ritschl's adoption of the phrase Value-Judgment.

Schultz's *Gottheit Christi* (1881) tells us (p. 318) that the uniqueness of Christ makes him “for us, God.” Again, (p. 509) for the Church—*i. e.* the believing community—“He is God.” So again, p. 725: “Christ is for us God.”

At p. 339 of the *Wesen*,³ Kaftan tells us that Christ is called in the New Testament not *ó θεός* but predicatively, *θεός*, as “the man in whom God makes the fulness of his eternal *Wesen* dwell, so that *for us*¹ he is the image of the invisible God.”

¹ Present writer's italics.

² p. 65.

³ It is right to state that my reference is from the 2nd edition (1887).

APPENDIX

Ritschl's own most striking statement stands in all editions of *Justification*, vol. iii.¹ "An authority which either excludes all other standards or else subordinates them to itself, which at the same time regulates in exhaustive fashion all human trust in God, has itself the worth² of Godhead." This, of course, dates as early as 1874.

We cannot therefore deny that the Bruce formula fairly represents the language of Ritschl's closest friends, and stands not far removed from his own. (I do not, of course, guarantee the exhaustiveness of any of my lists.) I trust the Philistines will not abuse this information! Too probably they may; but it is well to speak the truth.

The subsequent history of the Bruce formula is hardly less interesting than its Ritschlian pre-history. On one side, of course, it has been denounced; not always so courteously as by Prof. H. R. Mackintosh, who italicizes most of the phrase³ as the normative summary of Ritschl, if elsewhere⁴ of certain Ritschlians, and who asks⁵ whether Christ has "the reality as well as the religious value of God." Another passage⁶ makes Dr. H. R. Mackintosh's personal position clear: "Christology is only a reasoned account of how the Man Jesus has for us the value and reality of God." It is interesting to compare with this an earlier passage,⁷ where Dr. Mackintosh is summarizing the religious teachings of Acts i.-xii. "*In other ways also Christ's person had the religious value of God,*"⁸ while there is a "total absence of the idea of pre-existence." Apparently, then, we may share the πίστις of the apostolic Church without a speculative Christology, but not Dr. Mackintosh's γνώσις.

I believe I am right in saying that Dr. Selbie has put forward the Bruce formula as a rallying-cry for positive Christian unity. It has been employed by a moderator of the Presbyterian Church of England in a Synod sermon or address (1914). The last place where I have observed it is in Prof. Bethune-Baker's open letter to Bishop Gore.

¹ § 45; ed. I, p. 350; ii, p. 376; iii, p. 383; E. T. p. 405.

² One might almost render "the rank."

³ *Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 279.

⁴ p. 423.

⁵ p. 286.

⁶ p. 410.

⁷ p. 42.

⁸ Present writer's italics.

APPENDIX

“Men of the first or the second centuries, who had found in Jesus Christ the revelation of God, *and for whom in their own experience, He had the religious value of God,*¹” would be predisposed to believe, even if wrongly, that He entered on human life abnormally.

The formula may be open to criticism, but it seems to be supplying a felt want. It looks as if the heresy of yesterday was to become a binding test of orthodoxy to-morrow.

NOTE D

THE DEFINITION OF A VALUE-JUDGMENT

WHEN a child says “Fire burns” he probably means, There is a fire there, burning. But when a man says the same thing, he—more sophisticated being that he is—means, If or as often as conflagration takes place, it involves the phenomenon of combustion. Can one really restrict the *value-judgment* to either type? Scientific judgments are all universal (“as often as you have”). Or, in other words, they are hypothetical (“If you have—or had”). Is it not a value-judgment to say, If we have or even *had* religion, it is or would be blessed? The return of my dead Beloved would be unbearable happiness—can we refuse to call that a value-judgment? Is it not (lamentably) the hypothesis of an unreality, of an impossibility? I can conceive the saint’s cry of rapture *It is good for me to draw near to God* shrivelling in the agnostic to the pathetic or peevish note *Belief is a happy thing for those who can manage it*. I can conceive that each might suitably be called a value-judgment. Ritschl would limit the term to the first. Ritschl’s enemies pretend that the gravitation of the term is inevitably towards the second. Neither can be excluded.

Unless, indeed, the *religious* value-judgment exceptionally connotes *fact*? Every religion affirms: There is help! And the union of supreme helpfulness, supreme righteousness, supreme reality, supreme power—it is all triumphantly affirmed when one who has learned of Christ says, *I believe in God*.

¹ Present writer’s italics.

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